Godfrey v. Warden

Robert GODFREY #296302 v. WARDEN

Nos. CV164007698S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Tolland, Rockville, Geographic Area 19

March 8, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

Bhatt J.

If an individual pleads guilty and accepts a lengthy prison sentence in order to avoid the death penalty, does subsequent abolition of the death penalty utterly defeat the purpose of entering into that plea, such that the conviction should be vacated and criminal proceedings commenced anew?

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Robert Godfrey was charged with capital felony, murder, felony murder, burglary in the first degree and sexual assault in the first degree. On January 28, 2002, the court, Solomon J found probable cause for the homicide-related offenses. On March 11, 2004, Godfrey pled guilty to a one-count substitute information charging murder in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence of sixty years incarceration. This sentence was imposed on April 8, 2004. In 2012, our legislature passed Public Acts 2012, No. 12-5, which repealed the death penalty for crimes occurring after the effective date of the act. Subsequently, our Supreme Court abolished the death penalty for all individuals, including those already on death row. State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 122 A.3d 1 (2015).^[1] After Santiago, Godfrey filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. An amended petition was filed on April 17, 2018, which alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel in count one and that his plea should be withdrawn pursuant to the doctrine of frustration of purpose in count two. On the date of trial, counsel withdrew count one.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

Three witnesses testified at trial: the petitioner and the attorneys who represented him: Barry Butler and Fred DeCaprio. The parties submitted exhibits.

Attorney Butler . Attorney Butler, at the time the petitioner’s criminal case was pending, was an attorney in the Capital Defense and Trial Services Unit of the Office of Chief Public Defender. His job was to represent individuals exposed to the death penalty. At the time of the plea it was his understanding that the petitioner would serve "day for day" of the sentence and thus would not be eligible for release until he was either eighty-nine or ninety years old. To him there was a practical difference between a sentence of sixty years incarceration and a sentence of life without the possibility of parole because there may be future changes to the law that would make someone with a finite sentence eligible for early release. He did, acknowledge, however, that for someone who was thirty at the time of sentencing, a sentence of sixty years was an effective life sentence.

Avoiding the death penalty was "part of the reason" he recommended the plea to the petitioner and that it was "very important" that he not face death. He acknowledged that there were several reasons for his recommendation that the petitioner plead guilty, but "avoiding the death penalty was right up there." He was extremely concerned that the petitioner would be sentenced to death in this case because the "crime itself was horrific" and they "did not have an extensive mitigation case for the penalty phase," nor was it a strong one. There was no "mental state defense" to the offenses charged. While avoiding the death penalty was important to him, he could not say how important it was to the petitioner, or that it was the main reason in the petitioner’s mind, although it certainly was "part of the reason" the petitioner pled guilty. The petitioner did not want to plead guilty to sexual assault and that was a "deal-breaker" for the petitioner and thus, avoiding a sexual assault conviction was one of the reasons the petitioner pled guilty.

On the subject of the repeal of the death penalty, Attorney Butler had conversations with all his capital clients about the hope that one day the state might abolish the death penalty, but at the time of the petitioner’s case, there was no specific expectation or hope that the repeal was likely. To the contrary, according to Attorney Butler, then-Governor Rell "was not going to be involved" in repealing the death penalty. The death penalty was "very real."

Attorney DeCaprio . At the time of the petitioner’s criminal case, Attorney DeCaprio was the Public Defender for the Hartford Judicial District, although prior to the petitioner’s plea, he rejoined the Capital Defense and Trial Services Unit. He, too, recommended that the petitioner plead guilty because of concerns about the mitigation case. Avoiding the death penalty was "quite important." He concurred that there was "a significant likelihood" that the petitioner would be sentenced to death after a trial. Had the death penalty not been available, his advice to the petitioner "could have been different." According to him, it was a "fair assumption" that avoiding the death penalty was a significant reason for the petitioner to plead guilty. Others reasons for pleading included avoiding the stress of a capital trial on the petitioner and his family.

As to the issue of the repeal of the death penalty, he had no expectation that it would be repealed and he did not recall talking to the petitioner about any potential repeal in the future.

Robert Godfrey . The petitioner testified that at the time of the plea he had no understanding of how much time he would serve and had he known he would have to serve day for day he probably would have taken the matter to trial.^[2] Avoiding the death penalty was "somewhat important" to him and he would not have pled guilty had the death penalty been off the table. He was scared of the death penalty but he also did not want to plead to a sexual assault, something he was adamant he did not commit.

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. RESPONDENT’S DEFENSES

In its return, the respondent asserts that the claim fails to state a ground upon which relief can be granted and further, raises the defense of procedural default. The petitioner filed a reply in which he refutes procedural default by alleging that he did not have a prior opportunity to raise this claim because the factual basis supporting the claim did not exist. He also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel as cause and prejudice to overcome any procedural default.

The respondent also filed a motion to dismiss count two on August 17, 2018, relying on the same two grounds asserted in its return. This court orally denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A decision as to whether the petitioner procedurally defaulted was reserved until the petitioner had an opportunity to present evidence to overcome any default. Since the defenses raised in the motion to dismiss and the return are identical, this court will address them only once.

I. Failure to State a Claim

The United States Supreme Court has held that "the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), overruled in part on other grounds by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-82, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Here, the petitioner claims, in a matter of first impression for our state, that his conviction should be vacated if this court finds that the doctrine of frustration of purpose applies. The petitioner’s claim, if proven, may warrant habeas corpus relief.

2. Procedural Default

While the return does not specify in what way the petitioner is alleged to have procedurally defaulted, counsel for the respondent referenced at separate times the petitioner’s failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, ^[3] a motion to correct an illegal sentence or to raise the issue on direct appeal.

"A respondent seeking to raise an affirmative defense of procedural default must file a return to the habeas petition responding to the allegations of the petitioner and alleg[ing] any facts in support of any claim of procedural default ... Only after the respondent raises the defense of procedural default in accordance with [Practice Book] § 23-30(b) does the burden shift to the petitioner to allege and prove that the default is excused." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294 Conn. 165, 175-76, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). The petitioner must demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice. Brewer v. Commissioner of Correction, 162 Conn.App. 8, 17, 130 A.3d 882 (2015).

At the outset, this court notes that the respondent’s return alleges no facts in support of its affirmative defense of procedural default. Procedural default is addressed in one sentence "[i]n addition, to the extent that the petitioner now asserts that his guilty plea entered more than fourteen years ago was not knowing and voluntary at that time, the claim is procedurally defaulted and should be dismissed. P.B. § 23-29(5)." (Emphasis in original.) This appears to be no more than a blanket assertion of the respondent’s legal position that the claim is procedurally defaulted. Further, the claim of procedural default seems to be directed at an alleged claim of an involuntary plea. The claim in count two does not allege that the petitioner’s plea is involuntary; rather that the voluntary plea should nonetheless be rescinded because his purpose for entering that plea has been substantially frustrated by an unforeseen, subsequent event. The court further notes that despite alleging in the motion to dismiss that the claim is procedurally defaulted, the respondent does not brief that argument in its memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. The...