Gibson v. AHF, LLC

495 F.Supp.3d 499

Gary Doug GIBSON, Plaintiff

v.AHF, LLC, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-37-DLB-HAI

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division. at London.

Signed October 19, 2020

Edward E. Dove, Dove Law, Lexington, KY, for Plaintiff.

Donald C. Morgan, Katherine M. Coleman, Sturgill, Turner, Barker & Moloney PLLC, Lexington, KY, Molly C. McDiarmid, Pro Hac Vice, Susan W. Furr, Pro Hac Vice, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

David L. Bunning, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in this age discrimination and breach of contract case (Doc. # 27). The Motion has been fully briefed, (Docs. # 32 and 33), and is now ripe for the Court's review. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Gary Doug Gibson, filed the instant case in the Pulaski Circuit Court on December 27, 2018 against his former employer, Defendant AHF, LLC d/b/a AHF Products ("AHF")¹ asserting an age discrimination claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act ("KCRA"), Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.040(2) and a common-law breach of contract claim. (Doc. # 1-2). Thereafter, Defendant AHF removed the case to the Eastern District of Kentucky on February 6, 2019. (Doc. # 1). On March 6, 2020, AHF moved for summary judgment on both Plaintiff's KCRA claim and breach of contract claim. (Doc. # 27). Plaintiff responded on April 6, 2020 (Doc. # 32) and AHF replied on April 20, 2020 (Doc. # 33). This Motion is now ripe for the Court's review.

At the time of the incident giving rise to this litigation, Plaintiff was working as a day shift Lead at Armstrong's plant in Somerset, Kentucky. (Docs. # 27-1 at 3, 18, and 32 at 1). He was fifty-eight years old. (Doc. # 1-2 at 2). Gibson was responsible for supervising his team of workers and ensuring they conducted their work in a safe manner. (Doc. # 32-4 at 3). Gibson's job description as Lead outlined his responsibility for safety:

Supervisors & Leads

Proactive safety leadership means taking the necessary steps to return every employee home to their loved ones each and every day. This include[s]: identifying the opportunity, having the courage to act, assessing the situation, formulating a response, responding with conviction, and following up. Never walk past an unsafe or at risk situation.

(Id. ). Gibson was directly supervised by George Jones, and Jones was supervised by Eddie Stearns. (Docs. # 27 at 2 and 27-2 at 11, 14). Plaintiff stated he had issues with Jones due to "nit picking." (Doc. # 32 at 1).

Prior to the incident that led to Gibson's termination, Gibson claims Stearns made remarks related to his age on at least five or six occasions between 2016 and 2017. (Doc. # 27-1 at 68). These remarks were limited to "when are you going to retire?," "when are you getting out of here?," and were not accompanied by a suggestion that Gibson retire or leave his position. (Id. at 63, 71, 74). Further, no comments were made about Gibson's age. (Id. at 73). Gibson responded to these remarks by saying "I don't know. I'm going to try to make it to my retirement age," to which Stearns would laugh. (Id. at 69-70). Gibson recalls one incident happening in Stearns's office and another occurring in the break room. (Id. at 70). Gibson considered himself and Stearns to be friends. (Id. ).

Jones had a few performance-based discussions with Plaintiff directing him to ensure other employees were following safety procedures. (Docs. # 27 at 2-3, 32-1 at 1, and 32-2 at 1). Following these discussions, Greg Roy, a member of Gibson's team, "committed a major safety violation" on October 11, 2017. (Doc. # 27 at 3). While operating a forklift, Roy dropped a pallet of plywood from an elevated position. (Docs. # 27-3 at 36 and 27 at 3). Gibson observed the accident, looked to see if anyone was in the area where the pallet fell, and then radioed his supervisor, Jones, to report the incident. (Doc. # 27-1 at 64-65). Jones arrived a few minutes later. (Id. ). Gibson left the scene when Jones arrived, taking no further action. (Doc. # 27-3 at 36).

