Geddes v. People's Counsel for Balt. Cnty.

WILLIAM GEDDES, ET AL. v. PEOPLE'S COUNSEL FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY, ET AL.

No. 2755

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2015

March 31, 2017

UNREPORTED

Eyler, Deborah S., Nazarian, Salmon, James P., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Salmon, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

This case arises out of a dispute over the permitted uses for a parcel of property in Baltimore County known as 11019 Gateview Road, which is the primary residence of James and Karole Riffin, appellants.

On October 15, 2013, the Riffins filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings for Baltimore County a petition for special hearing to determine: 1) whether various uses on their property were permitted under Baltimore County zoning law; and 2) when is it lawful for a county code enforcement officer to enter upon private land.¹ By agreement, Baltimore County did not participate in that action but the People's Counsel for Baltimore County did participate.² After a public hearing, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued a written opinion and order dated January 7, 2014, finding that the uses proposed by the Riffins were not permitted. The ALJ dismissed the claim pertaining to the issue of whether an inspector had a right to enter upon private land. Mr. Riffin filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

Pursuant to a prior agreement with Baltimore County in which the Riffins agreed not to "appeal or otherwise contest" the ALJ's decision, the Riffins did not appeal, but theirneighbor, Will Geddes, who is an appellant in the instant case, filed an appeal with the Baltimore County Board of Appeals ("the Board").³ Despite the prior agreement with Baltimore County, Mr. Riffin participated in Mr. Geddes's appeal as a self-styled "petitioner," filed a memorandum, and gave testimony at the hearing. Mr. Riffin argued, among other things, that because the Board of Appeals was not an appellate body, he was not participating in an appeal and was therefore not in violation of his agreement with Baltimore County. The Board ultimately determined that Mr. Riffin was precluded from pursuing the appeal.

In addition to Mr. Geddes and Mr. Riffin, the People's Counsel appeared and participated in the hearing before the Board. An Assistant County Attorney for Baltimore County was seated in the courtroom gallery but did not participate in the case before the Board.

In a written order dated November 7, 2014, the Board determined that the proposed uses and storage of equipment on the Riffins' property were unlawful, denied the special hearing request, and dismissed the claim that a code inspector did not have the right to enter upon private property.

After losing before the Board of Appeals, Mr. Geddes and the Riffins filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County a petition for judicial review. A hearing was held onDecember 2, 2015. The circuit court dismissed the petition for judicial review as to Ms. Riffin, determined that Baltimore County's motion to intervene was moot, denied a motion to strike Baltimore County's pleadings, and affirmed the decision of the Board. Thereafter, Mr. Geddes and the Riffins, pro se, filed this timely appeal.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Mr. Geddes and the Riffins present numerous questions⁴ for our consideration, which we have consolidated and rephrased as follows:

I. Did the agreement between Baltimore County and the Riffins preclude the Riffins from participating as parties in the actions before the Board, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and this Court?

II. Was there substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's denial of the petition for special hearing?

III. Is Baltimore County a party to this action?

IV. Did the Board err in determining that it was without jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a Baltimore County Code Inspector's warrantless entry onto private property?

V. Did the Board err in failing to address issues pertaining to de novo hearings?

VI. Did the Board fail to consider whether the Riffins' property was eligible for Agricultural Assessment?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall dismiss the appeals of Mr. and Mrs. Riffin and affirm the judgment of the circuit court in all other respects.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The basic facts of the case are not in dispute. The Riffins' property is about 13 acres and includes the Riffins' residence and significant wooded areas. The property is split zoned RC-6 (Rural Conservation and Residential) and DR-1 (Density Residential). At issue is the legality of several land uses at the Riffins' property, particularly the storage bythe Riffins of various pieces of construction equipment, trucks, buses, automobiles, railroad cars, and railroad track.

In September 2013, Baltimore County issued a code enforcement violation and correction notice to the Riffins alleging illegal use of their property (under both the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations and the Baltimore County Code) resulting from the storage of heavy industrial equipment. Before issuing the citation, the inspector visited the property twice and took photographs of items stored there. The Riffins maintained, among other things, that most of their uses of the property were permitted as accessory to farm use, that the inoperable buses were used as residential sheds, and that the railroad cars and tracks were recreational.

In early October 2013, Baltimore County and the Riffins entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement pursuant to which the Riffins agreed to file a petition for special hearing to obtain a determination of whether their uses of the property were in compliance with the zoning regulations. Baltimore County agreed to suspend its code enforcement proceeding and refrain from imposing any fines or other penalties until after the Office of Administrative Hearings ("OAH") issued a decision on the petition for special hearing. In addition, the County agreed to refrain from having an Assistant County Attorney appear at the proceedings on the petition for special hearing and the Riffins agreed that if the ALJ denied any portion of their petition and determined that any of the activities on the property violated the County's zoning regulations, or any other state or local law, they would "immediately cease any unlawful activities and ... remove, without exception, any prohibited items" from the property within six months of the date of the ALJ's order.The Riffins specifically agreed that the order of the ALJ would be "a final Order and they will forego any right to appeal or otherwise contest the Order."

The Riffins filed a petition for special hearing seeking to determine whether their proposed principal and accessory uses, which were listed in the petition, were lawful and whether, and under what circumstances, a Baltimore County code inspector and enforcement officer could enter upon their private property. Mr. Riffin and his neighbor, Mr. Geddes, attended the public hearing on the petition. It is unclear if Mrs. Riffin attended the hearing, but she did not testify.

Mr. Riffin testified that on July 26 and September 16, 2013, Baltimore County Code Enforcement Officer Phillip Mills entered onto his property and took photographs, without his permission, and in violation of no trespassing signs that were posted on the property. Mr. Riffin further testified that he once owned a railroad and hoped to acquire another one. He kept on his property railroad equipment, tracks, a caboose, and other items, including a crane, two highboy trailers, one low trailer, a bobcat, two extendable semi-trailers, a man lift, an air compressor, and water storage tanks. Mr. Riffin kept the caboose for recreational purposes and used some of the other items to maintain trees that he claimed to be cultivating for future sale as ship masts. Mr. Riffin also testified that "[e]verything that I have is used in connection with my farming activities, one way or another[.]"

Mr. Geddes, a neighbor who owns property abutting the Riffins' property, had been on the Riffins' property and seen some of the items kept there. He testified that he did not have any objection to the items being kept on the Riffins' property.

The ALJ concluded that the principal use of the property was for residential dwelling purposes, that "it is plausible (though not free from doubt) that the [Riffins] utilize the property for residential agricultural purposes, as an accessory use," and that such a use was permitted. The ALJ further concluded that the railroad cars, tracks, ties, and related equipment could not lawfully be kept on property zoned DR-1 and RC-5.⁵ Nor could the Riffins keep untagged motor vehicles or commercial vehicles stored outside on the property. With respect to certain other equipment, the ALJ said:

Mr. Riffin also testified that he has a large crane, man lift, 70' tractor trailer and trucks. He indicated that these items are "very handy" and that he uses them "a lot" to pull pipes out of wells, assist in harvesting trees or to help his neighbors. Again, such heavy equipment and materials are not customarily used for residential or even agricultural purposes. No evidence was presented that any of the vehicles or equipment were registered as "farm vehicles" with the State of Maryland. These items, as alleged by Baltimore County, are items that must be stored in a "contractor's equipment storage yard," and not on residential property. That term is defined as follows in the [Baltimore County Zoning Regulations ("BCZR")]:

"The use of any space, whether inside or outside a building, for the storage or keeping of contractor's equipment or machinery, including building materials storage, construction equipment storage or landscaping equipment and associated materials."

I find that

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