Gilliam v. Honorable Kathleen N.A.

WILLIAM H. GILLIAM, Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN N.A. WATANABE and DAVID LAM, Defendants.

Civ. No. 20-00201 JMS-RT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

September 1, 2020

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, ECF NOS. 20 & 28, AND DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND, ECF NO. 39

I. INTRODUCTION

The court considers two motions to dismiss pro se Plaintiff William H. Gilliam's ("Plaintiff" or "Gilliam") Complaint—the first motion is by Defendant David Lam ("Lam"), ECF No. 20, and the second motion is by Defendant The Honorable Kathleen N.A. Watanabe ("Judge Watanabe"), ECF No. 28. After Gilliam filed his opposition to the motions to dismiss, he filed a "Motion for Leave to File Recast First Amended Complaint" ("Motion to Amend"), ECF No. 39, which the court indicated it would analyze in conjunction with the two motions to dismiss. See ECF No. 41.

Based on the following, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED with prejudice. The Motion to Amend is DENIED because further amendment would be futile.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Gilliam's Complaint alleges that he owns an interest in and resides at the Kuhio Shores at Poipu, a condominium on Kauai. ECF No. 1 at PageID #1-2. The precise source of his alleged ownership interest is unclear from the Complaint but apparently stems from his mother's estate and stock in an unspecified "Hawaii corporation involuntarily administratively dissolved in December, 2012." Id. at PageID #1. Judge Watanabe is a State of Hawaii Circuit Judge of the Fifth Circuit on Kauai, and Lam is a court administrator with that court. Id. at PageID #2.

The Complaint alleges that "as a result of a dispute with the [condominium association] governing the property, such [association] in its effort to suppress the rights of the plaintiff, and foreclose its claimed lien, [Judge Watanabe] appointed a receiver of the dissolved company usurping the judicial function of the Court and to determine title and then immediately sell the property and dispossess plaintiff." Id. at PageID #2-3 (citing "Hawaii Fifth Circuit Docket 16-00063").¹

Gilliam alleges that "[t]he State court has failed to obtain jurisdiction of the plaintiff by any means as the real party in interest . . . in any manner that satisf[ies] the requirements as provided in the United States Constitution of due process and equal protection of the laws." Id. at PageID #3. He claims he "has been given no opportunity for hearing," and has "claims and choses in action against the parties plaintiff and cross claims against the parties defendants that will be taken, diminished, and lost by the foregoing process." Id. He alleges that "the Clerk has refused to allow the Plaintiff access to the State of Hawaii electronic filing system to appear, monitor and file acts of the Court[.]" Id. And he claims that the condominium association "by the Defendant's orders will seize and sell all the property interests of Plaintiff in violation of several express provisions of the United States Constitution[.]" Id. at PageID #4.

Based on the allegations that his property interests are being taken, Gilliam makes federal claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 & 1985 "to protect and defend the civil rights and property interests of Plaintiff," "free from impairment," "and, any actions by others acting under color of state law." ECF No. 1 at PageID #4. The Complaint seeks as relief "a declaration of such right title and interest in and to the . . . dissolved company and its assets," and "injunctive relief . . . fully protecting the plaintiff's interests both individually and as Personal Representative." Id. It does not seek damages, only declaratory and injunctive relief.

Shortly after filing his Complaint, Gilliam filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") seeking "to restrain the execution of a Writ of Possession against Plaintiff for [the condominium that he is occupying] . . . and any attempt to take possession or to sell the premises, including any further acts in furtherance of any such writ, sale, or taking as may appear in the Court's file and docket Fifth Circuit Civil 16-00063." ECF No. 11 at PageID #19.

