Givens v. Chicago

234 N.E.3d 22

2023 IL 127837

John W. GIVENS et al., Appellees,

v.The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.

Docket No. 127837

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed October 19, 2023

Rehearing denied November 27, 2023

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon, Bridget J. Hughes, Judge, presiding.

Celia Meza, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Suzanne Loose, and Ellen W. McLaughlin, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.

Robert J. Napleton, Brion W. Doherty, and David S. Gallagher, of Motherway & Napleton, LLP, and Alexander McH. Memmen, of Memmen Law Firm, LLC, both of Chicago, and Lynn D. Dowd and Jennifer L, Barron, both of Naperville, for appellees.

OPINION

JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 After John W. Givens, Leland Dudley, and David Strong burglarized an elec- tronics store in 2012, they attempted to escape by backing a van out of a closed garage door, striking a police officer in the process. Chicago police officers fired their weapons at the van, resulting in Strong’s death and injuries to Dudley and Givens. Dudley and Givens were thereafter charged, convicted, and sentenced for felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2012)), aggravated battery to a peace officer (id. § 12-3.05(d)(4)), and possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2012)). Subsequently, they and Strong’s estate filed a civil lawsuit in the circuit court of Cook County against defendant, the City of Chicago (City), alleging the use of excessive force.

¶ 2 With respect to Dudley and Givens, the circuit court entered summary judgment for the City based on the collateral estoppel effect of their prior criminal proceedings. The estate’s lawsuit proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a partial verdict for the estate. However, the circuit court granted the City’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the jury’s answers to special interrogatories.

¶ 3 On appeal, the appellate court reversed the circuit court’s rulings on both issues, holding that (1) collateral estoppel did not apply to bar Dudley and Givens from litigating their excessive force claims and (2) the circuit court erred in vacating the jury’s verdict for the estate. 2021 IL App (1st) 192434, 451 Ill.Dec. 914, 184 N.E.3d 501. We allowed the City’s petition for leave to appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the appellate court’s judgment.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In the early morning hours of April 30, 2012, Givens, Dudley, and Strong burglarized Mike’s Electronics, a store selling car alarms and audio equipment located at 2459 South Western Avenue in Chicago. The store consisted of a showroom and attached garage on the first floor of the building. The three offenders entered the store through a window by breaking open a metal grate. An occupant of the second-floor apartment heard noises and notified the police. Multiple police officers arrived at the scene while Dudley, Givens, and Strong were still inside the store. Meanwhile, the three offenders took merchandise from the showroom into the attached garage and loaded it into a van that belonged to the store’s owner. They then got into the van, put it in reverse, and broke through the closed garage door. Dudley was in the driver’s seat, Strong was in the front passenger seat, and Givens was in the back seat. As the van exited the garage at a high rate of speed, it struck Chicago police officer Michael Papin on his left hip before hitting two other vehicles. Eight police officers shot their weapons at the van, firing approximately 75 bullets at the van and its occupants. Strong died at the scene. Givens and Dudley sustained severe injuries and were later charged criminally.

¶ 6 After being tried jointly by a criminal jury, Dudley and Givens were convicted of first degree felony murder predicated on a forcible felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2012)), aggravated battery to a peace officer (id. § 12-3.05(d)(4)), burglary (id. § 19-1(a)), and possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2012)). People v. Dudley, 2018 IL App (1st) 152039-U, ¶ 2, 2018 WL 4513850; People v. Givens, 2018 IL App (1st) 152031-U, ¶ 2, 2018 WL 6048224. Givens was convicted of aggravated battery to a peace officer based on an accountability theory for Dudley’s actions. Givens, 2018 IL App (1st) 152031-U, ¶ 13. Merging the burglary conviction into the felony murder conviction, the circuit court sentenced Giv- ens to consecutive prison terms of 20 years for felony murder, 6 years for aggravated battery, and 6 years for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Id. ¶ 2. Merging Dudley’s burglary conviction into his felony murder conviction, the circuit court sentenced Dudley to consecutive prison terms of 25 years for felony murder, 6 years for aggravated battery, and 6 years for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Dudley, 2018 IL App (1st) 152039-U, ¶ 2. Their convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. Id. ¶ 48; Givens, 2018 IL App (1st) 152031-U, ¶ 61.

