Gervais v. Miederhoff

ALAN F. GERVAIS, a single man, Appellant, v. BRAD L. MIEDERHOFF, a single man, and WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Respondents.

No. 47852-8-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

February 14, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Bjorgen, C.J.

Alan Gervais appeals the adverse portions of the judgment in his action to declare an easement for ingress and egress across a neighboring property owned by Brad Miederhoff, as well as the trial court's denial of his motion for reconsideration. He argues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to make necessary findings of fact, (2) concluding that Miederhoff did not have inquiry notice of an unrecorded easement, (3) concluding that Gervais had impliedly reserved no easement by prior use when he created the neighboring lot by short plat and (4) denying Gervais' motion for reconsideration. We hold that (1) the trial court made findings of fact sufficient to support its conclusions of law, (2) the trial court's conclusion of law that Miederhoff did not have inquiry notice was legally sound, (3) the trial court's conclusion of law that Gervais did not reserve an easement by prior use was also legally sound, and (4) the trial court did not err in denying the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration.

FACTS

Gervais owned a tract of land in Clark County, which he divided into four lots through a short plat in 1992. The short plat document describes an express easement for access to lots 1 and 2, but no similar easement for lots 3 and 4. However, the short plat shows that lots 3 and 4 have a shared corner. Access to lot 4 was through a driveway road that passed through lot 3, but the short plat did not describe this arrangement.

Gervais quickly sold lots 1 and 2 but maintained ownership of lots 3 and 4. In 1996, Gervais deeded lot 3 to his daughter. In 2004, Gervais' daughter sold the property to Grant Rosenlund. That same year, Gervais and Rosenlund entered into a written easement for use of the driveway across lot 3 for ingress to and egress from lot 4. In 2009, Rosenlund sold lot 3 to Miederhoff However, the 2004 written easement was not recorded until 2010. During this time, the driveway through lot 3 onto lot 4 was at most infrequently used by Gervais mainly for maintenance work on lot 4.

As part of the sale to Miederhoff, Rosenlund provided a seller's disclosure form, which stated "yes" in response to the question, "Is there a private road or easement agreement for access to the property?" Ex. 43 (emphasis added). He stated "no" on the same form in response to other questions asking if there were any easements on the property or joint maintenance agreements. Ex. 43. During the sale, Miederhoff also saw a copy of the short plat showing the shared boundary and lack of express easement.

Gervais brought this action seeking a ruling that he had an easement permitting access to lot 4 through lot 3 based on the express easement or an easement implied by prior use. Following trial, the trial court delivered an oral ruling in favor of Miederhoff on April 10, 2015. The court entered its judgment on June 26, and Gervais filed a motion to reconsider the same day. The trial court filed its written findings of fact and conclusions of law on June 29.

In its written findings and conclusions, the trial court found that the express easement did not provide Miederhoff with record notice because it was not recorded at the time of the sale and, as such, Miederhoff was a good faith purchaser without notice of the easement. The trial court also concluded that there was no inquiry notice from Gervais' occasional maintenance, no implied easement from prior use, no prescriptive easement, and no easement by necessity. However the trial court did conclude that an easement existed for the use of utility lines across lot 3.

Gervais' motion for reconsideration was based in part on an estimate of the cost of constructing a new access roadway for lot 4 that did not cross lot 3. Gervais had requested this estimate from AKS Engineering after trial. AKS calculated the cost of construction to be at least $1, 050, 000, much greater than the approximately $30, 000 estimate presented at trial. Gervais provided no reason why the greater estimate could not have been obtained before the start of the trial. Gervais also challenged the trial court's adverse conclusions of law on legal grounds. The trial court denied Gervais' motion for reconsideration.

Gervais appeals both the judgment and the denial of his motion for reconsideration, challenging several conclusions of law.

ANALYSIS

Gervais assigns error to the trial court's (1) judgment specifically challenging conclusions 1, 2, and 5, and (2) denial of his motion for reconsideration. The challenged conclusions state:

1. The Short Plat, Rosenlund/Miederhoff Seller's Disclosure Statement and Rosenlund/Gervais Driveway Easement did not provide record notice of Gervais' use of the driveway on Lot 3 to access Lot 4 prior to Miederhoff s purchase of Lot 3 in order to create an express easement.

