Gilcher v. Smith

1

PATRICK ALAN GILCHER, Plaintiff, v. RYAN SMITH, in his individual and official capacities; BILLY OLVERA, in his individual and official capacities; BRENT HOLBROOKS, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Macon County; ROBERT HOLLAND, in his official capacity as former Sheriff of Macon County; and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, as surety for the Sheriff of Macon County, Defendants.

CIVIL No. 1:23-cv-00192-MR

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division

December 13, 2024

ORDER

MARTIN REIDINGER, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. 16].

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 1, 2023, the Plaintiff Patrick Alan Gilcher (the “Plaintiff”)^[1]filed a Complaint against the Defendants Brent Holbrooks, in his official capacity as the current Sheriff of Macon County; Robert Holland, in his official capacity as the former Sheriff of Macon County; Ryan Smith, in his individual and official capacity; Billy Olvera, in his individual and official capacity; and Western Surety Company, as surety for the Sheriff of Macon County (collectively, the “Defendants”). [Doc. 1 at 1].

In his Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against Defendants Olvera and Smith for excessive force, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and for cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and against Defendants Holland and Holbrooks for failure to train, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Id. at 12-15]. The Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of common law battery against Defendants Olvera and Smith, and an action on the Macon County Sheriff's bond with respect to Defendants Holland, Smith, and Olvera. [Id. at 15-19]. On October 2, 2023, the Defendants filed an Answer. [Doc. 5].

On September 16, 2024, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment regarding all of the Plaintiff's claims. [Doc. 16 at 2]. On October 8, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. 23]. On October 22, 2024, the Defendants filed a Reply to the Plaintiff's Response. [Doc. 27]. This matter is now ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party must oppose a summary judgment motion with citation to “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). Namely, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To that end, a court may only consider material that can be reduced to admissible evidence. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 Fed.Appx. 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Md. Highways Contractors Ass'n v. Maryland, 933 F.2d 1246, 1251 (4th Cir. 1991)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2) (“A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.”).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine' dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,

when the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

Id. (citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewing the forecast of evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the following is a recitation of the relevant facts.

On September 4, 2021, Trey Chastain (“Officer Chastain”), then a police officer for Franklin, North Carolina, responded to a disturbance call from an RV park in Franklin. [Doc. 16-1: Chastain Decl. at ¶¶ 4-5]. Prior to Officer Chastain's arrival, the RV park manager had choked the Plaintiff and thrown him to the ground. [Doc. 24-3: Plaintiff Dep. at 15]. After interviewing witnesses on the scene, Officer Chastain arrested the Plaintiff, who appeared to be intoxicated. [Doc. 16-1: Chastain Decl. at ¶ 5; Doc. 17-2: Chastain Dep. at 4]. Officer Chastain then transported the Plaintiff to the Macon County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”). [Doc. 17-2: Chastain Dep. at 2; Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 5].

Defendants Olvera and Smith were working at the Detention Center as detention officers when the Plaintiff arrived at about 4:30 a.m. [Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 5; Doc. 16-2: Smith Decl. at ¶ 7].^[2] The Plaintiff appeared to be intoxicated when he entered the Detention Center. [Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 6]. The Plaintiff was physically cooperative but verbally uncooperative with Defendants Olvera and Smith. [Doc. 24-6: Smith Dep. at 9]. Defendant Smith thought the Plaintiff was being “annoying,” but the Plaintiff never threatened anyone. [Id. at 9-11].

At about 4:38 a.m., Defendants Olvera and Smith placed the Plaintiff into cell 239, and immediately upon entering the cell, the Plaintiff struck the cell door. [Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 6; Video One at 4:01-4:04; Doc. 24-3: Plaintiff Dep. at 5-6].^[3] Immediately after the Plaintiff struck the door, about three seconds after the Plaintiff entered cell 239, Defendant Smith opened the cell door, aimed his taser at the Plaintiff, ordered the Plaintiff to get on the ground, and handcuffed the Plaintiff's hands behind his back. [Doc. 176: Smith Dep. at 2; Video One at 4:04-5:37]. Defendant Smith testified that he had warned the Plaintiff against hitting the door, but Defendant Smith did not include any such warning in his written incident report. [Doc. 24-6: Smith Dep. at 12].

After handcuffing the Plaintiff, Defendant Smith checked to see if the Plaintiff's handcuffs were too tight. [Doc. 17-6: Smith Dep. at 2; Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 6]. Defendants Olvera and Smith then placed the Plaintiff in a “restraint chair,” a chair with straps that prevent the occupant from moving. [Doc. 17-6: Smith Dep. at 3; Video One at 5:46]. The officers placed the Plaintiff in the restraint chair for his own safety, as well as the safety of others. [Doc. 18: Olvera Decl. at ¶ 6; Doc. 24-5: Olvera Dep. at 16]. Defendant Olvera stated that putting the Plaintiff into the restraint chair was necessary because “hitting [the door] repeatedly could result in injury.” [Doc. 24-5: Olvera Dep. at 16]. Defendants Olvera and Smith then put the Plaintiff, who remained in the restraint chair, into cell 238. [Doc. 17-6: Smith Dep. at 3; Video One at 8:21].

The Plaintiff testified that he did not remember anyone checking on his “well-being” while he was in the restraint chair. [Doc. 24-3: Plaintiff Dep. at 25-26]. According to the Plaintiff, while he was in the restraint chair, he pleaded for medical help and for the detention officers to loosen his handcuffs, but the detention officers verbally antagonized him, rather than helping him. [Id.]. The Plaintiff testified that the detention officers told him to “quit being a baby,” and that his time in the restraint chair would restart every time he “whimper[ed].” [Id.]. Defendant Smith testified, on the other hand, that during his shift, the Plaintiff was continuously monitored during pursuant to Detention Center policy. [Doc. 16-2: Smith Decl. at ¶ 8]. According to Defendant Smith, this monitoring included allowing the Plaintiff to stand, checking the Plaintiff's handcuffs to ensure they were not too tight, and asking the Plaintiff if he wanted water. [Id.].

The video evidence shows that at around 5:14 a.m., Defendants Olvera and Smith removed the Plaintiff from cell 238....