Glenn v. Frenchko

642 F.Supp.3d 633

Christine GLENN, Plaintiff, v. Michelle Nicole FRENCHKO, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 4:21-CV-2276

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

Signed November 22, 2022

Matthew P. Baringer, Dennis R. Fogarty, Davis & Young, Willoughby Hills, OH, for Plaintiff.

Edmond Z. Jaber, Mazanec Raskin Ryder, Cleveland, OH, Kathleen M. Minahan, Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder, Solon, OH, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES E. FLEMING, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

The question before the Court is whether Plaintiff Christine Glenn should be granted leave to amend her complaint to cure its deficiencies, or whether Defendants Nicole Frenchko ("Frenchko") and Trumbull County Commissioners ("Commissioners") (collectively, "Defendants") should be granted judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 10) is DENIED.

FACTS, HISTORY, AND PENDING MOTIONS

On December 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed her original complaint against Frenchko and the Commissioners, alleging age and ancestry discrimination. (EFC No. 1, Complaint). Plaintiff initially sued under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Title VII of the American Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Id. at PageID# 2, ¶ 5). Plaintiff alleged that, upon her election as a county commissioner, Frenchko arrived to work with a list of employees she intended to remove from the Commissioner's office. (Id. at ¶ 10). Additionally, Frenchko was allegedly overheard stating she would "badger the old ones 'til they quit" and expressed a desire "to get someone younger in [Plaintiff's] position who knows technology." (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12). Plaintiff also stated that she "is of Italian descent and was subjected to defamatory and derogatory statements made about Italian people by Frenchko." (Id. at PageID# 3, ¶16).

The Complaint includes two counts: Count One asserts a federal age discrimination claim,¹ and Count Two alleges "Ethnic Discrimination" against Frenchko. Notably, the Complaint states that Plaintiff remains employed as the administrative secretary for the Trumbull County Commissioners, and does not allege that the Commissioners have taken any adverse action against her. (Id. at PageID# 2, ¶ 8).

Defendants jointly filed an Amended Answer² to the Complaint on February 22, 2022, generally denying the allegations against them, and included among their affirmative defenses that "Plaintiff has no damages and/or has failed to mitigate damages." (EFC No. 7, PageID# 13, ¶ 3). On February 25, 2022, Defendants filed a Renewed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.³ (EFC No. 9). Defendants claim the Court should dismiss for three reasons:

1) Age discrimination is not a cognizable claim under Title VII, and Plaintiff should have instead brought that claim under the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA) (id. at PageID# 37);

2) Frenchko is an improper party to the action, as neither Title VII nor the ADEA impose individual liability on supervisors or managers (id.); and

3) Plaintiff's ancestry discrimination claim is not ripe because Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies by pursuing the ancestry discrimination claim with the EEOC (id. at PageID# 38).

In response, Plaintiff filed a combined Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Instanter and Response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (EFC No. 10). In support of the Motion for Leave, Plaintiff points out that leave to amend has been sought within a reasonable time, particularly since the Court has not yet held a case management conference. (Id. at PageID# 45). Plaintiff notes that Defendants will not be prejudiced by the proposed amendments; in fact, the proposed amended complaint dismisses Frenchko as a party and dismisses Count Two in its entirety. (Id.). Lastly, Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint seeks to add a new state law age discrimination claim under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112, et seq.

Plaintiff also argues that dismissal of her age discrimination claim is improper because the original complaint did not specify the statute pursuant to which it was made, and therefore she should have an opportunity to clarify that she makes that claim under the ADEA and not Title VII. (Id. at PageID# 46). Plaintiff concedes that her individual claim against Frenchko should be dismissed. (Id. at PageID# 43). Defendants oppose Plaintiff's Motion for Leave, arguing that the amendment is futile since Plaintiff has not alleged any recoverable damages. (EFC No. 11, PageID# 47). Specifically, Defendants cite to 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)—listing "unpaid minimum wages," "unpaid overtime compensation," and "reinstatement or promotion" as sole remedies—and note that, since Plaintiff remains employed by the Commissioners, her claim for lost income, without more, does not aver sufficient facts to support a plausible claim for relief under the ADEA. (Id.).

Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of her Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on March 30, 2022 (EFC No. 12). Plaintiff addresses the ADEA damages issue by pointing out that the proposed amended complaint states, as a result of Defendants' conduct, "Plaintiff suffered a loss of income." (EFC No. 12, PageID# 66; see EFC No. 10-1, PageID# 51, ¶ 22). Plaintiff's Reply also states that "Plaintiff's actual damages will be further explored through discovery," (id.) and that "Plaintiff has alleged sufficient damages resulting from Defendants' unlawful discriminatory actions for which she is entitled to seek relief under the ADEA." (Id.).

On May 3, 2022, the Court sua sponte ordered the parties to submit briefs on the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. In light of the briefing submitted by the parties, the Court finds a reasonable basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff's claims are ripe and ruling on the merits of the parties' motions would not "entangle" the court in an "abstract disagreement." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I.

i. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Standard

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides that, "After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." The standard applicable to a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001)).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and examine whether the complaint contains 'sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 819 F.3d 788, 793 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This standard is not about the plaintiff's probability of success; rather, it merely demands that a plaintiff plead enough facts for the court to reasonably infer that discovery will be productive. Id. at 793-94 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The Court, however, "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). Thus, "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

ii. Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Standard

Pleading amendments are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Rule 15(a)(2), which provides that, in instances of amendment other than amending within 21 days of service of the initial complaint, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave," and that "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Plaintiff's original complaint was filed on December 2, 2021. (EFC No. 1). Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint was filed on March 17, 2022. (EFC No. 10). The 21 days allowed to amend without leave have expired, meaning that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) applies. Defendants oppose the proposed amendment. (See EFC No. 11).

The Supreme Court, in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), held that courts may not deny an amendment request without explaining its reasoning for doing so, and clarified the grounds that could justify denial of such a request:

Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires" . . . . In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.—the leave should, as the rule requires, be "freely given." . . . outright refusal to grant leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion.

(Emphasis added).

Like a motion for judgment on the pleadings, whether a proposed amendment is "futile" is governed by the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic Pres., 632 F.2d 21, 23 (6th Cir. 19...