Gay and Lesbian Law Students Ass'n at University of Connecticut School of Law v. Board of Trustees, University of Connecticut

Page 484

673 A.2d 484

236 Conn. 453, 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,190,

108 Ed. Law Rep. 724

GAY AND LESBIAN LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION AT the UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT SCHOOL OF LAW v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, et al.

No. 15191.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 24, 1995.

Decided March 26, 1996.

Paul M. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and Jane L. Scarpellino, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants (defendants).

Philip D. Tegeler, with whom were Marc E. Elovitz, pro hac vice, and, on the brief, Martha Stone, Hartford, Ruth E. Harlow, pro hac vice, and Matthew A. Coles, pro hac vice, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether, pursuant to General Statutes § 10a-149a, the United States military is prohibited from using the facilities and career services office of the University of Connecticut School of Law (law school) for recruitment purposes because of its current discrimination against gay men and lesbians. We conclude that it is.

The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, the Gay and Lesbian Law Students Association at the University of Connecticut School of Law, an unincorporated student organization that has as its primary objective the promotion of the needs of gay and lesbian students at the law school, brought an action against the defendants, the board of trustees of the University of Connecticut, the president of the university, Harry J. Hartley, and the dean of the law school, Hugh C. MacGill. The plaintiff alleged that by allowing the Judge Advocate General Corps of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines to recruit at the law school, the defendants had violated General Statutes §§ 46a-81a through 46a-81r (Gay Rights Law) ¹ and General Statutes *487s 10a-149a, ² and had breached their contract with the law school's students, based upon the law school's internal nondiscrimination policy. ³ The plaintiff sought an injunction barring the use of law school facilities and the career services office by any organization, including the military, that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation and a declaratory judgment declaring that the defendants had violated both the Gay Rights Law and § 10a-149a.

Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application for a temporary injunction to prevent an anticipated recruiting visit by the Judge Advocate General Corps to the law school campus. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiff was not aggrieved and that it lacked standing to pursue the action. The trial court denied that motion. The parties then filed a stipulation of facts. ⁴ Following an evidentiary hearing on the temporary injunction at which the stipulation was introduced into evidence, the trial court concluded that, although all employers who used the school's career services office were required to abide by the law school's nondiscrimination policy, which forbids, inter alia, discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual preference, the defendants, nevertheless, knowingly permitted and even assisted branches of the United States military to recruit and interview at the law school despite the military's open policy of discrimination against gay men and lesbians. Because § 10a-149a only requires the defendants to provide the same opportunities to the military that it affords other employers, the trial court concluded that the defendants' conduct violated the Gay Rights Law. Accordingly, the trial court issued a temporary injunction barring the defendants from permitting any organization, including the military, that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation from using on-campus employment recruiting facilities or other employment services of the law school and its office of career services.

Following the issuance of a temporary injunction, the parties agreed that the hearing and record from the temporary injunction could be consolidated with the final hearing and record on a permanent injunction. As such, the only remaining issue for the court to consider prior to issuing a permanent injunction was whether the United States military continued to discriminate against gay men and lesbians. On the basis of its finding that, pursuant to the revised United States Department of Defense policy on gays in the military, the military continued to discriminate against gay men and lesbians, the trial court issued a permanent injunction identical to the earlier temporary injunction.

The defendants appealed this ruling to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). They claim on appeal that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this case in the absence of notice under Practice Book *489s 390(d); ⁵ (2) the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this action; (3) the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the defendants' actions; and (4) § 10a-149a overrides the law school's obligations under the Gay Rights Law. The defendants do not challenge the trial court's finding that the military continues to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

The defendants argue that because the plaintiff failed to comply with § 390(d), ⁶ in that it failed to notify the military of the pending action, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter an injunction. The defendants recognize that, on its face, § 390(d) applies only to a claim for a declaratory judgment and that the trial court did not grant a declaratory judgment. They argue, nevertheless, in reliance on Mannweiler v. LaFlamme, 232 Conn. 27, 35, 653 A.2d 168 (1995), that because both the plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief depended upon the trial court's interpretation of § 10a-149a, the claims were "inexorably intertwined." Accordingly, the plaintiff should have notified the military of this action, and its failure to do so deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff responds that § 390(d) is inapplicable because it never pursued its claim for declaratory relief, and the trial court never considered or ruled on that claim. Rather, the trial court issued an injunction pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-99, ⁷ which statutorily authorizes a trial court to issue an injunction where General Statutes § 46a-81i or General Statutes § 46a-81j has been violated. Finally, the plaintiff contends that the affected branches of the military had actual notice of this case since 1992.

We agree with the plaintiff that § 46a-99 is the controlling provision in this case. Furthermore, we conclude that § 46a-99 does not contain a notice requirement and that the procedural requirement of § 390(d) should not be grafted onto this section. In enacting § 46a-99, the legislature has provided a mechanism to ensure that discrimination is eradicated. Had it intended there to be any particular additional procedural conditions, such as a notice requirement, the legislature could have included them. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 52-45a through 52-72.

Moreover, the defendants' reliance on Mannweiler v. LaFlamme, supra, 232 Conn. 27, 653 A.2d 168, is misplaced. In that case, in concluding that § 390(d) applied, this court explicitly recognized that the trial court had, in fact, considered and decided the declaratory relief claim. "Neither the trial court's memorandum of decision nor the judgment file indicates that the declaratory judgment aspect of this case was not determined by the trial court." Id., at 31, 653 A.2d 168. In the present case, the trial court never mentioned declaratory relief in any of its decisions, and, in its final judgment, the court specifically ordered a permanent injunction as its sole remedy. Consequently, Mannweiler does not dictate that the notice requirements of § 390(d) control in this case. We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff's failure to comply with § 390(d) did not adversely impact the trial court's jurisdiction to issue a permanent injunction.

II

In their second procedural claim, the defendants argue that the trial court's determination that the plaintiff had associational standing to bring this action was improper. We are not persuaded.

"The fundamental aspect of standing ... [is that] it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before [the] court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, [1952] 20 L.Ed.2d 947 [1968]. Hartford Kosher Caterers, Inc. v. Gazda, 165 Conn. 478, 485, 338 A.2d 497 (1973). Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court.... Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate non-justiciable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 192, 332 A.2d 78 (1973). Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320-21, 439 A.2d 349 (1981). The requirements of justiciability and controversy are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. [Maloney v. Pac, supra, at 321, 439 A.2d 349]. As long as there is some direct injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress, the injury that is alleged need not be great. Id.; see Bassett v. Desmond, 140 Conn. 426, 432, 101 A.2d 294 (1953). Where the nexus between the injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated is obvious and direct, a plaintiff has standing to maintain...