Gerrish v. Hammick

198 Conn.App. 816

234 A.3d 1095

Michael GERRISH

v.Paul HAMMICK et al.

AC 41759

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 13, 2020

Officially released July 7, 2020

Justin Sargis, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Kristan M. Maccini, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant Matthew Willauer).

DiPentima, C. J., and Prescott and Bear, Js.

PRESCOTT, J.

This is a tort action brought by the plaintiff, Michael Gerrish, against the defendant Matthew Willauer seeking to recover damages for injuries that he claims to have sustained as a result of an allegedly defamatory statement made by the defendant to the plaintiff's former employer, Quinnipiac University (Quinnipiac).¹ The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court, which initially had denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, improperly granted (1) the defendant's motion to reargue and (2) upon reconsideration, the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the defamation and tortious interference counts of his complaint. We disagree with both claims and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record before the court, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff worked as a police officer for the Bloomfield Police Department (department) from February, 1993 until June 1, 2012, when he retired with the rank

of sergeant.² Prior to retiring from the department, a department lieutenant accused the plaintiff of insubordination and neglect of duty and requested that he be investigated. After reviewing the request for an investigation, Paul Hammick, as chief of the department, ordered the defendant, who was a lieutenant and commander of the professional standards division of the department, to conduct an internal affairs investigation of the accusations made against the plaintiff. Before the investigation could be completed and before a decision could be made on whether to discipline the plaintiff, the plaintiff announced that he was retiring from the department.

Shortly after retiring from the department, the plaintiff began working for Quinnipiac as a public safety officer in October, 2012. In 2014, Quinnipiac decided that it would arm certain public safety officers, including former police officers like the plaintiff. To become an armed officer, officers needed to satisfy certain criteria, including "retir[ing] in good standing from their prior department and provid[ing] a letter of good standing" to Quinnipiac.

In determining whether the plaintiff was qualified to become an armed officer, Quinnipiac sought information from the department, including whether the plaintiff had retired from the department in good standing. Department policy defines "good standing"³ and gives the chief of the department the sole discretion to determine whether a department officer retired in good

standing.⁴ Quinnipiac investigator Karoline Keith conducted a background investigation of the plaintiff, which included investigating whether the department would issue the plaintiff a letter of good standing. When Keith asked the defendant whether the plaintiff would ever be able to obtain a letter of good standing from the department, the defendant responded, "no" (defendant's statement to Keith).⁵ Indeed, Hammick had determined, at some point after the plaintiff announced that he was retiring from the department, that the plaintiff had not left the department in good standing and thus would not be able to receive a letter of good standing. Because the defendant could not receive a letter of good standing from the department, as communicated to Keith by the defendant, Quinnipiac terminated his employment on August 19, 2014.

The plaintiff commenced this action on August 16, 2016. The complaint alleged that the defendant was

liable for, among other things, defamation and tortious interference. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The defendant denied the allegations in his answer and set forth special defenses in which he stated, among other things, that the plaintiff had failed to state claims for which relief could be granted with respect to both counts.

On October 2, 2017, the defendant moved for summary judgment on all counts of the plaintiff's complaint.⁶ With respect to the defamation count, the defendant, in his motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law in support thereof, stated that the plaintiff's defamation claim failed as a matter of law because the defendant's statement to Keith—that the plaintiff could not obtain a letter of good standing from the department—was substantially true. Regarding the tortious interference count, the defendant stated that this claim must fail "as a matter of law, because there exists no genuine issue of material fact that he did not provide any false information or, otherwise, improperly disclose information to Quinnipiac representatives concerning the plaintiff." In essence, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff's tortious interference claim must fail as a matter of law because there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that the defendant committed defamation, which was the tort underlying the tortious interference claim.

On March 12, 2018, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the defamation and tortious interference counts. In its memorandum of decision, the court set forth its reasoning for denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment on these counts. Regarding the defamation count, the court determined that whether the defendant's statement to Keith was true was a question of fact for the

jury "because it is unclear whether the plaintiff would ever receive a letter of good standing." With respect to the tortious interference count, the court concluded that "there [was] a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the defendant's] conduct was tortious." Specifically, the court stated that, "[b]ased on [the] evidence, a trier of fact could conclude [that the defendant] acted tortiously in either of two ways. First, he could have misrepresented whether the plaintiff would ever get a letter of good standing as he may have known that only Hammick, [as the chief of the department], could make that determination. Alternatively, he could have intentionally interfered in the plaintiff's employment without justification because, upon learning about Keith's investigation, he sought to make the plaintiff suffer an adverse employment action by ensuring [that] Quinnipiac would never obtain a letter of good standing from the [department]. Such conduct would qualify as malicious and, thus, a tortious act. Whether such conduct is malicious is for the trier of fact to decide." (Footnote omitted.) The court, therefore, denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the defamation and tortious interference counts.

In response to the court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on these counts, the defendant, on April 2, 2018, moved for the court to reconsider this decision. First, the defendant argued that the court incorrectly had concluded that the plaintiff's defamation claim did not fail as a matter of law. In support of this argument, the defendant asserted that the court had arrived at its incorrect conclusion because it had determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the truthfulness of the defendant's statement to Keith that the plaintiff could not obtain a letter of good standing, even though "the uncontroverted evidence [before the court was] that the plaintiff was not provided with a letter of good standing and retirement badge when he left the ... [d]epartment in May of

2012; nor in June of 2014, when he sought [a letter of good standing] for a position at Quinnipiac ... nor [was he provided with a letter of good standing] at any subsequent time. Thus, [the defendant's] response of ‘[n]o’ to [Keith] in response to her question to the effect of whether the plaintiff would be able to get a letter of good standing was substantially true." (Footnote omitted.) Thus, the defendant asserted that, because the defendant's statement to Keith was substantially true based on the uncontested evidence before the trial court, the plaintiff's defamation claim failed as a matter of law.

In his motion to reargue, the defendant also argued that the court improperly denied his motion for summary judgment on the tortious interference count. The defendant asserted that, in doing so, "the court ... misapprehend[ed] or overlook[ed]" the underlying tort upon which his tortious interference claim was based. The defendant pointed to the plaintiff's complaint, which states that "[t]he plaintiff's claim for tortious interference ... is based upon [the] plaintiff's allegation that [the defendant] ‘falsely communicated to Quinnipiac ... that [the] plaintiff was not entitled to retirement identification and falsely stated that he was found to have committed misconduct at the time of his retirement.’ " Thus, according to the defendant, "the [plaintiff's tortious interference] claim [was] based upon the underlying tort of defamation." In denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment on this count, however, the court "conclude[d] that a trier of fact could find that [the defendant] is liable either for the underlying tort of fraudulent misrepresentation or intentional interference," even though "[n]either tort is [pleaded] in the plaintiff's [c]omplaint nor can either be inferred from the allegations set forth."

In response to the defendant's motion to reargue, the court ordered the plaintiff to file a response to the

defendant's motion by April 27, 2018, which the plaintiff did. On May 1, 2018, the court granted the defendant's motion to reargue its ruling on the motion for summary judgment because the defendant "raise[d] controlling principles of law and possible...