Gibson v. Gables Residential Servs.

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HALSTON GIBSON, Plaintiff, v. GABLES RESIDENTIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant.

No. 21-cv-2952 (DLF)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

March 22, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge

Halston Gibson says that Gables Residential Services, Inc., her former employer, discriminated against her based on her disability when it did not allow her to work remotely during the COVID-19 pandemic. Gables replies that Gibson could not perform essential elements of her job offsite. Before the Court is Gables' Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 26. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

Gables is a real estate company. Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1, Dkt. 26-3 (“Def.'s SUF”). It operates 21 residential buildings in the Washington, DC area. Id. ¶ 7. Its properties include the Berkshire, near American University, with 759 units; Yuma Gardens, in Van Ness, with 36 units; and 215 C Street, on Capitol Hill, with 64 units. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 12-13; Search Results for “Berkshire Apartments to Yuma Gardens to 215 C Street,” Google Maps, https://perma.cc/T3EW-5QC5 (showing location of each building).

Gibson began working at Gables in November 2018 as an “assistant community manager.” Def.'s SUF ¶ 10. She served the Berkshire, Yuma Gardens, and 215 C Street, with a focus on the Berkshire. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. Although the parties disagree on Gibson's precise duties, they agree that she helped “tend to” Berkshire residents' “complaints and requests.” Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 66, Dkt. 31-1 (“Pl.'s SUF”). They also agree that her role carried several back-office responsibilities, including assisting with corporate inspections of the Berkshire's files and facilities and “back[ing] up” her supervisor-the Berkshire's community manager-when necessary. Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SUF ¶ 26, Dkt. 31-1 (backup roles); Def.'s SUF ¶¶ 47-48; Dep. of Halston Gibson 100:13-101:10, Dkt. 31-5 (“Gibson Dep.”) (audits). Gibson attended weekly staff meetings at the Berkshire, Gibson Dep. 108:21-109:7, and her job description tasked her with “[s]upervisi[ng]” the Berkshire's “office and maintenance team[s] in the absence of the [c]ommunity [m]anager,” Gibson Dep. ex 9 at 1, Dkt. 31-2.

Gibson suffers from lupus, an autoimmune disease. Pl.'s SUF ¶ 16. As a result, when the COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020, Gibson felt unsafe working from her normal office in the Berkshire. Def.'s SUF ¶ 77; Pl.'s SUF ¶ 22. She asked whether she could work from home or from 215 C Street until the pandemic subsided, or at least for a significant period of time. See Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 7-12; Def.'s SUF ¶¶ 79-82. She added that she could visit the Berkshire after usual business hours, when the building was less crowded, to perform tasks she could not perform remotely. Def.'s SUF ¶ 95; Pl.'s SUF ¶ 7.

Gables did not adopt Gibson's proposals. Instead, it placed her on medical leave. Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s SUF ¶ 92; Gibson Dep. 167:5-8. Her last day in the office was March 17, 2020. Gibson Dep. 115:10-11, 145:3-6.

Gibson took leave through April 23, 2020. On April 23, consistent with an offer Gables extended to all its employees, Gables allowed Gibson to work remotely one day a week to “perform[] select tasks that could be performed remotely.” Def.'s SUF ¶ 156 (uncontroverted).^[2]Gibson did so and spent her remaining four days per week on leave. Id. ¶ 166. In June 2020, however, Gables returned to full-time in-person work. Id. ¶ 167. Gibson did not return to the office and sought remote work through September. Pl.'s SUF ¶ 26. Gables declined and terminated her. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Her termination took effect on July 20 2020. Id. ¶ 27-28.

