Glagola v. MacFann

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ALYSSIA GLAGOLA, Plaintiff, v. WALTER MACFANN, et al, Defendants

Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-01263

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

July 27, 2023

J Nicholas Ranjan, Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ECF NO. 24

LISA PUPO LENIHAN, MAGISTRATE JUDGE

For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 24, be granted. More particularly, it is recommended that Plaintiff's two Federal statutory causes of action be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim as a matter of law and that the Court decline to exercise supplemental (here pendent) jurisdiction over the State law claims asserted.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ECF No. 11, was filed on September 9, 2022.^[1] Count I of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Walter MacFann, identified as her “landlord”, violated the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 3613, by “committing discriminatory housing practices” against her, while Count II alleges that he violated the Federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §1595, by subjecting her to “forced labor” under § 1589 and “sex trafficking” under § 1591. These counts further assert vicarious liability on the part of additional Defendants Tri-County Realty Associates, L.P. (“TCRA”), identified as the contractual lessor of the rental property, and AMW Consulting, LLC (“AMW”), identified as TCRA's general partner.^[2] Plaintiff also asserts seven State law counts: Assault, Battery, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, False Imprisonment, Trespass, Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment and, as against only TCRA and AMW, negligence.

In preface to strikingly sparse Counts, the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff left her boyfriend with her young son, little money and nowhere to go.^[3] She was introduced to MacFann, “a local real estate agent and investor” who “leased” her a home but “[u]nlike most landlords” wanted sex rather than rent.^[4] MacFann then “used Glagola's vulnerabilities to coerce her into a month's long sexual relationship”. ECF No. 11 at 1. Plaintiff then alleges that she signed a lease with TCRA, as her landlord, and that MacFann “allowed” Plaintiff to rent the home “for a month for cleaning the property without paying full rent.” Id. at 2.

When she was unable to pay her rent thereafter, MacFann “explain[ed] that he would pay Plaintiff's rent in exchange for sex.” Id. at 3. Owing to her personal and economic circumstances (i.e., her perceived absence of choice), Plaintiff acquiesced. Plaintiff then began to abuse alcohol, and MacFann began to not only demand sex for payment but to become angry when he suspected she had “male visitors” or had “gone on dates” (once sending her a photograph of a car parked in her driveway); sent unwanted sexual texts/messages; threatened her with homelessness and physically threatened her against ending their sexual relationship (once with a screwdriver and once pulling her by her clothes); and let himself into her home without notice or consent, including late at night. Id. at 3-4. MacFann implied he had a connected/influential position in the community and that a complaint against him “would not be believed.” When Plaintiff sought professional (substance use/mental health) treatment, “she was able to break off the relationship with MacFann and leave the property.” Id. at 4-5. There follows Plaintiff's two Federal claims (which include requests for punitive damages) and seven State law claims. Id. at 5-11.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support, ECF Nos. 24 and 25, were filed in early December, 2022.^[5] Plaintiff's Response in Opposition and Defendants' Reply were filed at ECF Nos. 26 and 27, respectively, and the issues raised are ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):

Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and a plaintiff must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013); Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).

III. ANALYSIS

As noted above, Counts I and II allege violations of the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 3613 (the “FHA”) and the Federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §1595 (the “TVPA”), respectively.

Fair Housing Act

First, the FHA makes it unlawful for property owners, landlords and by extension those acting within the scope of their role as agents, to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). See also Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 (2014) (holding this indicates “but for” causality). And Section 3613 of the FHA extends its protections from receiving different/less favorable housing availability, terms, or services to both quid pro quo (e.g., rental availability or terms linked to/exchanged for sex or sexual considerations) and “hostile housing environment” harassment. ECF No. 25 at 1517; ECF No. 27 at 7-10.^[6]

The Amended Complaint, however, neither alleges nor suggests that the availability of Plaintiff's lease with TCRA nor its terms or provision of services were conditioned on, or severely or pervasively adversely affected/influenced by (related to), MacFann's improper conduct, an essential element to a sexual harassment FHA claim. Cf., e.g., Fox v. Gaines, 4 F.4th 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 2021) (FHA sexual harassment claim actionable where sexual favors expressly sought for rental of available property and reduced rent thereafter, followed by fraudulent violation notices and fraudulent eviction notice after rental was paid); Kruger v. Cuomo, 115 F.23d 487, 489 (7^th Cir. 1997) (quid pro quo case alleging landlord's aggressive solicitations of sex for reduction in rental, followed by impositions of additional fees, repair charges and other actions adverse to leasehold). Rather, the coercive power of MacFann's alleged demands derived from his ability and threats to stop personally “pay[ing] Plaintiff's rent in exchange for sex”.^[7] Plaintiff does not allege that her lease contract was conditioned on those demands. She does not allege that its terms (e.g., rental due to TCRA) were different or changed, or that leasehold services (e.g., necessary repairs) were refused, or that her leasehold was withheld/revoked (e.g., by action for retaliatory eviction) in consequence of MacFann's sexual harassment.^[8] That is, the Amended Complaint fails to ground a claim that MacFann's assertedly opportunistic, immoral and perhaps otherwise actionable misconduct came within the discriminatory treatment scope of the fair housing protections of the FHA. ECF No. 25 at 8-12; ECF No. 27 at 7-8.

Federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act

Second the statutory provisions contained in the TVPA at Sections 1589, Forced Labor, and 1591, Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud or Coercion, are generally directed -as their titles suggest - to (a) forced work/involuntary servitude (such as enslavement-like conditions and abuse of e.g., immigrant/undocumented or otherwise unprotected peoples) and (b) commercial sex trafficking of children or in other specified circumstances. ECF No. 25 at 1-12; ECF No. 27 at 3-4.^[9] The reach of neither is so broad as to extend to the “rent payment in exchange for sex” nature of the individual parties' transactions/relationship (whether such funds MacFann's alleged admonition that Plaintiff “need[ed] to call [him] or [would] be homeless” - a plausible consequence of his withholding the funds she required to meet her lease obligations - is not analogous to FHA cases in which a landlord/agent invoked eviction proceedings or an oppressor threatened deportation. Cf. id. at 6 (alleging abuse of legal process). Cf. also ECF No. 11 at 4 (text message image reading “sex or promissory note which one do you wanna do”) were paid by MacFann directly to Plaintiff or to the rent due on her housing lease with TCRA). The Amended Complaint's allegations regarding Plaintiff's (a) one month cleaning of her rented premises in exchange for a rental payment reduction by MacFann and (b) sexual services to MacFann thereafter, do not come within the statutory provisions of the TVPA (or their intended application by way of, e.g., analogous cases). To the contrary, Plaintiff describes constraint by circumstances (domestic hardships, voluntary housing displacement, poverty, unemployment, a young son), of which MacFann took advantage, but which were independent of his conduct.^[10]She does not describe constraints of physical or psychological confinement approaching enslavement or other conditions of...