Goad v. Treasurer of State

372 S.W.3d 1

Cheryl GOAD, Deceased, Wesley Goad, Widower, Appellant,

v.TREASURER OF the STATE of Missouri—Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Respondent.

No. WD 72820.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Nov. 22, 2011.

Application for Transfer to Supreme Court

Denied Dec. 20, 2011.

Keith V. Yarwood, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Benita M. Seliga, Kansas City, MO, for respondent.

Before: GARY D. WITT, P.J., and JAMES E. WELSH and ALOK AHUJA, JJ.

ALOK AHUJA, Judge.

Appellant Wesley Goad, the surviving spouse of Cheryl Goad, appeals a final award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. The Commission rejected Goad's claim that he is entitled to the continued payment of workers' compensation benefits, following his wife's death, on account of a work-related injury which caused her to become permanently and totally disabled. Goad claims an entitlement to continued benefits payments under the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Schoemehl v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 217 S.W.3d 900 (Mo. banc 2007). The Commission held that any rights Goad may have had under the Schoemehl decision, as the surviving dependent of a permanently and totally disabled worker, had been abrogated by 2008 amendments to the relevant statutory provisions, because the statutory amendments became effective prior to Cheryl Goad's death. We conclude that the 2008 statutory amendments cannot be applied to Goad's claim, and accordingly reverse.

Factual Background

Goad's wife was injured on August 13, 2007, while lifting a mail tub at work, which led to a herniated disk in her back. Cheryl Goad never returned to work after her injury, and instead filed a claim for permanent partial disability benefits with the Division of Workers' Compensation on October 26, 2007. Mrs. Goad amended her claim on July 17, 2008, to allege that she was permanently and totally disabled. Mrs. Goad died of causes unrelated to her work injury on April 15, 2009. On May 19, 2009, the Workers' Compensation Division granted Goad's motion to be substituted as the claimant. In addition to prosecuting the claim that Mrs. Goad was permanently and totally disabled, Goad claimed a right to continuing payment of permanent total disability benefits following Mrs. Goad's death under Schoemehl.

An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) awarded Goad permanent and total disability benefits, but only through the date of his wife's death. The ALJ denied Goad further benefits under Schoemehl on the basis that Cheryl Goad had alleged a claim only for permanent partial disability benefits, not permanent total disability benefits, at the time the General Assembly abrogated Schoemehl effective June 26, 2008. Because Mrs. Goad had not pled a permanent total disability claim prior to June 26, 2008, the ALJ concluded that the 2008 statutory amendments applied to, and foreclosed, Goad's Schoemehl-based claim.

Goad sought review of the ALJ's decision. The Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision denying Goad continuing permanent total disability benefits by a two-to-one vote, but for different reasons. The Commission majority reasoned that Goad's rights under Schoemehl did not “vest” untilhis wife passed away, which was after the legislative action abrogating the decision. The Commission concluded that Goad's claim for continuing permanent total disability benefits was therefore subject to the new statute. The dissenting Commissioner argued that Goad was entitled to benefits under Schoemehl because the claim for workers' compensation benefits was pending after Schoemehl was decided, and before the enactment of the legislation abrogating the decision.

This appeal follows.

Analysis

We review the Commission's final award pursuant to article V, section 18 of the Missouri Constitution, to determine whether the Commission's award is “supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record.” Section 287.495.1 ¹ provides that appellate review of the Commission's award is limited to questions of law, and that the Commission's decision should be reversed only if: (1) the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the award was procured by fraud; (3) the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; or (4) there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. “This court is not bound by and affords no deference to the Commission's interpretation and application of the law.” Taylor v. Ballard R–II School Dist., 274 S.W.3d 629, 632 (Mo.App. W.D.2009).

I.

Goad argues that the Commission erred when it denied his claim for continuing permanent total disability benefits under Schoemehl, because Mrs. Goad died of causes unrelated to her work injury, and her claim was pending between January 9, 2007 (the date Schoemehl was decided), and June 26, 2008 (the effective date of the legislation abrogating Schoemehl ). Goad argues that the fact that Mrs. Goad did not die until April 15, 2009, after the effective date of the statutory amendments abrogating Schoemehl, does not affect his rights under that decision. We agree.²

Schoemehl held that the surviving dependents of an injured worker entitled to permanent total disability benefits have the right to continue receiving those benefits, for the lifetime of the surviving dependents, after the injured worker dies from causes unrelated to the work injury. 217 S.W.3d at 903.

