Gilani v. Deloitte LLP

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ASAD GILANI, Plaintiff, v. DELOITTE LLP et al., Defendants.

No. 23-CV-4755 (JMF)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

September 4, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

JESSE M. FURMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Asad Gilani, a former employee of Deloitte Consulting LLP proceeding here without counsel, brings claims under various federal, state, and local laws against Deloitte LLP, Deloitte Consulting LLP, Deloitte USA LLP, Deloitte Services LP, and Deloitte Retirement Committee (collectively “Deloitte” or “Deloitte Defendants”) as well as Richard Johnson, Mans Jabal, Navin Mudaliar Meghan Kelly, and Lisa Bradley (collectively “Individual Defendants”). Liberally construed, Gilani's operative Third Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) primarily alleges that he was subjected to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation because of age and disability. Defendants now move, pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss all of Gilani's claims. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

RULE 8(A)(2)

At the outset, Defendants seek to dismiss the Complaint, ECF No. 102 (“TAC”), on the ground that it fails to comply with Rule 8. See ECF No. 113 (“Defs.' Mem.”), at 6-8. Rule 8 provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). It requires “[e]ach allegation” to “be simple, concise, and direct,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1), to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts regularly dismiss complaints that fail to comply with this requirement, see, e.g., Keitel v. D'Agostino, No. 21-CV-8537 (JMF), 2022 WL 15524665, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2022), particularly if “the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised,” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Defendants' Rule 8 arguments are not without force as the Complaint is indeed “convoluted, confusing, and difficult to comprehend,” Phipps v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-6603 (ALC), 2019 WL 4274210, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2019), and at times “unintelligible” and “indiscernible,” Strunk v. U.S. House of Representatives, 68 Fed. App'x 233, 235 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order). That said, bearing in mind that “[t]he fundamental command of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is never to exalt form over substance,” and that there is a “jurisprudential preference for adjudication of cases on their merits rather than on the basis of formalities,” courts recognize that “dismissal of a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the most unsustainable of cases.” Ong v. Park Manor Rehab. & Healthcare Ctr., 51 F.Supp.3d 319, 344-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citations omitted). Here, the Court can - albeit with some difficulty - discern the basic structure of Gilani's claims, the allegations underlying them, and some (but not all) of the factual background of his claims. This is not, therefore, the “most unsustainable of cases.” Id. at 345. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss on Rule 8 grounds and will consider whether Gilani plausibly states claims for relief.

BACKGROUND

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2009). In general, a court may not look outside the pleadings, documents attached thereto or incorporated by reference therein, and matters of which juridical notice may be taken when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. But because a pro se plaintiff's allegations must be construed liberally, it is appropriate for a court to consider factual allegations made in such a plaintiff's opposition memorandum or affidavit, provided that the allegations are consistent with the complaint. See, e.g., Braxton v. Nichols, No. 08-CV-8568 (PGG), 2010 WL 1010001, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010); see also Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering a pro se plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to a motion to dismiss in addition to those in the complaint). Accordingly, the following facts, which are accepted as true for purposes of this motion, are drawn from the Complaint as well as Gilani's memorandum of law and affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss to the extent they are consistent with the Complaint. ECF No. 120 (“Pl.'s Opp'n”); ECF No. 120-1 (“Gilani Decl.”).^[1]

Gilani began working for Deloitte as a Specialist Master/Manager on or about July 12, 2021, when he was sixty-five years old. TAC ¶ 32. The day Gilani started working, he met with Jabal and Vengo, and Jabal - after discovering that Gilani had over forty-five years of experience - asked Gilani how old he was. Id. ¶ 41. After Gilani responded that he was sixty-five, Jabal responded: “Why are you still working? Do you want to get promoted to Senior Manager? Is that why you are working? Why do not you retire?” Id. Gilani spoke to Mudaliar, his assigned coach, about this incident, and also complained to Johnson. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. But Jabal “continue[d] to discriminate and harass Mr. Gilani because of his age, bullied, raise his voice on 8/2/21; 8/16/21, 8/26/2112/10/21 and 12/13/21.” Id. ¶ 40. At some point, Campbell coached Jabal on age discrimination and anti-harassment policies. Id. ¶ 58.

On October 20, 2021, Gilani, after arriving at a client's location in Arizona, notified Kocsi that he had a back condition, apparently a herniated disk, and furnished a doctor's note indicating that he was “disabled from 10/18/21 thru 11/1/21” and could “return to work with restrictions [no travel] from 11/1/21 . . . until seen by Neurosurgeon.” Id. ¶¶ 62, 67. Kocsi said he would check with Johnson and get back to Gilani, but he never did, and Gilani was therefore forced to travel from New York to Arizona every week until December 4, 2021, when his condition deteriorated and he could hardly walk because of the pain. Id. ¶¶ 62-63. During this period of time, Gilani had been expected to work sixty to eighty hours each week, excluding weekly travel to and from Arizona. Id. ¶ 64.

Gilani saw a doctor again on December 13, 2021, and that same day reached out to the Deloitte Call Center to open a formal request because Kocsi had not yet provided him with an accommodation. Id. ¶ 71. The doctor indicated that Gilani was unable to lift over five pounds and could not travel by airplane. Id. Bradley contacted Gilani on December 17, 2021, acknowledging receipt of the accommodation request and requesting more information. Id. ¶ 73. On December 12, 2021, Gilani sent the requested form, completed by his physician, to Bradley. Id. ¶ 75. It indicated that Gilani had sciatica due to a herniated lumbar disc aggravated by activity and that he could not yet perform the essential functions of his position. Id. On January 3, 2022, Gilani was informed that he would not be able to work with an accommodation and thus would need to apply for Short Term Disability benefits. Id. ¶ 76. Nevertheless, confusingly, Gilani seems to allege that Bradley did provide a temporary no-travel accommodation in or around January 2022 but that, against his doctor's advice, he was forced to work sixty to eighty hours per week from January to May 2022. Id. ¶¶ 79, 81.

Gilani alleges that his performance reviews were improperly lowered and that he was assigned failing projects in order to force him out. See, e.g., Id. ¶¶ 82-96. Gilani filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in October 2022, alleging age and disability discrimination. See ECF No. 102-1, Ex. 1; ECF No. 120 (“Pl.'s Opp'n”), at 19-20. While the circumstances around the end of Gilani's employment with Deloitte are not clear, he alleges that his benefits were terminated in May 2023 and that he was ultimately terminated on June 15, 2023, while he was out on disability. TAC ¶¶ 98-102. This lawsuit followed.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Holmes, 568 F.3d at 335. Thus, in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion against a defendant, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S at 570. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). More specifically, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. A complaint that offers only “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. Further, if the plaintiff has not “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. at 570. When, as here, a plaintiff brings claims of employment discrimination or retaliation, however, the facts “alleged in the complaint need not give plausible support to the ultimate question of whether the adverse...