Glover v. Junior

306 A.3d 899

Chanel GLOVER, Appellant

v.Nicole JUNIOR

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued August 9, 2023

Filed December 11, 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered May 4, 2022, In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Domestic Relations, at No(s): D22048480, Daniel R. Sulman, J.

Barbara Schneider, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Jacqueline DiColo, Philadelphia, for appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BOWES, J., OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Chanel Glover appeals from the domestic relations court order granting Nicole Junior’s petition for pre-birth establishment of parentage of the child that the married couple conceived through in vitro fertilization ("IVF") treatment during their marriage.¹ Glover challenges the trial court’s finding that her spouse had a contract-based right to parentage. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Junior and Glover met during 2019 and married in January 2021 while living in California. Even prior to the marriage, the couple discussed starting a family through IVF. In February 2021, the couple entered into an agreement with Fairfax Cryobank for donated sperm. Glover is listed as the "Intended Parent" and Junior the "co-intended Parent." See Fairfax Cryobank Contract, 2/3/21, at 1, 5. In accordance with the Fairfax Cryobank contract, the couple collectively selected a sperm donor from Fairfax Cryobank based specifically on the donor’s physical appearance, interests, and area of origin.

The couple moved to Pennsylvania in April of 2021, and in July 2021, Junior and Glover signed an IVF agreement with Reproductive Medicine Associates ("RMA"). Glover signed the agreement as the "Patient" and Junior executed it as the "Partner." See RMA Agreement, 7/11/21, at 9. Using Glover’s eggs and the sperm from Fairfax Cryobank, the couple conceived a son in August 2021, with a due date of May 18, 2022. The couple mutually decided on a name for the child, hired a doula, and retained the Jerner Law Group, P.C., in anticipation of Junior’s "Confirmatory Step-Parent Adoption" of their son. See Engagement Letter, 10/13/21 at 1; N.T., 5/3/22, at Exhibits J, M, and V. The doula contract identified both parties as "Client." N.T., 5/3/22, Exhibit M at unnumbered 6. Likewise, both women signed the attorney’s engagement letter agreeing to the joint representation and the terms of payment. See Engagement Letter, 10/13/21; N.T., 5/3/22, Exhibit J at unnumbered 7-9. Thereafter, on December 5, 2021, the parties each signed affidavits memorializing their intent to have Junior adopt their son, co-parent with equal rights to Glover, and assume financial obligations if the couple should separate. See N.T., 5/3/22, at Exhibit K.

Over the ensuing four months, the couple’s relationship deteriorated. Junior announced an intent to move from the marital residence when the lease expired. Glover stopped communicating with Junior about the obstetrics appointments and canceled mutually-scheduled events such as the baby shower. In March 2022, Glover informed her spouse that she no longer intended to proceed with the adoption, and on April 18, 2022, Glover filed a divorce complaint.

Two weeks later, Junior filed at the domestic relations docket assigned to the divorce proceedings the petitions for pre-birth establishment of parentage that are the genesis of the matter at issue in this appeal.² Following Glover’s responses and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Junior had a contractual right to parentage and granted the petitions as follows:

It is hereby ordered and decreed that: (1) Nicole S. Junior is confirmed as the legal parent of the child conceived during her marriage to Chanel E. Glover via [IVF] and due to be born in May of 2022; (2) Glover shall advise Junior when she goes into labor; (3) Both Glover and Junior shall have access to the child after birth consistent with Glover’s medical privacy rights and the hospital’s policies regarding newborn children. However, this paragraph shall not in any way be construed as a custody order; ([4]) Glover shall execute the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Birthing Parent’s worksheet indicating that Nicole S. Jun-ior is the child’s other parent; and ([5]) the name of Nicole S. Junior shall appear on the child’s birth certificate as a second parent.

When appropriate, a custody complaint may be filed under a custody case number.

Order, 5/4/22, at 1 (cleaned up).

Glover filed a timely appeal and both she and the trial court complied with Pa. R.A.P. 1925.³ She presents three questions, which we re-order for ease of review:

1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it found that [Glover] waived any challenges to the [c]ourt’s exercise of its jurisdiction and to its being a proper forum for a decision regarding [Junior’s] rights as a legal parent[?]

