Goddard v. Apogee Retail LLC

MELVIN M. GODDARD v. APOGEE RETAIL LLC, et al.

Civil Action No. DKC 19-3269

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

June 24, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination and workers' compensation case is the motion to dismiss filed by Apogee Retail, LLC. (ECF No. 23). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted, albeit without prejudice as to the attempted addition of pendant state law claims.

I. Factual Background

This dispute arises out of allegations that pro se Plaintiff Melvin Goddard, a resident of Washington D.C., has made against his former employer, Defendant Apogee Retail, LLC ("Apogee"), arising from his employment in one (or more) of its Maryland offices. Plaintiff reports beginning his job at Apogee in "early to mid[-]June of 2008" as a "driver's helper" but says that he transitioned to a "driver position" because he held a commercial learner's permit. It was in this position that Plaintiff reports involvement in a car accident that was "life chang[ing,] completely." (ECF No. 3, at 9).

Plaintiff's first amended complaint clarifies that the car accident occurred on September 3, 2008.¹ He says that when he regained consciousness after the collision, "[his] left leg and arm w[ere] hanging in the air by splint hanging from [] poles around the bed" and that he "sustained damages to the whole left side of my body." (ECF No. 10, at 15-16). The first amended complaint also quotes from an orthopedic evaluation, made shortly after the accident, on September 24, 2008, that purportedly read:

Mr. Goddard is a 29-year-old male who presents for consultation following a severe injury which occurred when he was driving a work truck. There was a loss of consciousness and patient struck some trees. He sustained multiple injuries including a dislocation of his left hip with a fracture of the acetabulum, a volar plate fracture of his 3^rd finger, a severe multi-ligamentous injury with left eye problems, multiple abrasions and lacerations with glass fragments into his scalp on the left side and into his left arm and for[e]arm . . .

The patient has been using Percocet to control pain. He do[es] not have any of the original imaging studies available for review today but he had reviewed the reports fromINOVA Hospital outlining my injuries. I was walking with crutches.²

Apparently in the hospital there was no obvious medical reason, which accounted for the patient's loss of consciousness. He may just have fallen asleep.

(ECF No. 10, at 21) (emphasis added by Plaintiff).

Plaintiff's administrative complaint also helps fill in some blanks by reporting that, in or around September 2008, he was "wrongfully terminated" "due to multiple disabling injuries sustained on the job and was unable to get further evaluation and medical treatment of [his] injuries." (ECF No. 1-1, at 4). While Plaintiff was still recovering in the hospital, he learned that there were "problems" with his insurance. After his release and while continuing to recover, his mother suggested that he hire a lawyer to pursue "getting long term medical care." That search ended with his hiring Steven C. Rohan to help "represent [him] in a work accident situation." (ECF No. 10, at 15-16).

Plaintiff, with Mr. Rohan's help, submitted a claim to the Maryland Worker's Compensation Commission ("WCC"), but what happened after that is far from clear. In his first amended complaint, Plaintiff vacillates between (apparently) quoting his attorney and interjecting his own commentary in a way that makesit nearly impossible to follow. Plaintiff's narration is, at times, also at odds with the facts and dates presented in his other filings. (See ECF No. 10, at 24). Mr. Goddard does, however, include, with his original complaint, an order from the WCC that states, "Hearing was held in the above claim in Laplata, Maryland on April 8, 2009, and as a result thereof, the Commission finds on the issue presented that the complainant's average weekly wage is $320.00." (ECF No. 1-1, at 37). Mr. Goddard suggests that he did not receive notice of the Agency's determination of his Average Weekly Wage and that this was a purported violation of Maryland code. (See ECF No. 18, at 4 & 5) (listing purported violations of Maryland code as he "had no notice of agency action," "no notice of hearing . . . on 1/15/2009 . . . on Average Weekly Wage hearing . . . [and] no knowledge of 4/08/2009 hearing"). Plaintiff alleges that, by April 13, 2009, he was not "getting the proper medical treatment-care within the [WCC] system" that he believes was owed to him. (ECF No. 1, at 10).