In response, the General Assembly amended several sections of Chapter 287 by enacting Senate Committee Substitute for House Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1883, 94th General Assembly, 2nd Regular Session, 2008 Mo. Laws 442 (“H.B. 1883”). In particular, H.B. 1883 enacted § 287.230.3, which states that, “in applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate the holding in Schoemehl v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 217 S.W.3d 900 (Mo.2007), and all cases citing, interpreting, applying, or following this case.” H.B. 1883 also amended §§ 287.200.1 and .2, and § 287.230.2, to achieve the legislative objective of overruling Schoemehl.

The Missouri Supreme Court has held that Schoemehl does not apply where the injured worker's claim had been finally decided prior to the Schoemehl decision. Strait v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 257 S.W.3d 600 (Mo. banc 2008), explains:

Courts respect the finality of judgments. The law bars the retrospective application of the laws to cases that have achieved final resolution. If [an injured worker's] claim [is] no longer pending, and her case [has] been closed, then Schoemehl cannot be applied to allow the substitution of [the injured worker's] dependents as beneficiaries of her permanent total disability benefits.

Id. at 602 (citations omitted). Thus, “the interpretation of the law that was made in Schoemehl applies to cases that were pending in the commission or pending on appeal at the time of the Schoemehl decision.” Id. at 602–03.

Under Strait, a claim must not have been finally adjudicated before Schoemehl was issued; if it became final before the Schoemehl decision, it cannot be reopened and modified to reflect Schoemehl's holding. See also, e.g., Taylor, 274 S.W.3d at 634 (“Essentially, the courts reasoned that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to determine permanent total disability survivorship benefits after a final award has been entered and the time for appeal has passed, and thus, the Commission cannot reconsider and modify the final award.”) (footnote omitted).

Goad's current claim satisfies the rule in Strait, because his wife's claim had not been finally determined when Schoemehl was decided; indeed, Cheryl Goad's underlying injury did not even occur until after Schoemehl. The question remains, however, whether Goad's claim can avoid the abrogation of Schoemehl by H.B. 1883.

Strait did not address the effect of the General Assembly's 2008 passage of H.B. 1883. In Bennett v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 271 S.W.3d 49 (Mo.App. W.D.2008), we applied Strait in light of the later legislative abrogation of Schoemehl, and held that “recovery under Schoemehl is limited to claims for permanent total disability benefits that were pending between January 9, 2007, the date the Missouri Supreme Court issued its decision in Schoemehl, and June 26, 2008, the effective date of HB 1883.” Id. at 53.Bennett's description of the “Schoemehl window” has been quoted and followed in numerous subsequent cases. See Tilley v. USF Holland Inc., 325 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Mo.App. E.D.2010); Roller v. Steelman, 297 S.W.3d 128, 132–33 (Mo.App. W.D.2009); Cochran v. Travelers Ins. Co., 284 S.W.3d 666, 671–72 (Mo.App. S.D.2009); Lawson v. Treasurer of State as Custodian for Second Injury Fund, 281 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Mo.App. S.D.2009).

Subject to the pleading issue we address in § II, below, Goad's claim satisfies the description of the “Schoemehl window” in Bennett, because the underlying claim was pending between the date of the Schoemehl decision (January 9, 2007), and the effective date of H.B. 1883 (June 26, 2008).

Rather than focusing on whether Cheryl Goad's claim was pending during the “Schoemehl window” described in Bennett, the Commission concluded that Goad was not entitled to continuing payment of permanent total disability benefits because his rights as the surviving dependent of an injured worker had not vested prior to June 26, 2008, when H.B. 1883 became effective, because Cheryl Goad was still alive at that time. The Commission majority explained:

“Rights are vested ... when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. They are expectant, when they depend upon the continued existence of the present condition of things until the happening of some future event. They are contingent, when they are only to come into existence on an event or condition which may not happen or be performed until some other event may...