2. Did the trial court err when it found that the issue of parentage was ripe for determination[?]

3. Did the trial court act within its discretion and err as a matter of law when it confirmed pre-birth legal parentage of [Junior?]

Glover’s brief at 5.

Glover first challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction to address the petition for pre-birth establishment of parentage. The crux of this contention is that, while the trial court had original jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings and any ancillary claims for relief, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Junior’s petition because Glover did not plead custody or parentage in the divorce complaint. See Glover’s brief at 43 ("[The] trial court did not have the authority, in the divorce forum, or any forum, to entertain an action for pre-birth establishment of parentage, especially as an emergency matter.").

Junior counters that the trial court had the authority to consider Junior’s petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania Divorce Code ("the Code"), which Junior contends "confers full equity powers to the family court[.]" Junior’s brief at 46. Relying on the Code’s preliminary provisions in §§ 3102, 3104, and 3105, concerning the legislative findings and intent, bases of jurisdiction, and effect of agreements between parties, respectively, Junior maintains that the trial court acted within its statutory authority over matters ancillary to the divorce in exercising jurisdiction over the petition to determine parentage. Junior continues that § 3323(f), governing "[e]quity powers and jurisdiction of the court," is effectively a catch-all provision that provides the court authority to grant equitable relief over matters that arise under the Code. Junior’s brief at 46.

In rejecting Glover’s challenge to its exercise of authority over the petition to determine parentage, the trial court first concluded that the jurisdictional issue was waived pursuant to P.A.R.A.P. 302(a) because Glover neglected to challenge it during the hearing. However, potentially recognizing that challenges to subject matter jurisdiction are non-waivable, the court provided an alternative statutory basis for its authority under § 3323(f) of the Code. For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court acted within its broad authority imbued under §§ 3104 and 3323(f) of the Code.

At the outset, we observe that Glover’s arguments conflate the principles of jurisdiction and authority. Quoting Riedel v. Human Relations Comm’n, 559 Pa. 34, 739 A.2d 121, 124 (1999), our Supreme Court has reiterated the relevant distinction as follows:

Jurisdiction and power are not interchangeable although judges and lawyers often confuse them[.] Jurisdiction relates solely to the competency of the particular court or administrative body to determine controversies of the general class to which the case then presented for its consideration belongs. Power, on the other hand, means the ability of a decision-making body to order or effect a certain result.

Domus, Inc. v. Signature Bldg. Sys. of PA, LLC, — Pa. —, 252 A.3d 628, 636 (2021) (holding procedural failure divested the trial court of "authority to order relief in the particular case before it" but did not divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction "to consider the general class of" the type of action at issue).

[1, 2] Phrased differently, subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to consider cases of a given nature and grant the type of relief requested. Harley v. HealthSpark Foundation, 265 A.3d 674 (Pa.Super. 2021). It "is defined as the power of the court to hear cases of the class to which the case before the court belongs, that is, to enter into inquiry, whether or not the court may ultimately grant the relief requested." Id. at 687.

[3] A challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. Our scope of review is plenary. Id.

[4–6] The various divisions of Pennsylvania’s "Courts of Common Pleas have unlimited original jurisdiction over all proceedings in this Commonwealth, unless otherwise provided by law." Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. v. Vukman, 621 Pa. 192, 77 A.3d 547, 552 (2013); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 931(a)("Except where exclusive original jurisdiction of an action or proceeding is by statute … vested in another court of this Commonwealth, the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings, including all actions and proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common pleas."). It is beyond cavil that the Courts of Common Pleas are competent to entertain parentage claims. See e.g., S.M.C. v. C.A.W., 221 A.3d 1214 (Pa.Super. 2019) (affirming parentage determination by the court of common pleas based upon application of the doctrine of paternity by estoppel); DeRosa v. Gordon, 286 A.3d 321, 331 (Pa.Super. 2022) (affirming court of common plea’s parentage orders granting DNA testing); V.L.-P. v. S.R.D., 288 A.3d 502 (Pa.Super. 2023) (vacating portion of court of common pleas order denying genetic testing and...