Gok v. Roman Catholic Church

550 F.Supp.3d 221

Hayriye Beril GOK

v.ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, et al.

Hayriye Beril Gok

v.Post & Schell, PC, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-4817

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-4968

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed July 20, 2021

Hayriye Beril Gok, Philadelphia, PA, Pro Se.

Baldev Singh, Nicholas M. Centrella, Conrad O'Brien, Philadelphia, PA, for Archdiocese of Philadelphia.

Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, Post & Schell PC, Philadelphia, PA, David E. Renner, FisherBroyles, LLP, Moon Township, PA, for Trinity Health/Catholic Health East, Oleg Teytelboym, Stanley Chan, Mike Slubowski.

Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, Post & Schell PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Trinity Health Mid Atlantic, Arnold Eiser, John Cigler, Reza Hayeri, Cathy Mikus.

Martha Gale, Nicole A. Feigenbaum, Administrative Office of PA Courts, Philadelphia, PA, for Alan J. Davis.

MEMORANDUM RE: RULE 59 MOTIONS TO MODIFY JUDGMENT

Baylson, District Judge

I. Introduction

The present two cases arise out of allegations of misconduct in Plaintiff's prior employment discrimination lawsuit in front of this Court: Doe v. Mercy Catholic Hospital Center, No. 15-2085 (E.D. Pa.) (the "Mercy litigation"). Plaintiff now alleges that dozens of entities and individuals named as defendants in these two cases were involved in fraudulent and unlawful actions to help her former employer, Mercy Catholic Hospital Center ("Mercy"), escape liability in the Mercy litigation.¹ This Court previously dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's federal law claims in the present lawsuits, and it declined to maintain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Defendants have now moved for this Court to modify its prior judgment, pursuant to Rule 59(e), and dismiss the state law claims with prejudice and prohibit Plaintiff from continuing her extensive pro se litigation against an increasing array of defendants, all of which stems from the now-dismissed matter of Mercy. Given Plaintiff's voluminous and improper pleadings, her refusal or inability to retain counsel, and her implausible and previously-litigated allegations, the Court will do so. The Court will DENY Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motions to modify its prior order (as well as other outstanding motions from Plaintiff), GRANT Defendants’ Rule 59(e) motions to modify its prior order by dismissing Plaintiff's state law claims with prejudice, ORDER Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not enjoin her from pursuing related litigation against any Defendant, and ENJOIN Plaintiff from pursuing any pro se litigation against the Rule 233.1 Defendants.

II. Procedural History

a. Prior Litigation

In the Mercy litigation (No. 15-2085), Plaintiff (then proceeding under a Doe pseudonym) was a medical resident at Mercy, where she alleged that she faced sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and violations of state law, resulting in her termination.

In ruling on the motion to dismiss, this Court initially dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims. See Doe v. Mercy, 158 F. Supp. 3d 256 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (Baylson, J.). First, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's Title IX claims, finding that Title IX's applicability to "educational programs" did not cover Plaintiff's position as a medical resident employed by Mercy. In the alternative, it also dismissed Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim as time-barred. Without remaining federal law claims, this Court declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part the motion to dismiss opinion. See Doe v. Mercy, 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017). The Third Circuit vacated this Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's federal law claims.² In doing so, it interpreted Title IX to conclude that "[w]hether a program or activity is sufficiently educational under Title IX is a mixed question of law and fact," id. at 556, and it was "plausible" that Mercy's residency program was "at least in part, educational under Title IX." Id. at 558. With the federal law claims surviving the motion to dismiss, the Third Circuit reversed dismissal of the state court claims, finding that this Court still had jurisdiction over them. Id. at 567.

On remand, the litigation proceeded through discovery, and the parties stipulated to dismissal without prejudice for Plaintiff's state law claims. Mercy moved for summary judgment, and Plaintiff opposed, relying in large part upon her own unsigned declaration. The declaration included her belief that Mercy had falsified her "service examination scores" to make Plaintiff appear lower-performing.

The Court granted Mercy's motion for summary judgment. Doe v. Mercy, No. 15-2085, 2019 WL 3243249 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2019) (Baylson, J.). The Court held that neither of Plaintiff's remaining claims — federal claims for retaliation or sexual harassment, both under Title IX — could survive summary judgment. Id. at *15. In doing so, this Court did "not credit" Plaintiff's declaration to the extent it "contradict[ed] her deposition testimony, [was] otherwise belied by the evidentiary record, or [was] premised on hearsay or evidence about which Plaintiff could not have personal knowledge." Id. at *2 n.3.

