Ginzburg v. Martínez-Dávila

368 F.Supp.3d 343

Alexander Aaron GINZBURG, Plaintiff,

v.Jorge Alberto MARTÍNEZ-DÁVILA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 19-1254 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 26, 2019.

Analynn M. Lopez-Cordova, Angel Sosa-Baez, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

OPINION AND ORDER

FRANCISCO A. BESOSA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On March 22, 2019, the Court denied plaintiff Alexander Aaron Ginzburg ("Ginzburg")'s request for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 (" Rule 65"). (Docket Nos. 4 and 10.) Ginzburg moves for reconsideration. (Docket No. 11.) For the reasons set forth below, Ginzburg's motion for reconsideration is DENIED .

I. Background

This litigation concerns a purported breach of contract. (Docket No. 1.) Ginzburg is a film producer. Id. a p. 1. Defendant Jorge Alberto Martínez-Dávila ("Martínez") is an actor, film producer, and the sole member of Utopia Film LLC ("Utopia Film"). Id. at pp. 1—2.¹

Around 2016 or 2017, Martínez planned to make a film and began some pre-production work. Id. at p. 2. The Puerto Rico Treasury Department provided Martínez with a tax credit pursuant to the Puerto Rico Film Industry Economic Incentives Act ("Act 27"), P.R. Laws Ann. tit 23, section 11006b. Id. at p. 3. Act 27 provides "grantees engaged in film projects or infrastructure projects ... a credit against [certain] taxes." P.R. Laws Ann. tit 23, § 11006b(a). The tax credit is valued at forty-percent of the "amounts certified by [an] Auditor as disbursed in connection with all Puerto Rico production expenditures." Id. § 1106b(b).² Grantees may sell the tax credit, the proceeds of which are "exempt from the payment of any tax imposed by the Government of Puerto Rico." Id. § 1106b(e).

Funds for the film dissipated, prompting Martínez to seek additional financing. Id. at p. 3. Ginzburg and Martínez purportedly entered into an agreement, evidenced by e-mail and text message communications. Id. Martínez agreed to transfer the tax credit and Utopia Film to Ginzburg. Id. at p. 4. The tax credit is "potentially worth about $ 730,000." Id. Ginzburg agreed to fund the entire film, ultimately contributing $ 901,310.90 to the project. Id. at p. 6. Martínez failed, however, to transfer the tax credit and Utopia Film to Ginzburg. Id. at p. 8.

Ginzburg asserts a breach of contract claim against Martínez, Parrilla, the Martínez-Parrilla conjugal relationship, and Utopia Film (collectively, "defendants") pursuant to Puerto Rico law. Id. at p. 9; see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3018. Should the Court find that the parties did not enter into an enforceable contract, Ginzburg requests that the Court construe the money he contributed to the film as a loan. Id. at p. 10. Ultimately, Ginzburg seeks "payment of $ 901,310.90." Id.

Ginzburg moved for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to enjoin the defendants from "selling, pledging, transferring or assigning the title and ownership of [Utopia Film] and the tax credit." (Docket No. 4 at p. 2.) The Court denied the motion for a TRO. (Docket No. 10.) Ginzburg moves for reconsideration. (Docket No. 11.) The arguments presented in support of Ginzburg's motion for reconsideration are unavailing.

II. Motion for Reconsideration Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not specifically provide for the filing of motions for reconsideration." Sánchez-Pérez v. Sánchez-González, 717 F.Supp.2d 187, 193-94 (D.P.R. 2010) (Besosa, J.) (citation omitted). "[I]t is settled in [the first] circuit[, however,] that a motion which ask[s] the court to modify its earlier disposition of [a] case because of an allegedly erroneous legal result is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)." Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a district court will alter its original order only if it "evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow situations." Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A motion for reconsideration does "not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures [or] allow a party [to] advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to judgment." Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). " Rule 59(e) does not exist to allow parties a second chance to prevail on the merits ... [and] is not an avenue for litigants to reassert arguments and theories that were previously rejected by the Court." Johnson & Johnson Int'l v. P.R. Hosp. Supply, Inc., 322 F.R.D. 439, 441 (D.P.R. 2017) (Besosa, J.) (citations omitted). "Stated another way, a motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded in a request for a district court to rethink a decision it has already made, rightly or wrongly." Morán- Vega v. Rivera-Hernández, 381 F.Supp.2d 31, 36 (D.P.R. 2005) (Domínguez, J.).

