Gedeon v. City of Springfield

MICHAEL J. GEDEON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-30062-KAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

September 9, 2016

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

(Dkt. Nos. 10, 23 & 26)

ROBERTSON, U.S.M.J.

On March 6, 2008, the defendant City of Springfield ("Springfield" or "Defendant") filed a verified code enforcement petition in the Hampden Division of the Housing Court Department of the Massachusetts Trial Court ("Housing Court") naming Andrea M. Gedeon as the respondent and seeking to remediate conditions at 1502 Bay Street in Springfield. Over the next six to seven years, Defendant sought to have Ms. Gedeon and Plaintiff Michael Gedeon (hereinafter, "Plaintiff") remedy what Defendant ultimately proved to the Housing Court's satisfaction was an illegal junkyard and fire hazard on the property. Springfield's efforts spanned multiple hearings in the Housing Court and ended with a court-authorized sale of the property by a receiver to recover its lien for expenses incurred in cleaning up the property.

Plaintiff, who is self-represented,¹ filed this suit against Springfield on or around April 2, 2015, bringing claims of trespass (Count I); conversion of property (Count II); and, reading thecomplaint generously, selective or retaliatory code enforcement in violation of his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III) (Dkt. No. 1). On October 14, 2015, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted (Dkt. No. 10). On December 21, 2015, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint which contained the same three claims as his initial complaint (Dkt. No. 23-2). Springfield opposed this motion but, in any event, renewed its motion to dismiss as to the proposed amended complaint (Dkt. No. 26). The court having scheduled a hearing on Springfield's motion to dismiss at which Plaintiff failed to appear (Dkt. No. 36), the pending motions are ripe for decision. The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 30). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. The court hereby grants Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, Springfield's motion to dismiss will be granted as to Count III, which contains the only claims in the amended complaint identifiable as having a basis in federal law. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims in Counts I and II of the amended complaint, which will be dismissed without prejudice.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

On or about March 6, 2008, Springfield filed a verified code enforcement action in the Housing Court naming as defendant Andrea M. Gedeon ("Ms. Gedeon"), record owner of 1502 Bay Street (Dkt. No. 11-4 at 1-3). The petition, to which the Housing Court assigned docket number 08-CV-335, sought a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction directing Ms. Gedeon to address a number of serious state sanitary code violations on the property (id.).

After a February 13, 2009 hearing, at which a representative of Ms. Gedeon appeared, the court ordered Ms. Gedeon to provide Springfield access to the property for the purpose of re-inspection (id. at 5). Following a March 13, 2009 hearing, Plaintiff was added as a defendant in the Housing Court action and he and Ms. Gedeon were ordered to register, remove, or garage all unregistered motor vehicles on the property and to remove all auto parts and tires and non-construction material, including bulk items, trash and/or debris, from the property by June 30, 2009 (id. at 6-7).

At a July 10, 2009 hearing, Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Springfield by which he agreed to comply with the March 13, 2009 order on or before July 27, 2009 (id. at 18). On July 28, 2009, Defendant conducted an inspection of the property to verify that Plaintiff had removed items as mandated by the March 13, 2009 order. Defendant found that violations remained at the property (id.). Following a July 31, 2009 hearing, Plaintiff was granted an extension to August 31, 2009 to comply with the March 13, 2009 order (id.). Defendant re-inspected the property on August 31, 2009 and observed several unregistered motor vehicles and debris throughout the property (id.). Plaintiff denied Defendant access to the rear of the property (id.). On or about September 4, 2009, Plaintiff entered into another court agreement to removeall cars from the front of the dwelling by October 1, 2009 and to allow Defendant access to the rear of the property (id.). Plaintiff further represented that no one was living on the property and that the dwelling would remain vacant. When Defendant inspected the premises pursuant to the September 4^th court agreement, it found that all violations remained (id.).

