Gilpin v. Harris

553 P.3d 169

Lisa GILPIN, Petitioner,

v.Hon. Danielle HARRIS, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pinal, Respondent Judge,Marcos Jerell Martinez, Real Party in Interest.

No. CR-23-0252-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed August 7, 2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County, The Honorable Danielle Harris, Judge, No. CR201800324. REMANDED

Order of the Court of Appeals, Division Two, No. 2 CA-SA 23-0067, Filed August 28, 2023

Colleen Clase (argued), Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Phoenix, Attorney for Lisa Gilpin

Kate Milewski, Pinal County Public Defender, Kevin D. Heade (argued), Defender Attorney, Pinal County Public Defender’s Office, Florence, Attorneys for Marcos Jerell Martinez

Randall Udelman, Arizona Crime Victim Rights Law Group, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Amici Curiae National Crime Victim Law Institute, et al.

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ and JUSTICES BRUTINEL, BOLICK, MONTGOMERY, and KING joined.

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

[1] ¶1 Legally insane individuals have been excused from criminal responsibility under Arizona law since at least 1901. Renée Melançon, Arizona 's Insane Response to Insanity, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 287, 294 (1998). But after a series of high-profile acquittals in the 1980s and 1990s, our legislature reduced the scope of the insanity defense. See id at 294— 99. Now, Arizona no longer has a traditional "not guilty by reason of insanity" defense. Instead, criminal defendants may be adjudicated "guilty except insane" ("GEI"). See A.R.S. § 13-502.

[2] ¶2 In State v. Heartfield, 196 Ariz. 407, 410 ¶ 10, 998 P.2d 1080, 1083 (App. 2000), our court of appeals held that defendants adjudged GEI are not responsible for their actions and, thus, do not have to pay restitution to their victims. In this Opinion, we examine the legislature’s changes to our state’s insanity defense and conclude that the legislature has assigned criminal responsibility to GEI defendants. In light of this legislative objective, we overrule Heartfield and hold that restitution is available from GEI defendants who cause or threaten to cause death or serious bodily injury.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Marcos Martinez killed his grandmother and subsequently pleaded GEI to first degree murder. Pursuant to his plea agreement, he was committed to the Arizona State Hospital and will remain under the jurisdiction of the superior court for the rest of his life. But—unlike what would have been the case with a guilty plea—Martinez’s GEI plea did not include restitution for the victims of his crime.

¶4 Lisa Gilpin claims to be a victim of Martinez’s crime. She sought roughly $18,300 in restitution from Martinez under Arizona’s Victims’ Bill of Rights (the "VBR").¹ But the superior court denied her request. It explained that, under Heartfield, a judgment of GEI is not a "conviction" for the purposes of restitution—and, therefore, restitution was unavailable.

¶5 Gilpin sought special action review from the court of appeals, but the court declined jurisdiction. We granted review because a crime victim’s entitlement to restitution from a GEI defendant is a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

[3] ¶6 This Court reviews issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo. Cox v. Ponce, 251 Ariz. 302, 304 ¶ 7, 491 P.3d 1109, 1111 (2021); Puente v. Ariz. State Legislature, 254 Ariz. 265, 268 ¶ 6, 521 P.3d 1007,1010 (2022).

I.

¶7 In Arizona, "a victim of crime has a right … [t]o receive prompt restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim’s loss or injury." Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8); see also State v. Patel, 251 Ariz. 131, 135 ¶ 14, 486 P.3d 188, 192 (2021) (explaining that the VBR grants victims the right to be restored to their pre-crime economic position). Thus, to determine whether a GEI defendant is responsible for restitution, we must determine whether a defendant adjudged GEI under § 13-502 has been "convicted of … criminal conduct." This, in turn, requires construing the word "convicted" as used in article 2, section 2.1(A)(8), as well as interpreting § 13-502 in the context of Arizona’s GEI framework.

A.

