Goins v. Hitchcock Independent School Dist., CIV. A. G-03-527.

424 F.Supp.2d 902

Rolisha GOINS, Corine Copeland, and Alma Lowe, Plaintiffs, v. HITCHCOCK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. Defendants.

No. CIV. A. G-03-527.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

October 15, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald J. Merriweather, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Bridget R. Robinson, Walsh Anderson et al., Austin, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER OF REMAND

KENT, District Judge.

This the fourth and final installment of a knock-down, drag-out dispute that has raged across the coastal plains like a veritable Hatfield-McCoy gun battle for the past six years.¹ The history of this case has been exhaustively recounted in a number of this Court's Orders, but for purposes of clarity, an abbreviated synopsis is included in this Order. Plaintiff Rolisha Goins ("Goins") filed her first lawsuit, 98-159 ("Goins I"), against Hitchcock Independent School District ("HISD") on March 27, 1998, alleging intentional gender discrimination. The parties eventually settled the claims and signed a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release of Claims. On August 16, 2001, Goins, Corine Copeland, and Alma Lowe (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed a second lawsuit against HISD, G-01-498 ("Goins II"), alleging violations of 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. ("Title IX"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII"), as well as state-law fraud claims arising out of the settlement agreement entered in Goins I. The Court granted Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss on March 20, 2002, dismissing all of Plaintiffs' federal claims with prejudice. See Goins v. Hitchcock I.S.D., 191 F.Supp.2d 860 (S.D.Tex.2002). On July 16, 2002, the Court granted HISD's Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Goins's claims. Final judgment was entered on July 17, 2002. The Order in Goins II was subsequently affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. On August 16, 2002, Plaintiffs again filed a complaint against HISD, G-02-590 ("Goins III"), alleging federal civil rights violations as well as various state-law claims, including fraud in the settlement agreement in Goins I. The Court's Order Dismissing Action G-02-590 for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction issued on May 22, 2003. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs' federal claims were barred by res judicata and that no basis existed for federal subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state-law claims. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the statelaw claims without prejudice. An appeal in Goins III is currently pending before the Fifth Circuit.

On June 27, 2003, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the 10th Judicial District, Galveston County, Texas, against HISD and the following individuals, in their individual and official capacities: Josie M. Orr, Ricky Bond, Ron Meir, Doris Scurry-Kennedy, Pat Turner, Mark Morgan, Shawn Kadlecek, Rochelle Randle, Joe Allen, Jimmy Anderson, Ruth A. Kane, Bill Banks, Brenda Taylor, Ronnie Purl, Janice Braunsdorf, Ann Sanders, and Barbara Wilson ("Defendants"). Plaintiffs' Original Petition essentially reasserted the claims involved in their prior lawsuits including violations of federal civil rights laws, state-law fraud, and numerous violations of the Texas Penal Code and Texas Open Government Act. Maintaining that they were never properly served, Defendants removed the case, thus presenting the controversy to this Court for the fourth time as G-03-527 ("Goins IV"). Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, albeit without leave of the Court, on August 7, 2003, deleting all federal causes of action. Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Remand on August 25, 2003, asserting that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and Defendants timely responded.² Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, it must REMAND for consideration by the Texas District Court.

I. Jurisdiction

Absent an express provision to the contrary, a defendant may remove a state-court action to federal court only if the suit could have been filed originally in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). The Defendants assert two bases for this Court's subject matter jurisdiction: first, that the Court can exercise federal question jurisdiction based on the existence of federal claims in Plaintiffs' complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and second, that the Court may exercise jurisdiction under the All Writs Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Careful consideration of the parties' motions and a brief review of the previous iterations of this dispute reveal, however, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the Court must REMAND the case to the Texas District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.").³

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Congress has provided the federal courts with jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Generally, the existence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that "federal question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. at 2429 (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97-98, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936)). If the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint does not show that federal law creates the plaintiff's right of action, federal question jurisdiction may exist if "the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). Although the well-pleaded complaint rule generally directs the court's attention to the face of the complaint, the mere allegation of a federal cause of action does not necessarily confer federal question jurisdiction on the district court. See John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 579 (5th Cir.2000) ("[I]n order to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction, claims cannot be obviously without merit or clearly foreclosed by the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court." (citations and internal quotations omitted)); see also 13B Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3564, at 68 (1984) ("[A] federal court must dismiss for want of jurisdiction if the federal claim that is the basis for jurisdiction is obviously without merit or is wholly frivolous.").

Defendants' primary argument for federal question jurisdiction centers on the presence of federal civil rights claims on the face of Plaintiffs' Original Petition. Brief consideration of the claims reveals, however, that they are inadvertent at best and frivolous at worst. In John Corp. v. City of Houston, the Circuit found that the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim, which alleged that the city's demolition of an apartment building constituted cruel and unusual punishment, was frivolous because a confiscation of property was not "punishment," as required by the controlling interpretation of the Eight Amendment. John Corp., 214 F.3d at 580 (citing, Ingraham, v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)). Because the claim was frivolous, the Court held that it did not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The present case presents a somewhat novel twist on the issue, but it is nevertheless clear that Plaintiffs' federal claims are so lacking in merit as to provide no basis whatsoever for subject matter jurisdiction. Whereas the complaint in John Corp. was deemed frivolous because of its facial conflict with controlling precedent, the Plaintiffs' complaint now under consideration conflicts with no less than two prior Orders of this very Court. Even if it does not sink to the level of frivolity, it is abundantly clear that the claim has no merit whatsoever. Because Plaintiffs' Original Petition presents no colorable federal claims on its face, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331.

In fact, Plaintiffs' federal claims were dismissed with prejudice in Goins II. Such a defense does not, however, provide this Court with subject matter jurisdiction. On the contrary, the Supreme Court rejected this proposition in Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 118 S.Ct. 921, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998). In Rivet, the Supreme Court considered the question whether a defense of claim preclusion based on a prior federal judgment created a proper basis for removal of a subsequent state-court action to federal court. See id. at 472, 118 S.Ct. at 923. Distinguishing claim preclusion from the doctrine of complete preemption, the Court noted that "[t]he prior federal judgment does not transform the plaintiff's state-law claims into federal claims but rather extinguishes them altogether." Id. at 476, 118 S.Ct. at 926. The Court concluded: "In sum, claim preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that provides no basis for removal under § 1441(b). Such a defense is properly made in the state proceedings . .." Id. at 478, 118 S.Ct. at 926; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Accordingly, the prior resolution of Plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims by this Court provides no basis for removal, and the Defendants must assert any res judicata defense in state court.

2. State-Law Claims

Defendants argue in the alternative that, because the Plaintiffs' claims necessarily depend on the validity of three prior orders of this Court, the claims present a federal question under § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As the Court understands the argument, Defendants contend that, because Plaintiffs' state-law claims relate to the settlement...