Glessner v. Chardan, LLC

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NEAL GLESSNER Plaintiff, v. CHARDAN, LLC Defendant.

CIVIL No. SAG-22-03333

United States District Court, D. Maryland

July 5, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Neal Glessner, a white male over the age of fifty, ECF 17 ¶ 26, brings two counts of unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (Count II) against Defendant CharDan, LLC (“CharDan”), the owner of Dan's Restaurant and Tap House (“Dan's Restaurant”). ECF 17 (“Federal Court Complaint” or “First Amended Complaint). Glessner complains that he was banned from the dining establishment on the basis of his age and race. Id. CharDan has filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, a motion to stay, ECF 24, which Glessner opposed, ECF 25. CharDan has filed a reply. ECF 26. This Court has reviewed the filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons explained below CharDan's motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the First Amended Complaint, ECF 17, and are taken as true for purposes of evaluating the motion.

On or about Friday, February 18, 2022, Glessner visited Dan's Restaurant and ordered two burgers and a salad to-go. ECF 17 ¶ 10. Approximately forty-five minutes later, around 8:00 P.M., Glessner commented to his friend, who was sitting at the bar, that his to-go order was taking too long. Id. ¶ 11. A server overheard Glessner's comment and asked for his patience, explaining that the restaurant was “very busy.” Id. ¶ 12. Glessner responded that it should not take that long to make two burgers, and the server noted that Glessner had ordered more than just the two burgers. Id. ¶ 13. Glessner responded, “tongue-in-cheek,” that he did not believe it “took too long to ‘cook' a salad.” Id. ¶ 14. At this point, the server went to the kitchen and returned with his to-go order. Id. ¶ 15. Glessner then left the restaurant. Id.

Shortly thereafter, a Manager of Dan's Restaurant approached Glessner's friend, who was still sitting at the bar, and told the friend to “tell [Glessner] that he is no longer allowed at Dan's.” Id. ¶ 16. The friend refused. Id. ¶ 17. At this point, the Manager informed the friend that both he and Glessner were barred from the premises. Id. ¶ 18. The Manager stated, “You old, white people act like you own everything. Get the fuck out of here!” Id. ¶ 25. An officer of the Boonsboro Police Department arrived approximately 8:30 P.M., and the friend informed the officer that he had been “discriminated against.” Id. ¶ 22. The friend later informed Glessner of the interaction and the manager's statements. Id. ¶¶ 24-25.

Glessner subsequently exchanged messages with various employees and owners of Dan's Restaurant, including Daniel N. Aufdem-Brinke (one of the members of CharDan), via Facebook and other media regarding Glessner's prohibition from entering the premises. Id. ¶¶ 27-53. Since the incident, Glessner alleges that he is aware of “approximately a half-dozen other white men who have been barred from Dan's for otherwise inexplicable reasons.” Id. ¶ 57. Based on these events, Glessner alleges that CharDan, acting through its Manager, “harbored special insidious hate towards white people, and would not have banned Plaintiff or his Friend if they had differently colored skin.” Id. ¶ 58.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss. See In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions[.]”) (quotation omitted); see also Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). However, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam).

Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint” and must “draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015); Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 522 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 943 (2011). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).

Finally, federal courts reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including court filings, and may consider documents incorporated into a complaint by reference without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Sec'y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007).

III. DISCUSSION

In its motion to dismiss, CharDan raises three reasons why this Court should dismiss Glessner's claims. First, CharDan argues that Glessner has not returned to the restaurant and therefore cannot allege a denial of services. ECF 24-1 at 5-7. Second, CharDan argues that Glessner has failed to allege any discriminatory intent based on race. Id. at 7-9. Finally, CharDan argues that this Court should abstain, or at minimum stay the case, given an ongoing parallel proceeding in the Circuit Court for Washington County, Maryland. Id. at 9-12. This Court first addresses CharDan's procedural abstention argument, and then turns to its substantive challenges.

A. Abstention

Prior to filing the instant action, Glessner filed a parallel case in the Circuit Court for Washington County, Maryland. See ECF 24-3 (State Court Complaint). The facts alleged in the State Court Complaint are nearly identical to those alleged in the present case, and the parties are similar, except that the State Court Complaint includes a manager of Dan's Restaurant as an additional defendant. Compare id., with ECF 17. For this reason, CharDan argues that this Court should abstain or at least stay the case pending the resolution of the state court case.

It is a well-recognized rule “that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, 849 F.3d 163, 167 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, under the Colorado River doctrine, a federal court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a duplicative federal action for purposes of ‘wise judicial administration.'” Id. (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). When determining whether to abstain, “the task is to ascertain whether there exist ‘exceptional' circumstances, the ‘clearest of justifications,' that can suffice under Colorado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983)).

“In deciding whether such exceptional circumstances exist, a court must first determine whether the federal and...