Gligorov v. Nation of Brunei

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GOCE GLIGOROV, Plaintiff, v. NATION OF BRUNEI, et al., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-1773 (TSC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

January 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TANYA S. CHUTKAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Goce Gligorov, a Slovenian businessman, brings this action against multiple defendants, including the Nation of Brunei high-ranking officials and others associated with the Brunei government, as well as private companies. Gligorov alleges seven counts arising from an agreement he made with some of the individual defendants and other representatives of the Brunei Government to investigate “alleged wrongful and illegal acts by other Brunei officials” in exchange for $250,000. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 24, ECF No. 29. Defendants Audley Property Management Company Limited, The Dorchester Group, Ltd., and Seven Properties AG (the “Corporate Defendants”) have moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and Gligorov has moved for jurisdictional discovery. Defs' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 32; Pl.'s Mot. for Jurisdictional Discovery, ECF No. 33. For the reasons below, the court will GRANT the Corporate Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and DENY Gligorov's Motion for jurisdictional discovery. The court need not reach whether Gligorov has failed to state a claim.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants are the Nation of Brunei, the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) Audley Property Management Limited, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, Crown Prince of Brunei Al-Muhtadee Billah, The Dorchester Group, LLC (d/b/a The Dorchester Collection), Seven Properties AG, PG Yusof Sepiuddin, Pehin Nawawi, Pehin Yasmin, HJ Zainal, HJ Aziyan, and Anak Haji Abdul Aziz. ECF No. 29. The Corporate Defendants own and operate properties in the U.K. and Switzerland. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 5, 8, 9. Gligorov claims Defendants: (1) violated the civil RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, resulting in injury to Gligorov's business or property, i d. ¶¶ 45-60; (2) engaged in a RICO conspiracy involving “money laundering, terrorist financing, mail and wire fraud, unlawful travel in furtherance of criminal activities, material support of terrorist activities, and other unlawful acts” that injured Gligorov's “business or property,” id. ¶¶ 61-71; (3) breached a contract to pay Gligorov $250,000 in exchange for his information about “allegations of corruption by certain Brunei officials,” id. ¶¶ 72-76; (4) received unjust enrichment from their failure to pay Gligorov for the information, id. ¶¶ 77-80; (5) engaged in fraud and fraudulent inducement for inducing Gligorov to “provide them with valuable information upon the false representation that he would be paid $250,000,” id. ¶¶ 81-84; (6) defamed Gligorov by “hav[ing] INTERPOL issue a ‘Blue Notice,'” which effectively placed him on an international watch list id. ¶¶ 51, 85-89; and (7) tortiously interfered with Plaintiff's “business relations or with reasonable expectation of prospective economic advantage,” id. ¶¶ 90-93. Counts 1,2, and 7 are asserted against all Defendants. ECF No. 29 at 19, 24, 29. Counts 3, 4, and 5 are asserted against all individual Defendants and the BIA. Id. at 25-27. Count 6 is asserted against all individual Defendants and Seven Properties. Id. at 28.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the “factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Crane v. New York Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). “‘Conclusory statements' or a ‘bare allegation of conspiracy or agency' do not satisfy this burden.” Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Unlike the presumption applied to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, in assessing a personal jurisdiction challenge the court does not treat plaintiff's allegations as true. Myers v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 915 F.Supp.2d 136, 139 (D.D.C. 2013). Rather, it may receive, consider, and weigh affidavits and other relevant materials outside of the pleadings to assist it in determining the pertinent jurisdictional facts. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 116, 120 n.4 (D.D.C. 2000).

III. ANALYSIS

“To establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, a court must engage in a two-part inquiry: A court must first examine whether jurisdiction is applicable under the state's long-arm statute and then determine whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process.” GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). To satisfy due process, a plaintiff must show that there are “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum, establishing that the maintenance of the suit “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Courts may exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction “permits a court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit,” whereas specific jurisdiction requires an “affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.” Livnat, 851 F.3d at 56.

A. General Jurisdiction

A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a corporation where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; where it is “at home.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127, 137 (2014). To establish general jurisdiction, a corporation's affiliations with the forum state must be “so continuous and systemic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citations omitted). In Daimler and Goodyear, the Supreme Court established a high bar to ensure general jurisdiction would not exist in every state in which a corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.” Brit UW, Ltd. v. Manhattan Beachwear, LLC, 235 F.Supp.3d 48, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2017).

Gligorov fails to show that any of the Corporate Defendants are “at home” in the District of Columbia. None of them are incorporated in this district, nor do they have their principal places of business here. ECF No. 38 at 3. Indeed, Gligorov concedes that Audley Property Management Company Limited is based in London, U.K., Dorchester Group Ltd. is headquartered in London, U.K., and Seven Properties AG is located in Meilen, Switzerland. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 5, 8, 9. Gligorov asserts-without any factual support-that there is a “substantial connection between the [United States] and the defendants in that they do substantial business in United States through various hotels and companies.” Id. ¶ 16. But he alleges only that the Corporate Defendants have hotels in California and New York. Id. This is insufficient to establish that the Corporate Defendants engaged “in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” in the District of Columbia. Consequently, this court does not have general jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

“Acts sufficient to subject a non-resident defendant to specific personal jurisdiction resulting from conduct within the District of Columbia are determined by the due process clause and enumerated by the District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423.” Bigelow v. Garrett, 299 F.Supp.3d 34, 44 (D.D.C. 2018). This court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if a plaintiff demonstrates that: “(1) the defendant transacted business in the District of Columbia; (2) the claim arose from the business transacted in the District; (3) the defendant had minimum contacts with the District; and (4) the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'” Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 786 F.Supp. 65, 71 (D.D.C.1992), abrogated on other grounds by FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2008), (citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316).

Gligorov has not established that the Corporate Defendants have engaged in any conduct that brings them within the jurisdiction of this court under D.C. Code § 13-423. Instead, he offers two alternative bases for personal jurisdiction: the RICO Act and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

1. Jurisdiction Based on RICO Statute

The federal RICO statue, 18 U.S.C. § 1965, grants a district court jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if “personal jurisdiction based on minimum contacts is established as to at least one defendant,” and “it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court.” FC Inv. Grp. LC, 529 F.3d at 1 099-1100, overruled on other grounds by Erwin-Simpson v. Air. Asia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2021). “Congress has expressed a preference in § 1965 to avoid, where possible, haling defendants into far flung fora.” Id. at 1100. Merely invoking the statute does not confer personal jurisdiction, and the court must still make its determination under the D.C. long-arm statute and the Constitution. Collingsworth v. Drummond Co. Inc., No. CV 19-1263, 2020 WL 2800612, at *7 n.4 (D.D.C. May 29, 2020), aff'd, 839 Fed.Appx. 567 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

Gligorov argues that the court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants based on its jurisdiction over the Nation of Brunei because Brunei has an embassy in the District of Columbia and this court...