In deciding a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing court has considerable discretion. Venegas-Hernández v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2004). "As a general rule, motions for reconsideration should only be exceptionally granted." Villanueva-Méndez v. Nieves-Vázquez, 360 F.Supp.2d 320, 323 (D.P.R. 2005) (Domínguez, J.). " Rule 59(e) relief is granted sparingly." Biltcliffe, 772 F.3d at 930.

III. Discussion

A temporary restraining order "is a provisional remedy imposed to maintain the status quo until a full review of the facts and legal arguments is available." Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 389-99 (2d Cir. 1995). The following four factors govern the Court's TRO analysis: (1) the likelihood that the movant will succeed on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) the balance of the relevant equities (i.e ., the hardship that will befall the defendants if the TRO issues contrasted with the hardship that will befall Ginzburg if the TRO does not issue); and (4) the effect of the Court's ruling on the public interest. Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981).³

Injunctive relief is "a matter for the discretion of the district court and is reversible, of course, only for an abuse of discretion." Id. Temporary restraining orders "must be used sparingly and only in cases where the need for extraordinary equitable relief is clear and plain." Northwest Bypass Grp. v. United States Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 453 F.Supp.2d 333, 338 (D.N.H. 2006) (internal citation and quotation omitted); see Mass. Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Def. Agency & Office of Emergency Preparedness, 649 F.2d 71, 76 n.7 (1st Cir. 1981). Ginzburg shoulders the burden of establishing that a TRO is warranted. Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1996).

A. Ginzburg Failed to Demonstrate Irreparable Harm

Ginzburg contends that the potential "dissipation of assets by the defendants" constitutes irreparable harm. (Docket No. 11 at p. 2.) According to Ginzburg, a TRO will preserve the tax credit and Utopia Film. Id. at 3. These assets, Ginzburg argues, are "indispensable for this Honorable Court to grant a meaningful remedy." The Court disagrees.⁴

To demonstrate irreparable harm, Ginzburg must establish that legal remedies are inadequate. Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 292, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (holding that the "inadequacy of a legal remedy is a prerequisite for equitable relief in any case"); See Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661, 668 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[T]he general rule is if there is an adequate remedy at law, equitable relief is unavailable."). "Legal remedies traditionally involve money damages [whereas equitable remedies] are ‘typically coercive, and are enforceable directly on the person or thing to which they are directed.’ " Int'l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Canada, Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2004).

This litigation is an attempt to recover legal damages. Ginzburg maintains that he is entitled to the tax credit and ownership of Utopia Film. (Docket No. 1.) Should these assets become unavailable, however, Ginzburg seeks a monetary award of $ 901,301.90. (Docket No. 1 at p. 10.) By doing so, Ginzburg recognizes that money damages are sufficient to remedy the harm he purportedly suffered. See CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Cost Props., 48 F.3d 618, 622 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that "an entitlement to money damages, without more, rarely constitutes an adequate basis for injunctive relief"). Accordingly, a TRO is not appropriate in this action. See Charles Equity Fund II, 370 F.3d at 162 (denying motion for injunctive relief, because the movant "[sought] an award of pecuniary damages" to "make it whole").⁵

Ginzburg fears that he "may end up without any means to enforce a judgment or collect the amounts he is owed." (Docket No. 4 at p. 7.) The potential inability of defendants to satisfy a future judgment is, however, an insufficient basis to grant injunctive relief. See Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that "a preliminary injunction is not warranted by a tenuous or overly speculative forecast of anticipated harm"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce & Smith, Inc., v. Bishop, 839 F.Supp. 68, 70 (D. Me. 1993) ("[E]conomic harm in and of itself is not sufficient to constitute irreparable harm.").⁶ Inherent in every breach of contract action is the possibility that the Court will award a monetary judgment that the defendant cannot satisfy. Granting a TRO based on this contingency would obliterate the irreparable harm requirement. See Alvin J. Coleman & Son, Inc. v. Francis Harvey & Sons, Inc., Case No. 12-40068, 2012 WL 3257894, *3, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110152, *10 (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2012) (The "possibility that Plaintiffs will be unable to satisfy any judgment they may obtain...