Plaintiff appealed. Despite previously having representation throughout the entire litigation, Plaintiff's counsel withdrew, and Plaintiff represented herself pro se for this final appeal. Although the Third Circuit initially dismissed Plaintiff's appeal for failure to prosecute, it later affirmed this Court's grant of summary judgment on the merits for both counts. Doe v. Mercy, No. 19-2734, 855 Fed.Appx. 842 (3d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021) (non-precedential). Id. at 849.

During her appeal, Plaintiff more expressly raised some of the claims that she echoed in the two present cases. The Third Circuit rejected those arguments:

Doe also complains about "spoliation of evidence" and "fraud on the court" in her brief here, but those issues are also forfeited, as she did not properly raise them in the District Court. For the same reason, we cannot entertain her claims, raised for the first time in her reply brief: (1) that Mercy is engaging in "continuous retaliation," which is causing a "hostile work environment at Appellant's current employment," (2) vague claims that her "constitutional rights" and "civil rights" have been violated, and (3) claims of "criminal conspiracy," and violation of various statutory provisions prohibiting fraud, including health care fraud.

Id. at *6 (citations omitted and emphasis added).

b. Plaintiff's Early Filings in Present Cases

Following this Court's dismissal of Mercy, and while the second appeal was pending, Plaintiff initiated the present two litigations: Gok v. Roman Catholic Church, No. 20-4817 (E.D. Pa.) (the "RCC litigation") and Gok v. Post & Schell PC, No. 20-4968 (E.D. Pa.) (the "P&S litigation"). Both cases have extensive procedural history, largely due to Plaintiff's practice of continually filing voluminous and procedurally improper motions. The Court will, however, summarize the most relevant filings to the present opinion. The filings in these two cases follow largely similar paths; unless otherwise noted, the Court will cite the docket for the RCC litigation, No. 20-4968.

Plaintiff initiated these litigations pro se in Fall 2020. ECF 1. Broadly speaking, Plaintiff's RCC complaint alleged that Mercy and others conspired to falsify documents for the prior litigation and her P&S complaint alleged that the attorneys in Mercy (both plaintiff and defense counsel) committed legal malpractice through fraud on the court. ECF 99.

Within only a few months, the two cases’ dockets totaled approximately 150 entries, predominately resulting from Plaintiff filing procedurally improper or duplicative motions. In December 2020, this Court struck the complaints without prejudice for failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Simultaneously, this Court denied all outstanding motions without prejudice and recommended that Plaintiff retain counsel, noting the difficulty of litigating cases like this pro se. Id.

Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint, ECF 104, which this Court also struck, ECF 108. In striking the first amended complaint, this Court again reiterated the importance of following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and recommended retaining counsel. Id.

Plaintiff then filed her second amended complaints, the now-operative complaints. ECF 109, see below, Section III (summarizing Plaintiff's allegations in the second amended complaints). Plaintiff alleged a mixture of federal law claims and state law claims. ECF 109.

In both cases, Defendants, either individually or as groups, filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See ECF 131 (summarizing motion to dismiss briefing). Plaintiff opposed some, though not all, of these motions. Id. The Court ordered Defendants to file a reply brief in support of the motions but limited that reply brief "to Plaintiff's allegations based on federal law" without "discuss[ing] any of Plaintiff's allegations under state law." Id. Defendants did so.

c. Motion to Dismiss Opinion

In April 2021, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's federal claims with prejudice in both the RCC and P&S litigations. ECF 153 ("MTD Opinion"), also available at 2021 WL 1726650. In the MTD Opinion, this Court noted that all of "Plaintiff's current claims stem from perceived wrongdoings throughout [the Mercy litigation]" and Plaintiff had " ‘improperly’ attempted to relitigate her failed claims in the prior [Mercy ] action." MTD Opinion at 5, 12.

This Court next reviewed all of Plaintiff's federal law claims: (1) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") violations, against RCC and P&S defendants; (2) Sherman Act violations, against RCC only; (3) Clayton Act violations, against RCC only; and (4) violations of due process, against RCC and P&S defen...