Gerrish v. Hammick

Michael GERRISH v. Paul HAMMICK, et al.

No. CV166070583S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford

May 31, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION UPON REARGUMENT/RECONSIDERATION ^[1] MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 133, # 135) MOTIONS TO STRIKE (# 143, # 169)

PECK JTR

In a five-count complaint, filed on August 17, 2016, against the defendants Paul Hammick, Matthew Willauer and the Town of Bloomfield (the town), the plaintiff, Michael Gerrish alleges tortious interference (count one); breach of implied contract (count two); defamation (count three); negligent infliction of emotional distress (count four); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (count five). The complaint sets forth the following factual allegations: The plaintiff retired from his position as police sergeant for the town of Bloomfield Police Department on June 1, 2012. Upon retirement, all police officers receive a retirement badge and identification card. On October 1, 2012, Quinnipiac University (Quinnipiac) hired the plaintiff as a public safety officer. In August 2014, Quinnipiac decided to arm some of its public safety officers, including former police officers. In furtherance of this initiative, Quinnipiac sought information from the Bloomfield Police Department about the plaintiff. On August 19, 2014, Hammick, Chief of Police of the Bloomfield Police Department, and Willauer, Lieutenant and Commander of the Professional Standards Division of the Bloomfield Police Department, communicated to the plaintiff’s employers at Quinnipiac that the plaintiff was not entitled to a retirement identification card and badge because he was found to have committed misconduct at the time of his retirement. The statements made by Hammick and Willauer were false and defamatory and were made with malice or in reckless disregard of the truth. Upon receipt of this information, Quinnipiac terminated the plaintiff’s employment on August 14, 2014. In their answer to plaintiff’s complaint, the defendants denied the plaintiff’s allegations and asserted several special defenses including that counts one, two, three, and four fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; counts two and three are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and count four is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity.

On October 2, 2017, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, memorandum of law, and fifteen exhibits addressed to all counts of the plaintiff’s complaint. On October 3, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to counts one, two, and three of his complaint accompanied by a memorandum of law and seven exhibits, including the plaintiff’s affidavit. Each side filed opposing memoranda including exhibits to the other side’s motion for summary judgment. In addition, the defendants moved to strike the plaintiff’s exhibits 4, 6, and 13, as well as portions of the plaintiff’s affidavit submitted in support of his own motion for summary judgment. All of the foregoing motions have been fully briefed and were heard at the short calendar held on November 13, 2017.

On March 12, 2018, the court issued its memorandum of decision, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to counts two, four, and five for all of the defendants. The court also granted the motion as to count one, tortious interference, for Hammick and the town. The court, however, denied the motion for count one for Willauer and for count three, defamation, for all of the defendants.^[2] The court also denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. On April 2, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to reargue pursuant to Practice Book § § 11-11 and 11-12, arguing the court misconstrued facts and law in partially denying the motion for summary judgment. On April 27, 2018, the plaintiff filed a reply, arguing the defendants’ motion was untimely and the court’s decision was correct. On May 1, 2018, the court granted the defendants’ motion for reargument and heard the matter on May 8, 2018. Upon reargument, the court allowed the plaintiff to file a supplemental brief, which he did on May 14, 2018, accompanied by exhibits. The defendants filed a reply on May 16, 2018, accompanied by exhibits.^[3] Upon reargument and reconsideration, the court grants the defendants’ requested relief and grants the motion for summary judgment as to the remaining counts of the plaintiff’s complaint. For the benefit of the parties and clarity of the record, the court hereby vacates its memorandum of decision issued on March 12, 2018 (# 171), and issues the following revised memorandum of decision.^[4]

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants’ Motion to Strike

The defendants move to strike paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 21, 27, 28, 29, and 32 of the plaintiff’s affidavit (Exhibit 3), in support of his motion for summary judgment on the grounds that it is does not comply with the requirements of Practice Book § 17-46 in that it is not based on personal knowledge, contradicts the plaintiff’s previous deposition testimony or is conclusory.^[5] The defendants further move to strike paragraphs 4, 6, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, and 41 of the plaintiff’s affidavit (Exhibit 4), in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on those same grounds. Additionally, the defendants move to strike paragraphs 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, and 22 of the affidavit of Sean Cecchini, a former police officer for the Bloomfield Police Department (Exhibit 6), in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that it is irrelevant, not based on personal knowledge, conclusory, and contains hearsay.^[6] Finally, the defendants move to strike the text messages between Hammick and Willauer (Exhibit 13) in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that those messages are inadmissible under the Connecticut Code of Evidence.^[7] The plaintiff only opposes the first motion to strike.

"A motion to strike is the proper method to attack a counteraffidavit that does not comply with the rules." 2830 Whitney Avenue Corp. v. Heritage Canal Development Associates, Inc., 33 Conn.App. 563, 569 n.3, 636 A.2d 1377 (1994). "[I]f an affidavit contains inadmissible evidence it will be disregarded." Id., 569. "[O]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nash v. Stevens, 144 Conn.App. 1, 15, 71 A.3d 635, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 915, 76 A.3d 628 (2013). "A party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 12 Havemeyer Place Co., LLC v. Gordon, 93 Conn.App. 140, 158, 888 A.2d 141 (2006). "Moreover, mere conclusions are insufficient as evidence which would be inadmissible upon the trial, such as hearsay." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In the present case, the plaintiff’s exhibit 3 contains legal conclusions, statements made without personal knowledge, and statements that conflict with the plaintiff’s deposition. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike is granted as to paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 21, 27, 28, 29, and 32 of the plaintiff’s exhibit 3.^[8] The plaintiff’s exhibit 4 further contains legal conclusions, statements made without personal knowledge, and hearsay. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike is granted as to paragraphs 4, 6, 10, 17, 28, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, and 41 of the plaintiff’s exhibit 4.^[9] The plaintiff’s exhibit 6 also contains statements made without personal knowledge, legal conclusions, and hearsay. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike is granted as to paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, and 22 of the plaintiff’s exhibit 6.^[10] The plaintiff’s exhibit 13 contains text messages between Hammick and Willauer regarding a potential settlement offer with the plaintiff. Because those messages focus solely on the settlement offer and do not reveal any bias, prejudice, or admission by the defendants, the evidence is barred by § 4-8 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiff’s exhibit 13 is also granted.

II. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law. In opposition, the plaintiff argues that there are genuine issues of material fact that prevent the court from granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozelko v. Papastavros, 323 Conn. 275, 282, 147 A.3d 1023 (2016). "[O]nly evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nash v. Stevens, supra, 144 Conn.App. 15.

"[A]s a general matter, summary judgment is considered inappropriate when an individual’s intent and state of mind are...