Glenn v. Union, ILA Local Union 333

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RENWICK A. GLENN, Plaintiff, v. UNION, ILA LOCAL UNION333 et al. Defendants.

Civil Action No. ADC-23-03204

United States District Court, D. Maryland

February 26, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

David Copperthite United States Magistrate Judge

Defendants Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc. (“Steamship Trade Association”) and Marine Terminal Corporation - East (“Marine Terminal Corporation”) have moved this Court to dismiss Plaintiff Renwick Glenn's (“Plaintiff') Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.^[1] ECF No. 30. Separately, Defendant Local No. 333 International Longshoreman's Association (“Local 333” or “Union”) has moved the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint for insufficiency of service of process and for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 29. In the alternative Local 333 asks the Court for summary judgment in its favor. Id.

Plaintiff responded in opposition to Steamship Trade Association and Marine Terminal Corporation's Motion (ECF No. 36), and the Defendants replied. ECF No. 37. Defendant Local 333's Motion is unopposed. After considering all parties' Motions, and the responses thereto, the . Court finds that no hearing is necessary. Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2023). For the reasons stated herein, the Court will GRANT Defendant Local 333's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 29). The Court will GRANT Defendants Steamship Trade Association and Marine Terminal . Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) IN PART and DENY the Motion IN PART.

Factual Background

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the challenged complaint. See Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759, 765-66 (4th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff is an African American male, aged 62, who resides in Baltimore, Maryland. ECF No. 22 at ¶¶ 21, 63 97. Plaintiff is employed by Ports America Chesapeake, LLC (“Ports America Chesapeake”) and the Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc. (“Steamship Trade Association”).^[2] Id. at ¶25. .

Ports of America Chesapeake is “a large terminal operator and stevedore operating throughout the United States, which includes loading and unloading cargo from ships and other operational activities.” ECF No. 22 at ¶ 27. Plaintiff asserts that “Ports of America Chesapeake LLC” is a d/b/a for named Defendant “Marine Terminal Corporation - East.” See ECF No. 22. The Steamship Trade Association is “a multi-employer association representing employers in the Port of Baltimore,” which “provides labor management relations, payroll processing, and work hours database management for those employed in the maritime trade industry.” Id. at ¶¶ 23, 28.

Plaintiff is also a member of . Local 333, a union, which operates as an affiliate of the International Longshoreman's Association (ILA). Id. at ¶ 22. The ILA is a labor union that represents longshoreman, clerks, checkers, and maintenance employees working on ships and terminals in ports on the East and Gulf coasts of the United States. Id. at ¶ 29. The relationship' between the Steamship Trade Association and Local 333 is governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. ¶ 23.

Plaintiff asserts that while employed by Defendants, he completed and passed a simulated crane training program on or about February 2, 2007; on or about August 20, 2010; and on or about January 20, 2012. Id. at ¶¶ 66-68. He believes that he was required by Defendants to retake the program a second and third time “to prevent [him] from getting practical crane training on the pier and ship.” Id. at ¶ 66. Plaintiff was ultimately never given the opportunity to become a “Certified Crane Operator” despite having completed and passed the required test. Id. at ¶ 69. However, he contends that three White males, and one African American male, all younger than himself, “completed an application for Crane Operator Trainee and received a promotion to Crane Operator Trainee over Plaintiff despite having less seniority.” Id. at ¶ 70.

While the Amended Complaint provides few details, Plaintiff also asserts that on September 14, 2018, internal union charges were brought against him after he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at ¶¶ 72-73. That same day, Plaintiff was suspended from membership in the ILA for a period of one year. Id. at ¶ 74. Finally, Plaintiff contends that when he inquired as to why he was not promoted, his supervisor stated that it was because Plaintiff had filed complaints with the EEOC. Id. at ¶ 75..

Procedural Background

On November 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January 16, 2024, alleging that all Defendants discriminated against him - on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII (Count I) and on the basis of age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (Count II). ECF No. 22. Plaintiff further alleged that all Defendants retaliated against him in violation of Title VII (Count III) and discriminated against him in violation of § 1981 (Count IV). Id. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also removed “Ports of America Chesapeake,” as a defendant and added “Marine Terminal Corporation - East (d/b/a Ports America Chesapeake, LLC).” Id. Plaintiff also changed the name of “Steamship Trade Association” to “Steamship Trade Association of Baltimore, Inc.” ECF No. 22.

On January 22, 2024, Defendant Local 333 filed a Motion to Dismiss for Insufficiency of Service and Failure to State a Claim, or in the alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 29. Also on January 22, 2024, Defendants, Steamship Trade Association and Marine Terminal Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.^[3] ECF No. 30. On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Steamship Trade Association and Marine Terminal Corporation's Motion, and those Defendants replied on February 14, 2024. ECF Nos. 36, 37. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant Local 333's Motion. See ECF No. 29.

Discussion

Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion “tests the sufficiency of the claims pled in a complaint.” Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 304 (4th Cir.. 2022) (quoting ACA Fin. Guar Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2019). Its purpose is not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” King v Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Rather, “[a] Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by the defendant that, even if the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.'” Gaines v. Baltimore Police Dep't, No. ELH-21-1211, 2023 WL 2185779, at *7 (D.Md. 2023) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)).

Upon reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts “all well-pleaded allegations as true and construe[s] the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” In re Willis Towers Watson plc Proxy Litig., 937 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). However, it does not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). The Complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists when Plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that [Defendant] is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. An inference of a “mere possibility of misconduct” is not sufficient to support a plausible claim. Id. at 679. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at.555. As for Title VII claims at the motion to dismiss stage, “the question is whether the plaintiff alleges facts that plausibly state a violation of Title VII above a speculative level.” Gaines, 2023 WL 2185779, at *8 (cleaned up and internal quotations removed) (quoting Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 617 (4th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff must state a plausible claim for relief, but “need . not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Gaines, 2023 WL 2185779, at *8 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 122 (2002).

Defendant Local 333 has styled its motion as a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 29. A motion styled in this manner implicates the court's discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery County, 788 F.Supp.2d 431,. 436-37 (D.Md.2011), aff'd 684 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(d) provides that if the Court considers matters outside the pleadings, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion “must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12. “A district judge has ‘complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to _;reject it or simply not consider it.'” Whitaker v. Md. Transit Admin., No. ELH-17-00584, 2018 WL 902169, at *7 (D.Md. Feb. 14, 2018) (quoting 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2011 Supp.)). “In general, courts are guided by whether consideration of extraneous material is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action, and whether discovery prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure is necessary.” Id. (citation omitted).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may...