Gibson sued under the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. Compl. ¶¶ 79-108, Dkt. 1-2. After approximately nine months of discovery, Min. Order of Dec. 6 2021, Gables moved for summary judgment, Dkt. 26. II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a litigant may move for summary judgment, “identifying each claim or defense . . . on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if . . . the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“[T]he Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

“A party opposing summary judgment must substantiate [its allegations] with evidence that a reasonable jury could credit in support of each essential element of [its] claims.” Menoken v. Burrows, 656 F.Supp.3d 98, 104 (D.D.C. 2022) (cleaned up). “The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the opposing party ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Disability Discrimination

The DCHRA makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice” to “discharge” or “otherwise . . . discriminate against any individual” for a “discriminatory reason based” in whole or in part on “actual or perceived . . . disability.” D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a), (a)(1)(A). “To show unlawful discrimination” under this section, a plaintiff must show “that she was qualified for [her] position with or without a reasonable accommodation[] and that she suffered an adverse employment action because of [her] disability.” Hunt v. Dist. of Columbia, 66 A.3d 987, 990 (D.C. 2013) (cleaned up). The Court will grant summary judgment to Gables on Gibson's disability discrimination claim because no reasonable jury could conclude that Gibson was qualified for her position with or without a reasonable accommodation.

A qualified individual can “perform the essential functions of her position” if given a reasonable accommodation, a standard mirroring the Americans with Disabilities Act's (“ADA”). Id. (quoting Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (1994)). Under the DCHRA, as under the ADA, courts give “substantial weight to [an] employer's view of job requirements,” including whether a function is essential. Id. (quoting Ward v. Mass. Health Rsch. Inst., 209 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2000)); see Turner v. D.C. Off. of Hum. Rts., 243 A.3d 871, 876 (D.C. 2021). They also consider whether an employer's “[w]ritten job descriptions” emphasize a particular function, whether employees spend substantial periods of time performing the function, and whether other current or past employees have performed that function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii); see Hunt, 66 A.3d at 991 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). And they examine whether, in fact, an employee who could not perform that function could still do her job well. See, e.g., id.; George v. Molson Coors Beverage Co. USA, LLC, 610 F.Supp.3d 280, 289 (D.D.C. 2022).

Some cases illustrate how this test applies in practice. On one side of the line, consider Hunt. A prison guard's anxiety disorder made it difficult for her to work with inmates. 66 A.3d at 989. She said she could do her job anyway by avoiding inmate contact and by taking breaks after contact occurred. Id. at 990-91. The D.C. Court of Appeals disagreed and granted summary judgment for the prison, holding that “contact with inmates was an essential job function of a correctional officer” and that taking breaks after contact would not be feasible as a matter of law. Id. at 991. Or consider Doak v. Johnson, a case whose facts mirror those of this case. 798 F.3d 1096, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2015). An office worker's illness “caused her to miss a significant amount of work.” Id. at 1098. The employee asked to start her day late and to work from home, insisting that doing so “would not have interfered with [her] ability to do [her] job.” Id. at 1106. Her employer disagreed, as did the Circuit. Given the record on summary judgment, the Circuit explained, any reasonable jury would conclude “that it was essential to [the employee's] job that she be present for interactive meetings during normal business hours” to meet with coworkers and engage in other in-person activities. Id. at 1106-07.

On the other side, take Langon v. Department of Health and Human Services. 959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992). A computer programmer suffered from multiple sclerosis. Id. at 1054. She asked to work from home and testified that she could program well outside of the office. Id. at 1054-55. Her employer replied that programming did not “lend itself to working at home” but did not “offer any . . . affidavit or deposition” testimony saying so. Id. at 1060. The Circuit found that a factual question existed as to whether programming required in-person attendance. Id. at 1060-61. Or take Solomon v. Vilsack. 763 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). A disabled employee could not work regular hours but “continued to perform all of her job duties and to complete all of her work.” Id. at 6. “Because of her efforts, [she] never missed a single work deadline throughout the acute phase of her illness.” Id. Her employer fired her anyway, insisting that regular hours were essential to her job. Id. at 7-8. The Circuit let a jury decide the issue, emphasizing the employee's immaculate performance on a flexible schedule. Id. at 12.

In this case, the parties agree that Gibson has a disability, that she...