2. Gervais' use of the driveway on Lot 3 to access Lot 4 to do occasional maintenance prior to Miederhoff s purchase did not provide constructive or inquiry notice to Miederhoff to create an implied easement.

5. Gervais established that creation of a driveway on Lot 4 from Spurrel Road may be more expensive than use of the existing driveway on Lot 3, but it is feasible. Therefore Gervais' [sic] did not establish an easement by necessity.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 41-44. We hold that the trial court did not err.

I. Judgment

In reviewing a trial court's judgment, we determine whether substantial evidence in the record supports the findings of fact and whether those findings support the conclusions of law. City of Tacoma v. State, 117 Wn.2d 348, 361, 816 P.2d 7 (1991). Substantial evidence is defined "as a quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person that the premise is true." Stieneke v. Russi, 145 Wn.App. 544, 566, 190 P.3d 60, 71 (2008). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

A. Failure to Make Necessary Findings of Fact

Gervais contends that the trial court's conclusion of law that no easement existed was not adequately supported because the court did not make findings of fact concerning (1) the location, configuration, and visibility of the road, (2) Miederhoff s receipt and review of the preliminary commitment for title insurance and associated documents, and (3) the seller's disclosure form. Gervais argues that these findings are critical to determining whether he has an easement over Miederhoff s lot. We disagree and hold that the trial court made all findings of fact necessary to support its conclusions of law.

Findings of fact need not be made concerning every contention made by parties to a case; however, findings must be made as to all material issues. Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co., 91 Wn.2d 704, 707, 592 P.2d 631 (1979). The trial court must make findings sufficient to inform us "what questions the trial court decided and the manner in which it did so." Tacoma v. Fiberchem, Inc., 44 Wn.App. 538, 541, 722 P.2d 1357 (1986). On appeal, we may look to oral findings of fact to interpret the written findings of fact if necessary. State v. Hescock, 98 Wn.App. 600, 606, 989 P.2d 1251 (1999).

1. Location, Configuration, and Visibility of the Roadway

Gervais argues that the trial court erred in not making findings regarding the location, configuration, and visibility of the roadway. However, no such facts were necessary to support the trial court's conclusions of law. The only conclusions that refer to the driveway at all refer to Gervais' use of it. The particular features of the driveway are immaterial to the trial court's conclusions, as discussed in greater detail below. Moreover, the existence and rough configuration of the roadway are evident in the trial court's finding of fact 6, mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law 10, and the court's oral ruling.^[1] We hold that the trial court did not err by making no express findings as to the location, configuration, or visibility of the roadway.

2. Preliminary Commitment for Title Insurance

Gervais contends that the trial court erred in not making a finding of fact about Miederhoff s receipt of the preliminary commitment for title insurance, which disclosed the existence and contained a copy of the short plat. We disagree that such a finding was necessary to support the trial court's conclusion of law.

The trial court concluded only that the short plat did not provide record notice of Gervais' use of the driveway for the purpose of creating an express easement. Findings of fact 1 through 4 clearly describe the short plat, providing adequate support for that conclusion of law.^[2] Finding 4, in fact, expressly found that the short plat did not contain an easement over lot 3 for the benefit of lot 4. Because the short plat did not provide evidence of the unrecorded easement, it is immaterial whether Miederhoff in fact received any disclosure that the short plat existed through the preliminary commitment for title insurance. We hold that the trial court did not err in failing to make a finding about Miederhoff s receipt of the preliminary commitment.

3. Seller's Disclosure Form

Gervais contends that the trial court erred in not making sufficient findings of fact concerning the seller's disclosure statement because the court made no specific findings about the Rosenlunds' responses to the questions on the form. We disagree that any such finding was necessary to support the trial court's conclusions.

As with the short plat, the trial court concluded only that the disclosure form did not provide record notice of Gervais' ...