II. Procedural Background

Nearly a decade later, Plaintiff "found out about" the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and, on July 10, 2019, filed a complaint.³ This complaint not only alleged wrongfultermination based on his injuries/disabilities but goes on to state:

I believe I have been discriminated against on the basis of my Race (African American), Color (Black), Sex (Male), Religion (Islam), National Origin (African American) and retaliated against for engaging in protected activity under the law in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ["Title VII"], as amended.

I believe I have been discriminated against on the basis of my disabilities and retaliated against for pursuing a workers compensation claim with an attorney, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ["the ADA"], as amended.

I believe I have been discriminated against on the basis of my Genetic Information and retaliated against for engaging in protected activity in violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.

(ECF No. 1-1, at 4). He checked the boxes in his Charge of Discrimination for discrimination based on 1) race, 2) color, 3) sex, 4) religion, 5) national origin, 6) retaliation,7) disability, and 8) genetic information. The complaint reports this discriminatory conduct as having occurred on September 9, 2008. (ECF No. 1-1, at 4). Five days later, Mr. Goddard received a response dismissing his administrative complaint and noting that, "Your charge was not timely filed with EEOC; in other words, you waited too long after the date(s) of the alleged discrimination to file your charge." (ECF No. 1-1, at 1).

Plaintiff ultimately filed a complaint in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia ("D.C. Court") on October 1, 2019, that named fifty-two Defendants. (ECF No. 1). That complaint seemingly omitted passages when photocopied, so Plaintiff submitted a corrected version to the court the next day. (ECF No. 3). This corrected filing concludes by referencing various subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the codification of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). That same month, Mr. Goddard filed a "Motion to Seal Personal Information" with the D.C. Court (ECF No. 4). Based on the allegations and Mr. Goddard's attachment of his EEOC complaint, the D.C. Court determined that Plaintiff meant primarily to sue his former employer, Apogee, for employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII and transferred the case to this court. (ECF No. 7).

Mr. Goddard subsequently filed a first amended complaint on November 15, 2019 (ECF No. 10) but was informed that this complaint failed to meet the pleading requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); hewas directed to file a second amended complaint within twenty-eight days that provided brief, clear, and concise allegations regarding the multitude of named Defendants. (ECF No. 11). On January 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed what he entitled a "Request for Affirmative Relief" (ECF No. 12) (filed under seal), which he supplemented with numerous exhibits two days later (ECF No. 13) (filed under seal), along with a motion to seal all personal information in his previous filings (ECF No. 14) that largely mirrored his earlier, still-pending motion to seal. (ECF No. 4). On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff submitted yet another request for affirmative relief (ECF No. 17), and six days later resubmitted a nearly identical filing but with added information and allegations. (ECF No. 18).

Ultimately, an order was issued on July 31, granting the two motions to seal (keeping ECF Nos. 12 and 13 under seal), and ordering the Clerk to edit the docket to reflect that ECF No. 18 would be treated as the "operative second amended complaint." The order also dismissed the two earlier motions for affirmative relief, (ECF Nos. 12 and 17), as moot, and allowed the case to proceed against Apogee only and based on the new complaint, while dismissing the other Defendants, without prejudice. (ECF No. 19).

On September 14, 2020, Apogee filed the currently pending motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 23). Apogee argues that the operative complaint fails in its entirety to state a claim upon which reliefcould be granted and fails in its entirety to conform with the pleading standards laid out by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (thereby depriving "the Defendant of an opportunity to frame a responsive pleading"). Apogge also argues that claims are barred under "workers' compensation immunity" and/or the relevant statute of limitations.

Notice was subsequently sent to Plaintiff informing him that his failure to respond adequately could be fatal to his complaint. After he was granted an extension, Plaintiff filed a document on October 23, 2020, entitled "Subject-Matter Jurisdiction" that was construed and docketed as his opposition. (ECF No. 27). On November 16, however, he submitted another letter to the court that signaled his intention to supplement this response which was construed as a motion for an extension and for leave to file a supplement (ECF No. 28) (filed under seal). These requests were granted by order two days later (ECF No. 29), and Plaintiff filed the supplemental response on December 23. (ECF No. 31...