Glowacki ex rel. D.C.G. v. Howell Pub. Sch. Dist.

DANIEL GLOWACKI and SANDRA GLOWACKI,on behalf of her minor child D.C.G., Plaintiffs, v. HOWELL PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, and JOHNSON ("JAY") MCDOWELL,individually and in his official capacity as a teacherin the Howell Public School District, Defendants.

Case No. 2:11-cv-15481

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: September 16, 2013

Hon. Patrick J. Duggan

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS, AND EXPENSES

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Daniel Glowacki's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses, filed on July 3, 2013. (ECF No. 47.) The motion has been fully briefed. Having determined that oral argument would not significantly aid the decisional process, the Court dispensed with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case were thoroughly discussed in this Court's June 19, 2013 Opinion and Order on the Parties' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment.Glowacki v. Howell Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 11-15481, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85960, (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2013) (Duggan, J.); (ECF No. 43). The Court incorporates those facts herein. Accordingly, the Court briefly outlines the facts as pertinent to the instant motion.

A. Complaint

On December 14, 2011, Plaintiff Sandra Glowacki commenced this lawsuit on behalf of her two minor sons, Daniel Glowacki and D.C.G., as their next of friend. Since that time, Daniel reached the age of majority and the Court ordered the Clerk of the Court to substitute Daniel into the present action. Plaintiffs instituted this action against Defendants Howell Public School District ("School District") and Howell High School teacher Johnson "Jay" McDowell, in his individual and official capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Daniel alleged that McDowell violated his rights to freedom of speech and equal protection when he was removed from class after making a statement disapproving of homosexuality. With respect to the School District, Daniel alleged that two policies - the District's Anti-Bullying Policy and Religious Expression Policy - were facially unconstitutional. Furthermore, Daniel alleged that the School District should be held liable for McDowell's unconstitutional conduct under various theories of municipal liability. Plaintiff D.C.G. asserted thatthe events giving rise to his brother's claims chilled the exercise of his First Amendment speech rights. As relief for Defendants' conduct, Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, a declaration that Defendants acted unconstitutionally, nominal damages,¹ and costs and fees.

B. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

On November 15, 2012, after having completed discovery, Plaintiffs and each Defendant separately filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. After a careful analysis of the various claims and defenses asserted by each party, this Court issued a ruling on June 19, 2013. Of the various claims asserted against both Defendants, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Daniel Glowacki on a single count, finding that McDowell violated Daniel's First Amendment rights when he removed Daniel from class after Daniel made an in-class remark disapproving of homosexuality and further finding that McDowell was not entitled to qualified immunity. Glowacki, No. 11-15481, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85960, at *29-*30, *33-*37. The Court dismissed Daniel's Fourteenth Amendment claim against McDowell, id. at*59-*63, and further dismissed Plaintiff D.C.G.'s 's First Amendment "chill" claim as the Court concluded that D.C.G. had not suffered an injury-in-fact and thus lacked standing to bring his claim, id. at *44-46.

The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the School District on Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Id. at *58-*63. With respect to Plaintiffs' facial challenge of the School District's policies, the Court found that "Plaintiffs have not pointed to anything in the record supporting their contention that the School District's policies are facially unconstitutional rendering the argument both legally and factually frivolous." Id. at *42. Because the School District's policies were entirely constitutional, the Court declined to enjoin further enforcement of said policies and determined that Plaintiffs' were not entitled to any form of injunctive relief. Id. at *43 n.11. Lastly, the Court rejected Plaintiffs' efforts to hold the School District liable pursuant to any theory of municipal liability. Id. at *46-58.

As a result of the above conclusions, the Court issued a judgment declaring that McDowell violated Daniel's First Amendment rights and awarded Daniel nominal damages in the amount of one dollar ($1.00) for the First Amendment violation. (J., ECF No. 44.)

On July 3, 2013, Plaintiff Daniel Glowacki filed the instant motion seeking attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has moved for $116,465.88 in attorneys' fees and $7,661.73 in costs and expenses² for a total of $124,127.61 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Pl.'s Br. 10.) In enacting and amending the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, Congress has authorized federal courts to award "a reasonable attorney's fee" in civil rights cases, including those initiated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but such fees may only be awarded to "the prevailing party[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). To be considered a prevailing party, a party must receive "at least some relief on the merits of at least some of his claims." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603, 121 S. Ct. 1835, 1839 (2001) (quotation omitted). A party prevails in his lawsuit when there has been a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute." Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S. Ct. 1486, 1494 (1989). That material alteration must affect the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S. Ct. 202, 203 (1988) (per curiam).

There is no question that Plaintiff is not a prevailing party vis-à-vis the School District as the Court entered summary judgment in favor of the School District on all counts.³ Therefore, to be eligible for attorney's fees, Plaintiff must be a prevailing party with respect to his claims against Defendant McDowell.

Despite McDowell's efforts to disclaim Plaintiff's prevailing party status, (Def.'s Resp. 2-3), the Supreme Court of the United States has held that "a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party under § 1988." Farrar v. Hobby,506 U.S. 103, 113, 113 S. Ct. 566, 574 (1992). As the Court explained, a "material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties occurs" when "the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement against the defendant." Id. at 113, 113 S. Ct. at 574. "A judgment for damages in any amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the defendant's behavior for the plaintiff's benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay." Id. Under Farrar, Plaintiff - who received an enforceable judgment of nominal damages against McDowell - is thus a prevailing party within the meaning of section 1988.

That Plaintiff is a prevailing party, however, is the beginning of the inquiry, not the end. A prevailing party does not have a right to attorney's fees under section 1988; rather, the statute commits an award of reasonable fees to the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . ."); Day v. James Marine, Inc., 518 F.3d 411, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Statutes like § 1988 make fees permissible, not mandatory. . . ."). In other words, prevailing party status merely brings a plaintiff across the statutory eligibility threshold. Once this threshold is met, a court must then determine what fee is reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, [] 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).

While a prevailing civil rights plaintiff "ordinarily recover[s] an attorney's fee[,]" a court may decline to award fees if "special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Lefemine v. Widerman, --- U.S. ---, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2012) (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). One circumstance in which no fees should be awarded is when the plaintiff receives nominal damages because of a "success [that] is purely technical or de minimis[.]" Farrar, 506 U.S. at 117, 113 S. Ct. at 576 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This is because "[s]uch a plaintiff either has failed to achieve victory at all, or has obtained only a Pyrrhic victory for which the reasonable fee is zero." Id. "Although the 'technical' nature of a nominal damages award or any other judgment does not affect the prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988." Id. at 114, 113 S. Ct. at 574. Importantly, however, "[n]ominal relief does not necessarily a nominal victory make." Id. at 121, 113 S. Ct. at 578 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

As the above-cited authority makes clear, not all civil rights plaintiffs obtaining nominal damages will categorically be entitled to or denied attorney's fees. Because the touchstone of the attorney's fee inquiry is reasonableness, the Court must now determine whether Plaintiff's request is reasonable. Although the majority opinion in Farrar provides but one consideration to guide courts engaged in the complicated task of determining a reasonable attorney's fee, Justice O'Connor's concurrence articulates...