Godinet v. Management and Training Corp.

994 F.Supp. 1348

Randall B. GODINET, Plaintiff, v. MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING CORPORATION, d/b/a Flint Hills Job Corps Center, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 96-4127-DES.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

February 11, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

K. Gary Sebelius, Michael M. Walker, Wright, Henson, Somers, Sebelius, Clark & Baker, LLP, Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff.

Randall J. Forbes, S. Eric Steinle, Christina Collins, Frieden, Haynes & Forbes, Topeka, KS, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SAFFELS, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 83).

I. INTRODUCTION

Randall B. Godinet ("Godinet"), an American Samoan, was first employed by the defendant, Management and Training Corporation ("MTC"), at the Flint Hills Job Corps Center ("Flint Hills") as a Residential Advisor in January of 1992. He was later promoted to Senior Residential Advisor by Tom Adams, the Group Life Manager at Flint Hills, and Kim Matsen, the Residential Living Supervisor. After Matsen announced that she was resigning to accept the Group Life Manager position at the Kittrell Job Corps Center in 1993, Godinet sought the Residential Living Supervisor position.

Godinet alleges that, at the same time that he was seeking the Residential Living Supervisor ("RLS") position, he was offered a position with the Oceanside, California, Boys and Girls Club at a substantially higher salary than he was being paid as Senior Residential Advisor ("SRA") at Flint Hills. Godinet further alleges that he turned down that offer based upon Adams' representations that Godinet was the top candidate for the RLS position. After Godinet rejected the offer from Oceanside, Flint Hills announced that Kristin Johnson, a white female who was Flint Hills' Counseling Supervisor, would take Matsen's place as the RLS. Adams, who made the decision to appoint Johnson as RLS, did not interview Godinet before announcing his decision.

Upon learning of Johnson's appointment as the RLS, Godinet requested a meeting with the key managers at Flint Hills for June 11, 1993, the following day. During this meeting, Godinet was informed that Johnson had been selected for the RLS position because she was better qualified. The managers also stated that they felt Godinet had done a good job and that they hoped he would continue to work there. Godinet asked if the managers were going to stick by the decision to place Johnson in the RLS position and they indicated that they were. At the close of this meeting, Godinet gave the Center Director his pre-written resignation letter which stated that he was leaving because he did not believe that the management had confidence in his supervisory abilities. Godinet gave two weeks' notice in his resignation and was paid for those two weeks; however, he did not work during that time because he was told not to report for work after turning in his resignation.

After leaving his position as SRA at Flint Hills, Godinet applied for the Residential Living Manager position at the defendant's Kittrell Job Corps Center ("Kittrell"), a position which would report directly to Matsen as the Group Life Manager at Kittrell. Matsen told Godinet that he was the top candidate for the Kittrell position and that she was recommending that he be hired. In the mean time, Godinet contacted Hank Owens at the defendant's corporate headquarters and informed him that he had not been hired for the RLS position at Flint Hills and that he believed that Flint Hills had discriminated against him. After this contact, Mose Watkins, another officer at the corporate headquarters, called Matsen and recommended that Edison Mosley, a black male, be hired for the Kittrell position, even though Mosley had previously been fired from another Job Corps Center. After Matsen reiterated her desire to hire Godinet, she was removed from the hiring process, and Mosley was hired to fill the Kittrell position.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court shall render summary judgment upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The rule provides that "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. at 248. A dispute over a material fact is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. Id. "Only disputes over facts that might properly affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.

The movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir.1993). The movant may discharge its burden "by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant need not negate the nonmovant's claim. Id. at 323.

Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the nonmovant must do more than merely show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Rule 56(c) requires the court to enter summary judgment against a nonmovant who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof. Id. at 322. Such a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the nonmovant's case renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 323.

A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. O'Block, 788 F.2d 1433, 1435 (10th Cir.1986) (stating that "[t]he court must consider factual inferences tending to show triable issues in the light most favorable to the existence of those issues"). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence, but merely to determine whether there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmovant for a finder of fact to return a verdict in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Essentially, the court performs the threshold inquiry of determining whether a trial is necessary. Id. at 250.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks summary judgment on plaintiff's claims that defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge any individual because of such individual's race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Although the plaintiff originally asserted state law claims pursuant to the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 44-1001, et seq., he has voluntarily dismissed his state law claims and is now proceeding only on his Title VII claims. The remaining claims asserted by the plaintiff include the following: (1) failure to promote, (2) constructive discharge, and (3) retaliation.

The Tenth Circuit has adopted the burden-shifting format set out in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as a framework for analyzing claims under Title VII when no direct evidence of discrimination exists. E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir.1992). This framework has also been applied to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441 (10th Cir.1995) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim).

To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of discriminatory intent arises and the burden of production shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its challenged conduct]." Id. "[T]he defendant does not at this stage of the proceedings need to litigate the merits of the reasoning, nor does it need to prove that the reason relied upon was bona fide, nor does it need to prove that the reasoning was applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion." Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). However, the employer's reason for the adverse action "must be reasonably specific and clear." Id.

If the defendant employer meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination arising from the prima facie case "simply drops out of the picture." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). "`At the summary judgment stage, it then becomes the plaintiff's burden to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer's proffered reason for the challenged action is pretextual — i.e. unworthy of belief.'" Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 327 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1019, 116 S.Ct. 2552, 135 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1996) (quoting Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir.1995)). The plaintiff may establish pretext by showing "`that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or ... that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'" Rea v....