Glover v. City of Benton Harbor

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RON GLOVER, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BENTON HARBOR, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-134

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

April 5, 2023

OPINION

PHILLIP J. GREEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initially filed his complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. In an order (ECF No. 10) entered on February 2 2023, that court transferred the action to this Court for further proceedings. In an order (ECF No. 14) entered on February 3, 2023, the undersigned granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 15.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings.

“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).^[1]

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Saginaw County Correctional Facility (SRF) in Freeland, Saginaw County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred during Plaintiff's arrest in Benton Harbor, Michigan, as well as at the Berrien County Jail (BCJ). Plaintiff sues the City of Benton Harbor, the Benton Harbor Police Department, the BCJ, and Police Officer Michael Steven Johnson. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing all Defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2-3.) He also sues Defendant Johnson in his individual capacity. (Id., PageID.2.)

Plaintiff alleges that the events about which he complains occurred in April of 2018. (Id., PageID.6.) According to Plaintiff, officers from Benton Harbor were “responding to a call about a guy stealing a lawn mower.” (Id., PageID.5.) The officers tried to detain Plaintiff, but he “proceeded to ride off [on his bicycle] on [his] way home” because he did not have a lawn mower. (Id.) Defendant Johnson chased Plaintiff down, and Plaintiff was struck by the police truck. (Id.) Once Plaintiff was down on the ground, Defendant Johnson “continued to hold his knee on [Plaintiff's] neck.” (Id.) Plaintiff “screamed for help” as this was happening. (Id., PageID.6.) He alleges that Defendant Johnson kept his knee on Plaintiff's neck “even after [Plaintiff was] cuffed.” (Id., PageID.7.)

Plaintiff faults the Benton Harbor Police Department for dispatching the officers. (Id., PageID.5.) He suggests that officers lied in their report and that Defendant Johnson was later fired because of the incident. (Id.) He also faults the City of Benton Harbor for employing the officers. (Id.)

Plaintiff was taken to the BCJ, where he claims he was denied medical attention for the wounds caused by Defendant Johnson. (Id., PageID.5-6.) Plaintiff alleges he suffered pains in his legs, back, and hips from being hit with the police vehicle. (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff also suggests that he was fed food he was allergic to and that officers at the BCJ harassed him because they heard that Plaintiff got Defendant Johnson fired. (Id., PageID.6.) Plaintiff contends he was supposed to receive physical therapy, but that “the county denied” that. (Id., PageID.8.)

Public news sources indicate while investigating the stolen lawn mower, officers “came upon a man on a bike without a head light, a state law and city ordinance violation.” See “Fired BH Patrolman Facing Felony For Running Over Fleeing Suspect,” https://www.moodyonthemarket.com/fired-bh-patrolman-facing-felony-for-running-over-fleeing-suspect/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2023). The man, who was Plaintiff, refused to stop. See “Former Benton Harbor Officer Charged After Allegedly Running Over Suspect with Patrol Vehicle,” https://www.fox17online.com/2018/07/12/former-benton-harbor-officer-charged-after-allegedly-running-over-suspect-with-patrol-vehicle (last visited Mar. 28, 2023). Officers tried to block Plaintiff, but he “got off the bicycle and started running.” Id. Defendant Johnson pursued Plaintiff with the squad car and ultimately hit Plaintiff. Id. Defendant Johnson was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon. Id. Plaintiff ultimately pled guilty to resisting and obstructing a police officer and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and was sentenced to one year in the BCJ. Id.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Johnson violated his constitutional rights by detaining him without probable cause and by using excessive force against him. (Id., PageID.7.) Plaintiff also suggests that the BCJ violated his rights by failing to provide medical attention. (Id., PageID.5.) Additionally, Plaintiff vaguely asserts that the City of Benton Harbor engaged in “First Amendment retaliation, fabrication of evidence, failure to supervise, and inadequate training.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks damages for his pain and suffering. (Id., PageID.8.)

II. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. At 679.

Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the...