Gideon Asen LLC v. Glessner

583 F.Supp.3d 242

GIDEON ASEN LLC, Plaintiff,

v.James T. GLESSNER, in his Official Capacity as State Court Administrator for the State of Maine Judicial Branch, Defendant.

Docket No. 2:21-cv-00189-NT

United States District Court, D. Maine.

Signed February 4, 2022

Anthony Moffa, Pro Hac Vice, University of Maine School of Law, Portland, ME, Taylor Andrew Asen, Gideon Asen LLC, New Gloucester, ME, for Plaintiff.

Jason Anton, Thomas A. Knowlton, Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for Defendant James T. Glessner.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Nancy Torresen, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Gideon Asen LLC alleges that Section 2857 of the Maine Health Security Act, as it is being implemented by the Defendant, violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by keeping confidential certain Maine Superior Court decisions issued during medical malpractice prelitigation panel proceedings. The Defendant has moved to dismiss the action (ECF No. 8). For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED .

BACKGROUND¹

The Maine Health Security Act, 24 M.R.S. § 2501 et seq. ("MHSA " or the "Act "), codifies Maine's medical malpractice system. Compl. ¶ 13 (ECF No. 1). Under the Act, every medical malpractice case brought in Maine must be screened by a prelitigation screening panel before proceeding to litigation in Maine Superior Court. Compl. ¶ 14. The purpose of the mandatory prelitigation screening panel is to identify meritorious claims of professional negligence "to encourage early resolution of those claims prior to commencement of a lawsuit" and "to encourage early withdrawal or dismissal of nonmeritorious claims." 24 M.R.S. § 2851(1).

The chair of the prelitigation screening panel may issue subpoenas and permit discovery, and the chair may rule on discovery-related requests itself or may allow the parties to seek a ruling in the Superior Court. Id. § 2852(5)–(6). Absent agreement of the parties, however, "[t]he panel has no jurisdiction to hear or decide ... dispositive legal affirmative defenses." Id. § 2853(5). "The panel chair may require the parties to litigate, by motion, dispositive legal affirmative defenses in the Superior Court prior to submission of the case to the panel," or "[b]oth parties ... may request that certain preliminary legal affirmative defenses or issues be litigated prior to submission of the case to the panel." Id. These legal issues, "as well as any motion relating to discovery that the panel chair has chosen not to rule on," may be put before the Superior Court by motion without the plaintiff needing to first file a complaint. Id.

Rule 80M of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure governs the medical malpractice screening panel procedures. Me. R. Civ. P. 80M. Rule 80M(e) provides the mechanism by which the Maine Superior Court may weigh in on certain legal issues during prelitigation panel proceedings. Compl. ¶ 17. Before the panel hearing, the panel chair may "order the parties to resolve by motion in the Superior Court legal defenses or issues outside the jurisdiction of the screening panel." Compl. ¶ 17 (quoting Me. R. Civ. P. 80M(e) ). If the panel chair determines that an issue is outside the panel's jurisdiction, the chair must "refer the motion to the Chief Justice of the Superior Court for assignment to a justice of the Superior Court." Compl. ¶ 17 (quoting Me. R. Civ. P. 80M(e) ).

The MHSA mandates that "all proceedings before the ... panel, including its final determinations, must be treated in every respect as private and confidential by the panel and the parties to the claim." Compl. ¶ 15 (quoting 24 M.R.S. § 2857(1) ). The notice of claim (the document that initiates the prelitigation screening panel proceeding) and "all other documents filed with the court in the action for professional negligence during the prelitigation screening process are confidential." 24 M.R.S. § 2853(1-A). Under the Act, "written decisions of the Superior Court that are issued pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80 [M](e) are rendered confidential and not accessible to the public as a matter of course." Compl. ¶ 18.

According to the Plaintiff, in or about 2016, Justice Anderson on the Maine Superior Court issued a written decision on a legal question he was asked to adjudicate in a medical malpractice matter before the prelitigation screening panel. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20. And in or about 2016, Justice Murray on the Maine Superior Court issued a written decision on a legal question she was asked to adjudicate in a medical malpractice matter before the prelitigation screening panel. Compl. ¶¶ 21–21.1.² Both decisions were promptly sealed pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80M(e) and have never been made public. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21.1–22. The Plaintiff believes that, in addition to those two examples, justices of the Superior Court have issued other written decisions during the medical malpractice prelitigation screening process that have been sealed due to the confidentiality of the prelitigation screening panels. Compl. ¶ 23.

The Plaintiff alleges that Section 2857 of the Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution insofar as it requires that these judicial decisions be kept indefinitely under seal. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 25, 31. The Plaintiff, Gideon Asen LLC, is a law firm that specializes in medical malpractice litigation, and the Plaintiff claims to have an interest in having access to "written decisions by justices of the Superior Court on undecided issues of law in the area of medical malpractice." Compl. ¶¶ 6–7. In its one-count Complaint, the Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Section 2857 violates the First Amendment and an order enjoining the Defendant³ from keeping Superior Court judicial decisions sealed (absent any non-MHSA-based reason for confidentiality). Compl. ¶ 31. The Defendant moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.⁴ Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. ("Def.’s Mot. ") (ECF No. 8). In its motion to dismiss, the Defendant argues that I should dismiss the Complaint because: (1) the Plaintiff lacks standing because it has not alleged a sufficiently particularized injury; (2) the Younger and Pullman abstention doctrines apply; and (3) the Plaintiff fails to state a claim because Section 2857 does not violate the First Amendment.

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of standing challenges whether the plaintiff " ‘is a proper party to invoke’ federal jurisdiction." Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. , 102 F.3d 1273, 1281 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 518, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), on the other hand, "tests the ‘legal sufficiency’ of a complaint." Me. Educ. Ass'n Benefits Tr. v. Cioppa , 842 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Me. 2012) (quoting Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys. , 304 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Me. 2004) ).

Although these two grounds for dismissal are "conceptually distinct," a reviewing court relies on the same plausibility pleading standard in evaluating a complaint for failure to establish standing and for failure to state a claim. See Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp. , 823 F.3d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting "[t]he parallelism between the threshold requirements needed to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6) and the threshold showing necessary for standing"). In both instances, the court must "accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor." Alston v. Spiegel , 988 F.3d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Santiago v. Puerto Rico , 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011) ); see Hochendoner , 823 F.3d at 730. "Just as the plaintiff bears the burden of plausibly alleging a viable cause of action" to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff also "bears the burden of establishing sufficient factual matter to plausibly demonstrate his standing to bring the action."

Hochendoner , 823 F.3d at 730, 731 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). Distinguishing sufficient from insufficient pleadings is a "context-specific task." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

The plausibility standard as applied to standing determinations requires that each element of standing "be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e. , with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Hochendoner , 823 F.3d at 730. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). At the pleading stage, "the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element" of standing's three elements. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). "[C]onclusory assertions" and "unfounded speculation" do not "supply the necessary heft." Hochendoner , 823 F.3d at 731.

In the Rule 12(b)(6) context, the pleading standard requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That "short and plain statement" need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). "[A] complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Alston , 988 F.3d at 571 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Plausible" means "more than merely possible" but does not require all facts necessary to establish a prima facie case. Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica , 755 F.3d 711, 717–18 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

The Defendant's first...