The court, however, denied that Motion for TRO as moot because Gilliam had obtained the relief he sought from the ICA in his appeal in the State Action. See ECF No. 22. In particular, in an appeal of a denial of Gilliam's motion to intervene, the ICA ordered that "the Writ of Possession and Order to Sell, both entered on October 2, 2019, by the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit, are stayed as against Gilliam in his personal capacity, pending this court's final decision in this appeal, and absent further order by this court." ECF No. 22-1 at PageID #163. The ICA explained that "the Writ of Possession and, by reference, the Order to Sell specifically commands the removal of Gilliam, in his personal capacity, from the Property. However, Gilliam was never made a party to the underlying foreclosure action." Id. at PageID #161-62. The state trial court had "denied Gilliam's motion to intervene in the underlying foreclosure action," id. at PageID #160, which is the subject of Gilliam's appeal. The ICA reasoned that

[I]f the Writ of Possession and Order to Sell are enforced against Gilliam pending the decision on appeal, the Property will be taken out of his possession and put in the possession of [court-appointed] receiver, who has been authorized to sell the Property.

Id. at PageID #162. That appeal remains pending before the ICA.

B. Procedural Background in this Court

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 1, 2020. ECF No. 1. Lam filed his motion to dismiss on May 28, 2020, ECF No. 20, and Judge Watanabe filed her motion to dismiss on June 18, 2020, ECF No. 28. Plaintiff filed his "Resistance to Defendan[t]s' Watanabe and Lam['s] Motion to Dismiss" ("Opposition") on July 21, 2020. ECF No. 36. Defendants filed a Reply on July 27, 2020. ECF No. 38. Plaintiff filed his Motion to Amend on July 29, 2020. ECF No. 39. The court decides the matters without a hearing under Local Rule 7.1(c).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court Abstains Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)

Both Defendants argue that the court should abstain under Younger. See ECF No. 20-1 at PageID #109; ECF No. 28-1 at PageID #186. Under Younger, "federal courts sitting in equity cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, enjoin pending state criminal proceedings." ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014). After Younger was decided in 1971, it was extended to a "limited category of state civil cases." Rynearson v. Ferguson, 903 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted) (describing history). Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013), clarified that Younger is limited to "three 'exceptional' categories," id. at 78. "Those cases are: (1) 'parallel, pending state criminal proceeding[s],' (2) 'state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions,' and (3) state civil proceedings that 'implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.'" ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759 (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72-73). Sprint also described the third category as "civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." 571 U.S. at 73 (quoting New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989)).

That is, outside the purely criminal context, "Younger abstention is appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges." ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759 (citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at 80-82). The qualifying civil proceedings, for example, "relate to the state courts' ability to enforce compliance with judgments already made." Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2018). ReadyLink gave instances of "'[c]ore' orders [that] involve the administration of the state judicial process," 754 F.3d at 759, such as "an appeal bond requirement, a civil contempt order, or an appointment of a receiver." Id. (internal citations omitted).

"If these four threshold elements are established [courts] then consider a fifth prong: (5) 'whether the federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an exception to Younger applies.'" Rynearson, 903 F.3d at 924-25 (quoting ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759).

Here, the State Action fits into a narrow category of cases to which this court should abstain—that is, Younger applies. The State Action that denied Gilliam an opportunity to intervene (allegedly, in violation of his constitutional rights) was "ongoing" when this suit was filed and is pending in the ICA. Indeed, the ICA has granted Gilliam's motion to stay enforcement of the orders of Judge Watanabe (Writ of Possession and Order appointing and authorizing the receiver to sell the property) that would eject him from the property—the very relief Gilliam had sought in his earlier Motion for TRO in this court. The State Action implicates important state interests (court operations and ability to enforce its judgments) and allows Gilliam to raise constitutional defenses. And much of the relief Gilliam seeks—an injunction preventing the State court from enforcing its foreclosure judgment, and invalidating the orders appointing and allowing the receiver to sell the property—involve "'[c]ore' orders [that] involve the administration of the state judicial process," ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759.² The order appointing and instructing the receiver to sell the property "relate[s] to the state courts' ability to enforce compliance with judgments already made." Cook, 879 F.3d at 1041; see also ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759 (giving "an...