[4, 5] ¶8 We focus first on the constitutional right conferred by section 2.1(A)(8) of the VBR. The constitution does not define "convicted," so we give the term its plain meaning. See Matthews v. Indus. Comm’n, 254 Ariz. 157, 164 ¶ 34, 520 P.3d 168, 175 (2022). And we use context and dictionary definitions to help identify this plain meaning. See In re Drummond, — Ariz. —, —, 543 P.3d 1022, 1025 ¶ 7 (2024). The meaning of "convicted" varies in context, see State v. Green, 174 Ariz. 586, 587, 852 P.2d 401, 402 (1993), but it is ordinarily understood to mean a finding—or an accepted plea—of guilt, see In re Lazcano, 223 Ariz. 280, 282 ¶ 7, 222 P.3d 896, 898 (2010); see also State v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 4, 6, 672 P.2d 956, 958 (App. 1983). This understanding conforms with dictionary definitions. In the criminal context, "conviction" means "finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been proved guilty" and "[t]he judgment … that a person is guilty of a crime." Conviction, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

[6] ¶9 Here, nothing in the VBR suggests that anything other than this ordinary mean- ing and definition should apply. We therefore conclude that, in the context of the VBR, being convicted of criminal conduct is synonymous with being found guilty of a crime. But this begs the question: What does it mean to be found guilty of a crime?

¶10 As with "conviction," dictionary definitions are instructive when discerning the meaning of the word guilty. "Guilty," in the criminal context, means "[h]aving committed a crime; responsible for a crime." Guilty, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). Thus, being found guilty of a crime is synonymous with being found responsible for having committed a crime.

[7] ¶11 In this light, a simple syllogism reveals the plain meaning of article 2, section 2.1(A)(8). "Convicted" means a finding of guilt, and "guilty" means being held responsible. Therefore, being convicted of criminal conduct means being held responsible for criminal conduct. Accordingly, under the VBR, a crime victim has a right to receive restitution from the person held responsible for the crime causing his or her loss.

B.

¶12 Having established that the meaning of the word convicted in article 2, section 2.1(A)(8) is based on the concept of criminal responsibility, we now turn to whether a GEI defendant is held criminally responsible under § 13-502.

1.

[8] ¶13 As always, we start with the statutory text. Drummond, 543 P.3d at 1025 ¶ 5. But when the text is ambiguous—that is, "if more than one reasonable interpretation exists"—this Court turns to secondary interpretive techniques. Id. As relevant here, § 13-502(A) provides that:

A person may be found guilty except insane if at the time of the commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that the person did not know the criminal act was wrong. A mental disease or defect constituting legal insanity is an affirmative defense.

The statute also informs us that a "guilty except insane verdict is not a criminal conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes under § 13-703 or 13-704." § 13-502(E).

¶14 Here, § 13-502 is ambiguous because it has more than one reasonable meaning. On the one hand, § 13-502(A) refers to a person being "found guilty"—which suggests a finding of criminal responsibility. See Part 1(A). And subsection (D) instructs the judge to calculate and "suspend" a sentence, which suggests the "except insane" attached to the guilty finding only affects sentencing. Indeed, subsection (E) informs us that a GEI verdict is "not a criminal conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes." (Emphasis added.) This indicates that a GEI verdict is a criminal conviction outside of sentencing enhancement, or else the last clause of subsection (E) would be redundant. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) ("[E]very word and provision is to be given effect ….").

¶15 On the other hand, the words "except insane" follow the words "found guilty," suggesting that a legally insane defendant is excluded from being held criminally responsible. See Exception, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ exception (last visited Aug. 1, 2024) (defining "exception" as "the act of excepting" and "exclusion"). Furthermore, subsection (A) classifies a "mental disease or defect constituting legal insanity [a]s an affirmative defense." And an "affirmative defense" is defined as a defense "that attempts to excuse the criminal actions of the accused." A.R.S. § 13403(B). This suggests that, under § 13-502(A), mental diseases or defects may negate criminal responsibility and culpability. See State v. Holle, 240 Ariz. 300, 304 ¶ 22, 379 P.3d 197, 201 (2016). Unlike traditional affirmative defenses, however, GEI verdicts do not result in an acquittal. See State v. Reese, 156 Or.App. 406, 967 P.2d 514, 516 (1998) ("A guilty except for insanity finding is not an acquittal—it is a guilty verdict.").

¶16 Other statutes’ references to GEI verdicts also fail to clarify the issue. Several statutes imply that convictions are distinguishable from GEI verdicts—at least for some purposes. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(1) (distinguishing between a "final judgment of conviction or verdict of guilty except insane"); A.R.S. § 13-4518(A)(2) ("ever been convicted of or found guilty except insane"); A.R.S. § 14-2803(L)(2) ("‘Felonious and intentional’ means a conviction or a finding of guilty except insane …. "). But these distinctions do not conclusively establish a given meaning,...