Gill v. Jetblue Airways Corp.

836 F.Supp.2d 33

George T. GILL and Sondra Gill, Plaintiffs,

v.JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 10–11454–FDS.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Dec. 14, 2011.

Gerald W. Sousa, Sousa & Sousa P.C., So. Easton, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher A. Kenney, Eric B. Goldberg, Kenney & Sams, P.C., Southborough, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

SAYLOR, District Judge.

This is an action against JetBlue Airways for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff George Gill, an incomplete quadriplegic, while boarding an aircraft. The complaint alleges negligence in the accommodation of Mr. Gill's disability during aircraft boarding. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.

JetBlue has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). In substance, it contends that plaintiffs' tort claims are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”) and the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (“ACAA”) and that those federal laws provide no private causes of action in place of the state law claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the training requirements under ACAA regulations preempt the common-law standard of care applicable to plaintiffs' claims of negligent training. Otherwise, however, the motion will be denied because the claims are not preempted in any other respect.

I. Background

The facts are stated as alleged by the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs George and Sondra Gill are residents of Quincy, Massachusetts. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–2). Mr. Gill is an incomplete quadriplegic, with some use of his upper extremities but none of his lower extremities. ( Id. ¶ 5). As a result, he uses a wheelchair. ( Id.).

Defendant JetBlue Airways, a commercial airline, is a Delaware corporation with a principal office in Forest Hills, New York. ( Id. ¶ 3).

At some time prior to February 1, 2009, the Gills purchased from JetBlue two round-trip tickets from Boston Logan Airport to Tampa, Florida. ( Id. ¶ 4). Their flights were scheduled to depart for Florida the morning of February 1, 2009, and to return to Massachusetts on February 12, 2009. ( Id.).

On the morning of February 1, Mr. Gill was using his ordinary wheelchair at the airport prior to his and his wife's flight. ( Id. ¶¶ 6–7). Upon arrival at the boarding gate, the Gills requested permission to begin boarding early to allow for the extra time Mr. Gill required. ( Id. ¶¶ 5–6). Their request was granted, and two JetBlue employees helped Mr. Gill down the jetway toward the aircraft. ( Id. ¶ 7).

In order for Mr. Gill to board the aircraft, it was necessary to transfer him to a narrower “aisle/boarding” wheelchair at the end of the jetway. ( Id. ¶ 7). To begin this transfer process, one of the JetBlue employees aligned Mr. Gill's wheelchair next to the aisle/boarding wheelchair. ( Id. ¶ 8). The employee then removed the right armrest of Mr. Gill's wheelchair. ( Id.). On the aisle/boarding wheelchair, the left armrest was set in its “up” position, which would enable Mr. Gill to slide onto it from his wheelchair, and the right armrest was in the

“down” position. ( Id.). Mr. Gill was therefore able to slide from his wheelchair onto the aisle/boarding wheelchair from the left side. ( Id.).

Once Mr. Gill was on the aisle/boarding wheelchair, however, the JetBlue employees were unable to bring down the left armrest. ( Id.). When he offered to adjust his position in the chair to facilitate lowering the armrest, the employees responded that it was unnecessary to bring it down. ( Id.). Mr. Gill contends that he insisted that he preferred having the armrest lowered prior to boarding, but was ignored. ( Id.). As the employees continued preparing the chair for boarding, Mr. Gill began to slip off the left side of the wheelchair. ( Id.). The employees were unable to prevent Mr. Gill from falling off the side of the chair. ( Id.). Emergency medical technicians were called, although it does not appear that medical assistance was provided at this point. ( Id.). Ultimately, a group of men helped Mr. Gill back onto the aisle/boarding wheelchair and onto the plane. ( Id.).

Upon his arrival in Tampa, Mr. Gill was taken by ambulance to a hospital, where x-rays revealed a comminuted fracture of the left femur. ( Id. ¶ 9). He was eventually discharged on February 12, 2009. ( Id.). Mr. Gill then returned to Boston, where he was admitted to the West Roxbury VA Hospital. ( Id. ¶ 10). Two surgeries were eventually performed on Mr. Gill's leg, each accompanied by a substantial period of inpatient care. ( Id. ¶¶ 10–11).

On July 6, 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Gill filed this action against JetBlue in the Massachusetts Superior Court. The complaint alleges negligence on the part of the two JetBlue employees while they assisted Mr. Gill with boarding as well as negligent supervision on the part of JetBlue for failure to properly train its employees. JetBlue removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. JetBlue has now moved for judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).

II. Standard of Review

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings “is treated much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Perez–Acevedo v. Rivero–Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir.2008). It differs from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion primarily because it is filed after the close of pleadings and “implicates the pleadings as a whole.” Aponte–Torres v. University of Puerto Rico, 445 F.3d 50, 54–55 (1st Cir.2006). Because a Rule 12(c) motion “calls for an assessment of the merits of the case at an embryonic stage, the court must view the facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom to the nonmovant's behoof.” R.G. Financial Corp. v. Vergara—Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir.2006).

However, to survive a defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, a plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). That is, “[f]actual allegationsmust be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The court will therefore grant defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings if plaintiffs' well-pleaded facts do not “possess enough heft to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir.2008) (quotations and original alterations omitted).

III. AnalysisA. Preemption Principles

It is a “fundamental principle of the Constitution” that the Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000); seeU.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Preemption of state law by a statute enacted by Congress may take three forms: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption. Express preemption requires “language in the federal statute that reveals an explicit congressional intent to pre-empt state law.” Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996). In the absence of an express statutory preemption clause, conflict preemption may be implied “where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). Field preemption occurs when Congress creates a regulatory scheme so pervasive in a particular subject area as to demonstrate that it “intends federal law to occupy the field.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (internal citations omitted).

In all forms, preemption turns on congressional intent. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analysis.”) (internal quotations marks omitted). The court must therefore begin, “as in any exercise of statutory construction[,] with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs.” New York St. Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995). However, because “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action,” it is presumed “that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996).

B. The Airline Deregulation Act

JetBlue contends that the Airline Deregulation Act expressly preempts plaintiffs' state-law tort claims. The ADA, which amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (“FAA”), includes a preemption clause that prohibits any state from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier....” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).¹ According to the Supreme Court, Congress enacted this provision “to ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). The Court has therefore held that the words “related to,” as used in this clause, “express a broad preemptive purpose” and encompass all state laws “having a connection with or reference to” airline...