¶ 7 A. Dudley’s and Givens’s Criminal Appeals

¶ 8 In Dudley, 2018 IL App (1st) 152039-U, ¶ 18, the appellate court noted that, in the felony murder context, courts in Illinois adhere to the proximate cause theory of liability (People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392, 401, 305 Ill.Dec. 927, 856 N.E.2d 1078 (2006); People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462, 465, 227 Ill.Dec. 491, 687 N.E.2d 973 (1997)), wherein liability attaches for any death proximately resulting from an offender’s unlawful activity. The appellate court found it undisputed that Dudley committed burglary, a forcible felony under Illinois law (720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2012)). Dudley, 2018 IL App (1st) 152039-U, ¶ 20. The appellate court held that Strong’s death occurred during Dudley’s burglary commission because Strong was shot during the offenders’ attempt to escape from the police. Id. The appellate court further held that "Strong would not have been killed had [Dudley] not carried out that burglary." Id. In rejecting Dudley’s argument that he was not liable because Strong’s death was directly attributable to the police shooting, the appellate court noted that "the purpose of the felony murder statute would be defeated if resistance, even in the form of deadly force, could be considered a sufficient intervening circumstance to terminate a [criminal] defendant’s liability for felony murder." Id. ¶ 21.

¶ 9 The appellate court further rejected Dudley’s claim that Strong’s death was not a foreseeable consequence of his burglary offense because he was unaware that the police were outside the store and, given that Dudley and his cooffenders were unarmed, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the police would use deadly force in shooting at the van. Id. ¶ 22. The appellate court stated:

"First, [Sergio] Hernandez [(who occupied the second-floor apartment)] testified that the police continuously announced their presence after they arrived. More notably, the video footage showed that lights flashed inside the showroom and the garage, and in both instances, at least one of the offenders hid. Finally, before [Dudley] drove the van through the garage door, Officers Lopez and Gonzalez broke a hole through the interior door to the garage, and continuously yelled ‘Chicago police officers, come out, you’re surrounded, just come out.’ Thus, [Dudley] had reason to know that once he drove the van through the garage door, a police officer would be in the vehicle’s path. Moreover, [Dudley] disregards that the van, itself, was a deadly weapon, inviting the police to resist its force with their own deadly weapons." Id.

The appellate court "categorically reject[ed] [Dudley’s] vacuous contention that no reasonable person could have foreseen that, in reversing a van through a locked garage door during a burglary commission, he would be met with police resistance using deadly force." Id. ¶ 23. The appellate court concluded that Dudley’s felony murder conviction furthered the purpose of the felony murder statute because he committed a forcible felony and Strong was killed as a result of the violence accompanying that felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2012) (person who kills another without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing acts which cause the death, he is committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder)). Dudley, 2018 IL App (1st) 152039-U, ¶ 24; see also Givens, 2018 IL App (1st) 152031-U, ¶ 30.

¶ 10 The appellate court further addressed whether the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of a general order of the Chicago Police Department. Dudley, 2018 IL App (1st) 152039-U, ¶ 25. The general order provided that, when confronted by an oncoming vehicle, officers are authorized to fire at it to prevent death or great bodily harm to themselves or others but, if it is known that the vehicle is the only force being used, officers should move out of the vehicle’s path. Id. The appellate court held that the issue before it involved whether Strong’s death was a foreseeable consequence of Dudley’s burglary offense, not whether the police shooting was reasonably foreseeable to Dudley. Id. ¶ 27; see also Givens, 2018 IL App (1st) 152031-U, ¶ 34.

¶ 11 In Dudley, the appellate court further held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish that Dudley knowingly caused bodily harm to Officer Papin. Dudley, 2018 IL App (1st) 152039-U, ¶ 30; see 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West 2012) (a person commits aggravated battery when, in committing a battery, he knows the individual battered to be a peace officer); 720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 2012) (a person commits battery if he knowingly without legal justification causes bodily harm to an individual or makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual). The appellate court stated:

"In his brief, [Dudley]

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