Gaytan v. New Mexico

DAVID GAYTAN Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO, A. J. ROMERO,and NEW MEXICO STATE POLICE, Defendants.

No. 19-cv-0778 SMV/KRS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

April 27, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT V

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count V of the Amended Complaint [Doc. 63], filed on December 18, 2020. Plaintiff responded on January 11, 2021.¹ [Doc. 68].² Defendants replied on January 25, 2021. [Doc. 71]. The Court finds that a hearing is not necessary because the Motion can be resolved on the briefs.

The Amended Complaint [Doc. 62] names three Defendants: the State of New Mexico, the New Mexico State Police, and New Mexico State Police Officer A.J. Romero in his official and individual capacities. Count V asserts claims against all Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for trespass ("unwarranted intrusion"), malicious prosecution, and false arrest. Having considered the parties' submissions, the record, the relevant law, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court will grant the Motion in part. The Court finds that Count V fails to state aclaim against the State of New Mexico, the New Mexico State Police, and Officer Romero in his official capacity. As for the claims against Romero in his individual capacity, those based on trespass ("unwarranted intrusion") and malicious prosecution will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. However, the Motion will be denied as to the claim for false arrest against Romero in his individual capacity. Romero has not convinced the Court that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for false arrest, or that he is entitled to qualified immunity based on the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint.

Background: Factual and Legal Allegations in the Amended Complaint

The Amended Complaint alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of this motion: Plaintiff owned a lot in Socorro, New Mexico, where he operated a food cart. [Doc. 62] at 1. State Police officers used Plaintiff's lot for traffic stops, which interfered with his business. Id. Plaintiff went through the appropriate administrative channels to request that State Police no longer pull people over into his lot. Id. Defendant Romero worked for the State Police in Socorro County. Id. On October 12, 2017, Romero surveilled traffic from Plaintiff's lot and conducted a traffic stop on it. Id. After Romero had finished citing the motorist, Plaintiff approached him in a calm manner and asked him to leave the lot and not use it in the future for traffic stops. Id. at 2, 4. Romero became enraged, handcuffed Plaintiff forcibly, put him in the police car, and booked him into custody. Id. at 2. Plaintiff was subsequently released without being charged. Id.

In Counts I-IV of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts state-law claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Id. In Count V, he claims that Romero violated his federal constitutional "right to be free fromunwarranted intrusion and to be free from illegal search and seizure" by parking on his lot to surveil traffic, conducting a traffic stop on his lot, and by arresting him without probable cause. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff also asserts that Romero violated his federal constitutional right "to be free from false arrest" and "illegal seizure" by arresting him without probable cause.³ Id.

Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).⁴ "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679; see also Christy Sports, L.L.C. v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009). The complaint must provide "more than labels and conclusions" or merely "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," because "courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation and citation omitted).

The complaint's sufficiency is a question of law, and, when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, view thoseallegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov't Sols., 923 F.3d 729, 764 (10th Cir. 2019) ("Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, lacks enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.") (quotations and citations omitted); Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[F]or purposes of resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.") (citing Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006)); Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Granting a motion to dismiss is a harsh remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the interests of justice.") (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Moreover, the court's role when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991). When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts "must determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed." Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007). Finally, the moving party "bears the burden of proving the basis for dismissal." Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, Jones on Evidence, § 3:29.10. Shifting burdens; motions to dismiss, ¶ 1 (7th ed.) (updated May 2020).

Discussion

Plaintiff asserts that Officer Romero violated his constitutional rights in three ways: by parking on Plaintiff's lot to surveil traffic, by conducting a traffic stop on Plaintiff's lot, and by arresting Plaintiff without probable cause. [Doc. 62] at 3-4. Defendants contend that Count V must be dismissed for failure to state a claim because the Defendant state entities are not proper parties; because trespass is not a cognizable claim; and to the extent that Count V states a claim for unlawful arrest, Defendant Romero is entitled to qualified immunity. [Doc. 63] at 3. The Court agrees in part.

Section 1983 creates only a right of action. It does not create any substantive rights; substantive rights must come from the Constitution or federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1386 (10th Cir. 1989). To state a claim on which relief can be granted under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege: "(1) a violation of rights protected by the federal Constitution or created by federal statute or regulation, (2) proximately caused (3) by the conduct of a 'person' (4) who acted under color of [state law]." Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 2002). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a § 1983 complaint must assert a legal argument that defendants violated a particular law or constitutional provision, and it must allege sufficient facts to support that legal argument.⁵ See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)) ("'The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit' is 'to isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged.'"). Importantly, § 1983 claims can only be brought against a "person" acting under colorof state law. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). State officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 because a suit against a state official in his official capacity is a suit against the state itself. Id.

A. State-Entity Defendants

Defendants argue that Count V fails to state a claim against the state-entity Defendants. The Court agrees. A cause of action under § 1983 requires the deprivation of a civil right by a "person" acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Will, 491 U.S. at 71 ("[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983."). Thus, Count V against the State of New Mexico will be dismissed with prejudice because the State is not a "person" and therefore not a proper defendant in any § 1983 claim. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

Likewise, the State Police is an arm of the State, and a suit against it is construed as a suit against the State.⁶ See id. at 60 (construing a suit against the "Michigan Department of State Police" as a suit against the State of Michigan). Just as the State of New Mexico is not a proper defendant, neither is the New Mexico State Police. See id. at 71. Count V against the New Mexico State Police will be dismissed with prejudice. See id.

Finally, state officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" and therefore not proper defendants in § 1983 claims.⁷ Id. Therefore, Count V will be dismissed with prejudice as against Defendant Romero in his official capacity. See id.

B. Defendant Romero in His Individual Capacity

When acting in his...