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JESSICA GESSELE, ASHLEY ORTIZ, NICOLE GESSELE, TRICIA TETRAULT, and CHRISTINA MAULDIN, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
JACK IN THE BOX, INC., a corporation of Delaware, Defendant.
No. 3:14-CV-01092-HZ
United States District Court, D. Oregon
April 14, 2024
Jon M. Egan, Jim W. Vogele, Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Douglas S. Parker, Heather St. Clair, Ian Maher, LANE POWELL PC, David Symes, SYMES LAW OFFICE LLC, Attorneys for Defendant
OPINION & ORDER
MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, ECF 439; Plaintiffs' Bill of Costs, ECF 442; Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees, ECF 444; and Defendant's Bill of Costs, ECF 445.
For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Bills of Costs; awards Plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount of $1,697,237.20; awards Plaintiffs costs in the amount of $30,934.32 and class notice charges in the amount of $56,604.07; denies Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees; grants in part Defendant's Bill of Costs; and awards Defendant costs in the amount of $16,194.19.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Jack in the Box, Inc., owned and operated several restaurants in Oregon until September 30, 2011, by which time it had sold all of its Oregon restaurants to franchise operators.
Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant in its Oregon restaurants at various times before March 29, 2010. Plaintiffs received their final paychecks from Defendant between July 11, 2008, and March 30, 2010.
On August 13, 2010, Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, and Tricia Tetrault filed a putative class-action Complaint in this Court against Defendant
(Gessele I, Case No. 3:10-CV-00960-ST) for violations of the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and Oregon wage-and-hour laws.
On May 16, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint in which they added Christina Mauldin as a named Plaintiff.
On March 20, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint in which they alleged Defendant (1) failed to pay minimum wages in violation of the FLSA and Or. Rev. Stat. § 653.025, (2) failed to pay overtime wages in violation of the FLSA and Or. Rev. Stat. § 653.261, (3) failed to pay all wages due following termination of Plaintiffs' employment in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.140, (4) deducted unauthorized amounts from Plaintiffs' paychecks in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.610, and (5) failed to pay all wages when due as required by Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.120.
On August 13, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify Oregon Rule 23(b)(3) Classes and Alternative Motions to Either Certify Hybrid FLSA Classes or Certify FLSA 216(b) Collectives.
On December 13, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint. On January 7, 2013, Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart denied the Motion on the grounds of undue delay and prejudice.
On January 28, 2013, Magistrate Judge Stewart issued Findings and Recommendation in which she recommended conditional certification of the proposed FLSA Workers Benefit Fund (“WBF”) and Shoe Collectives and Subcollectives under § 216(b) and certification of the proposed Rule 23(b)(3) Oregon WBF and Shoe Classes and Subclasses. Magistrate Judge Stewart recommended denying certification of the proposed FLSA Break Collective and the Rule
23(b)(3) Break Classes and Subclasses.
On April 1, 2013, District Judge Ancer L. Haggerty entered an Order adopting the January 28, 2013, Findings and Recommendation; conditionally certifying Plaintiffs' proposed FLSA WBF and Shoe Collectives and Subcollectives under § 216(b); certifying Plaintiffs' proposed Rule 23(b)(3) Oregon WBF and Shoe Classes and Subclasses; and denying certification of the FLSA Break Collective and the Rule 23(b)(3) Break Classes and Subclasses.
On May 7, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims on the grounds that Plaintiffs' FLSA claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the Court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state-law claims.
On November 5, 2013, Jason Diaz filed a Consent to Join Law Suit. Diaz, however, did not become a named Plaintiff in Gessele I.
On March 19, 2014, District Judge Anna J. Brown issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, Tricia Tetrault, and Christina Mauldin were required to file written consents with the Court to commence their FLSA collective action, but they failed to file those written consent forms timely. The Court, therefore, never acquired jurisdiction over their FLSA claims, and, as a result, the Court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. Judge Brown also concluded Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, Tricia Tetrault, and Christina Mauldin did not file written consents within the applicable limitations period; neither equitable tolling nor equitable estoppel applied; and, therefore, their FLSA claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, Judge Brown dismissed the FLSA claims of Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, Tricia Tetrault, and Christina
Mauldin with prejudice and dismissed their state-law claims without prejudice.
On April 16, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed Motion to Amend/Correct in which they moved the Court to amend its March 19, 2014, Opinion and Order to dismiss their FLSA claims without prejudice on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction over those claims.
On May 15, 2014, Judge Brown granted the Motion to Amend/Correct and issued an Amended Opinion and Order dismissing Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, Tricia Tetrault, and Christina Mauldin's FLSA claims without prejudice.
On June 10, 2014, Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, Tricia Tetrault, Christina Mauldin, and Jason Diaz filed a putative class action against Defendant in Multnomah County Circuit Court (Gessele II) in which they alleged claims for violation of Oregon's wage-and-hour laws, violation of the FLSA, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable and quasi-contractual claims for return of money.
On July 9, 2014, Defendant removed Gessele II to this court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction based on Plaintiffs' FLSA claims and/or jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).
On August 8, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand Case to State Court on the grounds that (1) issue preclusion/ collateral estoppel barred litigation of Gessele II in this court; (2) the “law of the case” barred litigation in this court if issue preclusion did not bar litigation; and (3) judicial estoppel barred litigation of Gessele II in this court if neither issue preclusion nor law of the case barred such litigation.
On October 17, 2014, Judge Brown entered an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. Judge Brown concluded (1) although issue
preclusion barred relitigation as to whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the FLSA claims of Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, Tricia Tetrault, and Christina Mauldin, it did not bar litigation of Diaz's FLSA claims against Defendant brought for the first time in Gessele II; (2) the law of the case did not bar relitigation as to whether this court had jurisdiction; (3) the decision regarding lack of jurisdiction over Gessele I did not apply to Diaz because he was never a named plaintiff in Gessele I, and, therefore, judicial estoppel did not apply or require remand of Diaz's FLSA claims; (4) judicial estoppel applied to and estopped Defendant from relitigating the issue of this court's lack of jurisdiction over the FLSA claims of Jessica Gessele, Ashley Ortiz, Nicole Gessele, Tricia Tetrault, and Christina Mauldin; and (5) Defendant did not waive its right to remove Gessele II by seeking dismissal of Gessele I on jurisdictional grounds.
Defendant appealed the Court's October 17, 2014, Opinion and Order to the Ninth Circuit.
On June 11, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued a Mandate in which it reversed in part the October 17, 2014, Opinion and Order and remanded the matter to Judge Brown for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held (1) the doctrine of issue preclusion precluded Defendant from relitigating “the jurisdictional issues” in Gessele I; (2) Defendant “[was] not precluded from invoking federal jurisdiction” in Gessele II because Gessele I did not address jurisdiction under CAFA nor the timeliness of the new FLSA claims asserted in Gessele II; (3) Defendant's position in Gessele I that the court lacked jurisdiction over the FLSA claims asserted in that matter “is not inconsistent with [Defendant's] . . . [assertion in Gessele II that] there is no time bar to the newly asserted FLSA claims, or that the district court has CAFA jurisdiction over the state-law claims”; and (4) Defendant did not waive its right to remove
Gessele II “through its filings in the state court or its prior conduct in this litigation.”
On August 31, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asserting Diaz's claims were subject to an arbitration agreement. On the same day Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Statute of Limitations) and to Establish Tolling for FLSA Collective Members and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant's eighth, ninth, and twelfth affirmative defenses.
On December 22, 2015, Judge Brown issued an Order in which she denied as premature (1) portions of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Statute of Limitations); (2) portions of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and...