Upon reviewing a video of the incident, AHF managers, including Stearns, observed other safety violations in Gibson's area committed by Gibson and members of the team he supervised. (Docs. # 27-5 at 1 and 27 at 3-4). AHF suspended Gibson on October 23, 2017 and terminated him two days later. (Docs. # 27-1 at 62 and 32 at 1-2). AHF also terminated Roy, age fifty-seven, the driver of the forklift, and reprimanded other members of Gibson's staff relating to their actions on October 11, 2017. (Doc. # 27-5 at 2). The decision to terminate Gibson was made by Stearns, Brumbaugh (the plant manager), and Human Resources, and was approved by upper management. (Doc. # 27-5 at 1-2).

AHF contends that the forklift incident, along with Gibson's history of reprimands, was the reason for his termination. (Doc. # 27 at 5). In support of this contention, AHF provides the Major Safety Violation Occurrence Report ("the Report"), which stated that following the incident, Gibson "walked off; failing to remove employees from the unsafe condition" and that "this was a serious safety offense that allowed employees to remain in an unsafe working condition without [Gibson] interceding." (Doc. # 27-3 at 36). Gibson, on the other hand, contends that the real reason for his termination was his age and argues that he followed protocol by notifying his supervisor of the forklift incident. (Doc. # 32 at 4, 10-11).

On January 23, 2018, Gibson attempted to collect severance pay under the Severance Pay Plan for Salaried Employees ("the Plan"), which is the basis for his breach of contract action. (Doc. # 32-3 at 1). According to Plaintiff, based on the Plan, he would be entitled to thirty-eight weeks of pay. (Doc. # 1-2 at 2). AHF did not respond to this request or provide reasons for denying Gibson's severance claim until the instant litigation was filed. (Doc. # 32 at 2). The Plan provides severance for employees under specific conditions. (Doc. # 27-6 at 5). These conditions state that an employee is eligible for severance only if terminated without cause and due to a reduction of force or the elimination of an employee's position. (Doc. # 27-6 at 5-6). The Plan is administrated through AHF's Severance Pay Committee ("the Committee"). (Id. at 7). The Committee is solely responsible for administering the Plan, deciding who is eligible for the Plan, and handling appeals to denials of benefits. (Id. at 3-4, 5-7, 9). If the Committee determines a terminated employee is eligible for severance pay, a lump-sum benefit will be paid out in an amount that is based on the length of the employee's service and salary when terminated. (Id. at 7, 12). The Plan further provides that in order to receive benefits, the terminated employee must sign a waiver releasing "then existing rights and claims" against AHF. (Id. at 6-7).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact." Sigler v. American Honda Motor Co. , 532 F.3d 469, 483 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Plant v. Morton Int'l Inc. , 212 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 2000) ). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Following the Court's review of the record, if a "rational factfinder could not find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate." Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 154 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 1998).

1. Age Discrimination Claim

First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's age discrimination claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot prove discriminatory pretext. (Doc. # 27 at 7). Kentucky courts have adopted the federal standards used in assessing claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") for age discrimination claims brought under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act ("KCRA"). Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp. , 545 F.3d 387, 393 (6th Cir. 2008). The KCRA provides that it is unlawful for an employer to terminate an individual "because of the individual's ... age forty (40) and over." KRS § 344.040(1)(a).

A plaintiff bringing an age discrimination claim "must prove that age was a determining factor in the adverse action that the employer took against him or her." Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc. , 986 F.2d 1020, 1023 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Kraus v. Sobel Corrugated Containers, Inc. , 915 F.2d 227, 229-30 (6th Cir. 1990) ). A plaintiff can establish an age discrimination claim by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Geiger v. Tower Auto. , 579 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir. 2009). Direct evidence is that which "requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions." Allen , 545 F.3d at 394 (quoting Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc. , 317 F.3d 564, 570 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). Alternatively, circumstantial evidence "does not on its face establish discriminatory animus, but does allow a factfinder to draw a reasonable inference that discrimination occurred." Id.

While Plaintiff claims that his suit is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the only proof he provides is questions by his supervisor, Stearns, asking Plaintiff when he was planning on retiring. (Doc. #...