Gitwaza v. Garland

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PAUL MUHIRWA GITWAZA v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, ET AL.

ACTION No. 4:22-CV-434-P

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division

December 6, 2023

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JEFFREY L. CURETON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 25], filed May 19, 2023, and (2) Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 28] filed May 21, 2023. Having carefully considered the motions responses, and reply, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED and Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED as genuine issues of material fact exist, and, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), this case should be returned to the District Court Judge to conduct a de novo hearing on Plaintiff's application.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Paul Muhirwa Gitwaza is a citizen of Rwanda and has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since July 26, 2013. (Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for Hearing on Naturalization Application (“Pl.'s Compl.”) at 1.) Based on an incident allegedly occurring on June 9, 2017, Plaintiff was arrested on September 30, 2018 and charged in the Kings Criminal Court, Brooklyn, New York, with Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree in violation of New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 130.55, a class B misdemeanor, and Forcible Touching-Intimate, in violation of NYPL § 130.52(01), a class A misdemeanor. (Defendants' Appendix to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs.' App.”) at 2, 6.) There is a factual dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding whether Plaintiff entered a “pre-plea” or a “temporary plea” to the initial charges.^[1] On March 13, 2019, Plaintiff pled guilty to the lesser charge of Disorderly Conduct in violation of NYPL § 240.20, which is classified under New York law as a violation. (Defs.' App. at 5-6.) An Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal Conditional Discharge and Pre-Sentence Conditions, also dated March 13, 2019, shows that Plaintiff was: (1) sentenced to a one-year conditional discharge, to expire on March 12, 2020; (2) ordered to pay a mandatory surcharge and other fees; and (3) ordered to complete a sex offender program and that failure to do so would result in fifteen days in jail.^[2] (Defs.' App. at 5.) On March 13, 2019, a judge at the Kings Criminal Court also entered an Order of Protection that was effective until and including March 12, 2021, and ordered Plaintiff to have no contact with the alleged victim. (Defs.' App. at 4.) Plaintiff encountered difficulty in completing his required sex offender treatment because, after passing a polygraph test that questioned him about his conduct with the alleged victim, Plaintiff's therapist in Texas terminated the treatment, stating that it was unethical for the therapist to “heal somebody who is not a sex offender.” (Defs.' App. at 12; see Plaintiff's Appendix to Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 38], at 1-7.)^[3] In January 2020, Plaintiff completed all required evaluations, classes, court appearances, and adherence to the restraining order concerning his conviction for disorderly conduct. (Defs.' App. at 52.)

On May 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking de novo review and requested a hearing by this Court on his Form N-400 Naturalization Application (“Form N-400 Application”), which was filed on September 16, 2020, and denied initially by Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) on January 28, 2022. (Defs.' App. at 51-56.) In the denial, the USCIS found that, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(3)(iii), Plaintiff had not established during the statutory period that he was a person of good moral character based on Plaintiff's conviction for Disorderly Conduct stemming from charges of sexual abuse and forcible touching that occurred during the statutory period and Plaintiff's failure to establish extenuating circumstances.^[4] (Defs.' App. at 52-53.) Plaintiff requested reconsideration and, on April 11, 2022, Plaintiff appeared for a hearing before the USCIS to review the denial of his Form N-400 Application. (Defs.' App. at 57.)

At the USCIS hearing, Plaintiff submitted a letter in which he, inter alia, denied forcibly touching or committing any kind of sexual abuse upon the woman who made the allegations against him (“the alleged victim”) that resulted in his arrest. (Defs.' App. at 38.) In the letter, Plaintiff claimed that he had been falsely accused by the alleged victim, who he had originally met in 2005 when he baptized her in France. (Id.) Plaintiff further stated that he reconnected with the alleged victim when she saw him in New York one day and, eventually, the alleged victim became “one of [his] family.” (Id. at 38-39.) He claimed that the incident occurred when the alleged victim invited him to stay at her apartment to pray for her when Plaintiff was visiting “the ambassador in New York.” (Id. at 39.) Plaintiff further stated that: (1) the alleged victim acted inappropriately toward him; (2) he refused her advances; and (3) he, ultimately, “kicked her (with [his] foot) to go out from the room, she struck the room door, then she left.” (Id. at 3940.) Plaintiff, in the letter, also set forth his personal and work background, as well as how he had been a good and moral citizen. (Id. at 36-38.) In a decision dated May 4, 2022, the USCIS reaffirmed its denial of Plaintiff's Form N-400 Application. (“Defs.' App. at 51-62.)

II. PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

In Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “has the burden of establishing that he met the good moral character requirement,” and that Plaintiff cannot do so “because [Plaintiff] pled guilty to an offense arising out of his sexual abuse of a woman in New York City.” (Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs.' Br.”) at 4.) Defendants claim that there is no dispute that Plaintiff engaged in an unlawful act “as touching ‘[a woman's.] bare breasts . . . without [her] consent . . . is ‘against moral or ethical standards.'” (Defs.' Br. at 6.)

At the hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment, Defendants argued that Plaintiff's act of entering into a temporary plea or pre-plea agreement to Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree and Forcible Touching was an admission that Plaintiff engaged in these crimes, even if such temporary plea or pre-plea agreement was later vacated. Defendants further claimed that, at the very least, Disorderly Conduct^[5] rises to the level of showing that Plaintiff does not have good moral character as Plaintiff admits that he kicked the alleged victim while they were alone. Defendants also argued that Plaintiff did not contend that any extenuating circumstances applied for his behavior.

In Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that he pled to Disorderly Conduct, which is a violation and not a crime under New York law, and that he never admitted to any of the allegations of which he was accused. (Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.'s Br.”) at 2-3.) Plaintiff claims that he “has never forcibly touched the alleged victim or had any kind of sexual contact with her.” (Pl.'s Br. at 3.) Plaintiff states that, on March 13, 2019, he “pleaded to the violation of Disorderly Conduct in violation of New York Penal Law (NYPL) 240.20” and “never pleaded to the charges alleged in the accusatory to wit, the forcible touching and sexual abuse[ ], which were vacated.” (Pl.'s Br. at 3.) Plaintiff states that “[t]here was never a pre plea agreement in this matter” and that he “only pleaded to the violation.” (Pl.'s Br. at 3.) As to the sex offender program, Plaintiff states:

Concerning the sex offender program, it was stopped after three months because Plaintiff passed a polygraph test in the State of Texas, and the program administrator, Dr. Cameron[,] stated that he could not treat Plaintiff because Plaintiff was not a sex offender. The victim never submitted to a polygraph test. Plaintiff could not comply with the treatment program because the doctor in charge of the program stated that Plaintiff was not a sex offender; and therefore, he could not treat someone who was not a sex offe[nder]. Plaintiff asked to withdraw the plea and go to trial after the polygraph test, but the Court declined to withdraw the plea. A plea to disorderly conduct was first entered, but Plaintiff was not sentenced until the program had been completed. Plaintiff pleaded to disorderly conduct on March 13, 2019, and was sentenced on January 9, 2020.

Criminal counsel of Plaintiff stated that Plaintiff entered a pre-plea to the charges, and after the treatment was completed, the plea was vacated, and a plea to disorderly conduct was entered. However what counsel meant was that Plaintiff entered a plea to disorderly conduct because there was never a pre-plea in the criminal matter. The record supports the finding that there was never a preplea in this matter.

(Pl.'s Br. at 3-4 (internal citations omitted).) Plaintiff claims that “he pleaded to a violation, which is a petty crime, and does not affect the good moral character requirement.” (Pl.'s Br. at 4.)

At the summary-judgment motion hearing, Plaintiff further argued that he agreed to plead to Disorderly Conduct because it would not impact his immigration status as it qualified as a “petty crime” under the immigration statutes. Plaintiff again emphasized that there was no preplea in this case and that he only ever pled guilty to Disorderly Conduct which is not a crime of moral turpitude. (Id.) Plaintiff claimed that, pursuant to the “petty offense exception” found in 8...