Glen Riddle Station, L.P. v. Middletown Twp.

GLEN RIDDLE STATION, L.P., Plaintiff, v. MIDDLETOWN TOWNSHIP, Defendant.

Civ. No. 21-286

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 25, 2021

Diamond, J.

MEMORANDUM

Apartment complex owner Glen Riddle Station asks me to remedy a purported due process violation by issuing a state law "mandamus" order prescribing Middletown Township's interpretation and enforcement of its local fire code. I will dismiss because the Court lacks both jurisdiction and the authority to issue a state law mandamus. As a further alternate ground, I will dismiss because GRS has no standing. Finally, even if this action were otherwise viable, I would abstain from hearing it.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In May 2020, Sunoco filed a Declaration of Taking in the Delaware County Common Pleas Court, condemning portions of GRS's property to provide temporary workspace and access road easements for non-party Sunoco LLP's work on the Mariner East 2 pipeline. (Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 6-10.) GRS is comprised of five buildings; Sunoco's workspace easement extends through the middle of the property, with three buildings on one side and two on the other. (See Ex. E to Compl., Doc. No. 1-3, at 25.) To reduce noise, Sunoco installed temporary "Sound Walls" along the sides of the easement; the Walls are configured differently during the day and at night. (Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 11-12.) This dispute arises from Sunoco's "Sound Walls Plan."

As alleged, before the Walls were completed, GRS asked the Township to be heard regarding any upcoming construction that might affect its property. (Id. ¶¶ 15-18.) As alleged, the Township approved the Plan without hearing from GRS. (Id. ¶¶ 19.) During a January 11, 2021 public meeting, the Township declared the Plan safe, and issued a corresponding "safety declaration" in its January Engineering Report. (Id. ¶ 20.) The Walls were built later that month.

The gravamen of GRS's Complaint is that the Plan is unsafe because it violates several provisions of the "International Fire Code" (which the Township has adopted). (Id. ¶¶ 23-42.) GRS first alleges that the Walls bisect existing roads, violating the fire code requirement that each dwelling be equipped with two separate fire apparatus access roads. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) GRS also urges that the Walls: lack required movable gates that can be operated by one person; and obstruct the property's roads, thus violating the code requirement to allow sufficient space for emergency vehicles to turn around on dead-end fire apparatus roads. (Id. ¶¶ 34-40.) GRS urges that in combination, these purported defects might prevent emergency services from easy access to the property during a fire or other emergency. (Id. ¶¶ 54-56.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The record abundantly shows that GRS's objection to the Plan is but one of countless complaints it has made in connection with Mariner East 2's construction. (PUC Compl., Doc. No. 12, Ex. 8; Id. Ex. D, E, F, H, K.) On December 2, 2020, after its complaints were not resolved to its satisfaction, GRS filed a Public Utility Commission complaint against Sunoco alleging, inter alia, that the Plan was unsafe, thus violating the Township's fire code. (See generally PUC Compl., Doc. No. 12, Ex. 8; see also id. ¶¶ 51-52, 70.) Although that matter remains pending, the Administrative Law Judge recently ruled that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to hearallegations of municipal ordinance violations. (See January 28, 2021 Order, PUC Dkt. No. C-2020-3023129.)

On January 21, 2021, GRS filed the instant two count Complaint: (1) alleging under § 1983 that the Township violated GRS's procedural due process rights; and (2) asking me to exercise "supplemental jurisdiction" and "cure" that violation by issuing a state law mandamus order directing the Township to interpret and apply specific provisions of its fire code in a manner GRS favors. (Compl., Doc. No. 1); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. GRS thus asks me to rule that the Township must comply with local fire code sections D106, D103.4, and D103.5. (Compl., Doc. No. 1, at 13-14.) GRS further asks me to direct the Township to bar work on the GRS property until the Township enforces those three provisions against Sunoco, thus "curing" the Walls' "defects" I discussed earlier. (Id.) GRS also seeks monetary damages.

On January 25, 2021, GRS filed an "Emergency Motion for Writ of Mandamus and Peremptory Judgment." (Doc. No. 3.) Remarkably, GRS never requested a hearing on its "Emergency Motion." I ordered GRS to serve a copy of the Motion on Sunoco, and asked any interested party to submit a memorandum addressing whether: (1) the Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter; (2) a federal court has the authority to issue a "mandamus" under Pennsylvania procedural law directing a municipality as to how it must interpret and enforce its own ordinances; (3) Sunoco is an indispensable party; (4) GRS has standing; and (5) I am required to abstain from hearing this matter. (Doc. No. 7.) GRS, the Township, and Sunoco (as amicus curiae) have submitted memoranda. (Doc. Nos. 10, 12-13, 17-20.)

The Township now moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of standing, and failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 23); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (12)(b)(6). Sunocofiled a short statement supporting dismissal. (Doc. No. 25.) GRS asks me to deny the Township's Motion. (Doc. No. 26.)

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Motion to Dismiss Under 12(b)(1)

The Third Circuit instructs that a "facial attack" on subject matter jurisdiction:

is an argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court because, for example, it does not present a question of federal law, or because there is no indication of a diversity of citizenship among the parties, or because some other jurisdictional defect is present.

Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). In ruling on a facial attack, I must accept as true all facts alleged and construe any inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.

Because standing is a jurisdictional issue, motions to dismiss for want of standing are commonly addressed under Rule 12(b)(1). In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012).

Courts disagree as to whether abstention is analyzed under Rule 12(b)(1), Rule 12(b)(6), or distinct standards. See Bird v. Borough of Moosic, 2020 WL 7699452, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2020) (compiling cases). Compare Jaffery v. Atl. Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 695 F. App'x 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming district court's decision granting 12(b)(1) motion on abstention grounds); Dutton v. Court of Common Pleas of Phila. Domestic Relations Div., 215 F. App'x 161, 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (analyzing abstention motion distinctly from 12(b)(6) or 12(b)(1) motions); Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Twp., 671 F.2d 743, 745 (3d Cir. 1982) (describing dismissal on abstention grounds as "in the nature of a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)"). The distinctions are semantic, however, as all the standards require me to accept as true GRS's factual allegations.

IV. DISCUSSION

I will dismiss because the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, I conclude that GRS lacks standing. In the further alternative, I will dismiss because this Court is without authority to grant the relief GRS seeks. Finally, even in the absence of these defects, I would abstain.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

I must dismiss if the federal claim supporting supplemental jurisdiction "is 'made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction' or if the claim is 'wholly insubstantial and frivolous.'" Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 898 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). This is not a factual determination; dismissal is appropriate only where the claims are "insubstantial on their face." Id. (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542 n.10 (1974)). Further, "dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely because the legal theory alleged is probably false, but only because the right claimed is 'so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.'" Id. at 899 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)).

GRS contends that because the Court has federal question jurisdiction over its due process claim, it also has supplemental jurisdiction over GRS's state law mandamus request. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing for "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (establishing "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy").

To make out a § 1983 due process violation, the plaintiff must show "that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'life, liberty, or property,' and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide 'due process of law.'" Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).

GRS alleges that its due process rights were violated by the Township's "clandestine" approval of the Sound Walls Plan, including its failure to provide GRS adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard. (Compl., Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 47-56; Motion for Mandamus, Doc. No. 3, at 2-4.) Unfortunately for GRS, it seeks to protect an insubstantial interest. The mere risk of harm—here, that in very limited circumstances emergency vehicles might not have easy access to every part of the property—is not a cognizable deprivation of life, liberty, or property. See Rivera v. Rhode Island,...