On or about October 5, 2009, Defendant entered into another agreement with Plaintiff, approved by the Housing Court, in which Plaintiff agreed to have all wrecked, inoperable and/or unregistered motor vehicles removed from the property by October 30, 2009 (id. at 18-19). Defendant inspected the premises on November 4, 2009 and found that all violations remained (id. at 19). Defendant entered into two more agreements with Plaintiff, dated November 6 and November 23, 2009, by which Plaintiff agreed to have all wrecked, inoperable and/or unregistered motor vehicles removed from the property by dates certain (id.). Plaintiff failed to comply with these agreements, as verified by inspections that took place at the property on November 18 and December 9, 2009 (id.). After a December 11, 2009 hearing, at which Plaintiff was present, Plaintiff was ordered to allow Defendant access to the premises on January 20, 2010 for the purpose of inspecting and removing all unregistered vehicles (id. at 8). Plaintiff's January 13, 2010 motion for reconsideration was denied by the Housing Court (id. at 19). At a June 18, 2010 status hearing, at which Plaintiff represented that he planned to build a garage on the property and had made "significant progress" in registering multiple motor vehicles on the property (id.), Plaintiff agreed that Springfield could enter the property on June 25, 2010 for an inspection (id.). Defendant inspected the property on that date and found that all violations remained (id.).

Following an August 18, 2010 hearing, the Housing Court ordered Plaintiff to remove all unregistered and inoperable vehicles, as well as all auto parts, including tires, car doors, engines,and axels, on or before September 1, 2010 (id. at 10). The Court further ordered Plaintiff, after September 1, 2010 and upon 48 hours' notice, to give Springfield access to the property to remove the aforementioned items (id.). Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the court order, which appeal was dismissed on Springfield's motion on November 21, 2011 (id. at 20).

On or around February 14, 2012, without prior notice to Plaintiff, an inspector employed by Defendant entered the premises at 1502 Bay Street and took photographs of conditions on the property (Dkt. No. 23-1 at 1, ¶ 1). At a February 27, 2012 evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion for an injunctive order, at which Plaintiff appeared, Plaintiff moved orally to strike photographs taken at 1502 Bay Street on February 14, 2012 "from within the property lines" (Dkt. No. 11-4 at 13, ¶ 2). Plaintiff's motion to strike was allowed without opposition by Springfield, and the photographs to which Plaintiff objected were not considered as a basis for the Housing Court's order, in which it found that Defendant had sustained its burden of proof that the property at 1502 Bay Street constituted a junkyard in violation of Springfield ordinances and rejected Plaintiff's defense to the action (id. at 13, ¶¶ 2-3). Accordingly, the Court ruled that Springfield had six months to enter the premises and remove the trash, debris, unregistered vehicles, automobile parts, building materials, and overgrowth (id. at 13). Defendant was required to provide Plaintiff with three business days' notice of its entry onto the premises (id.). Once proper notice had been issued, Defendant had thirty days to complete its cleaning activity. The Housing Court authorized Springfield to establish a lien on the premises for the reasonable costs incurred in cleaning the property (id. at 14).

On or around March 15, 2012, pursuant to the Housing Court's February 27, 2012 order, Springfield served its notice of entrance on Plaintiff, who responded by filing a March 29, 2012 motion for an emergency hearing. After the hearing, at which Plaintiff was present, hisemergency motion was denied (id. at 20). On or around April 9, 2012, Springfield served Plaintiff with another notice of entrance, informing Plaintiff that Springfield would be on the property from April 23 to April 27, 2012, pursuant to the Housing Court's February 27, 2012 order, to clean the property (id.). On Springfield's entry onto the property, it discovered six illegal 275-gallon oil tanks containing heating oil, along with a variety of combustible materials (id. at 21). Based on this information, the Housing Court issued a search warrant for the premises at 1502 Bay Street (id.). The Housing Court denied Plaintiff's ensuing emergency motion, and, on May 3, 2012, after another hearing, determined that the oil tanks were illegally installed and authorized Defendant to enter the premises with a licensed contractor to remove the tanks and oil (id. at 15-16, 21).

Following a June 27, 2012 hearing on Defendant's motion for the appointment of a receiver, the Housing Court found that Plaintiff had failed to manage...