Golden v. Floyd Healthcare Mgmt., Inc.

904 S.E.2d 359

GOLDEN

v.FLOYD HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, INC. d/b/a Floyd Medical Center.

S24G0008

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: July 2, 2024

Superior Court, Floyd County, Kay Ann Wetherington, Judge

Michael Brian Terry, Jane D. Vincent, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, 1201 W. Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 3900, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3417, William Sims Stone, The Stone Law Group - Trial Lawyers, LLC, P.O. Box 70, Blakely, Georgia 39823, Ryals Drayton Stone, Michael George Regas, II, The Stone Law Group - Trial Lawyers, LLC, 5229 Roswell Road, NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30342, C. Sutton Connelly, Cook & Connelly, P. O. Box 370, Summerville, Georgia 30747, for Appellant.

Julius Winfrey Peek, Jr., Robert Thomas Monroe, Jason Bradley Sanker, Benjamin Pleas Stell, McRae, Smith, Peek, Harman & Monroe, LLP, 111 Bridgepoint Plaza, Suite 300, Rome, Georgia 30162, for Appellee.

McMillian, Justice.

On October 21, 2021, Jami Lynn Golden filed a renewal action against Floyd Healthcare Management, Inc. d/b/a Floyd Medical Center ("Floyd Medical") in Floyd County Superior Court, asserting claims of medical malpractice and hospital negligence, among other claims. Floyd Medical moved to dismiss, arguing in part that OCGA § 9-3-71 (b), a five-year medical malpractice statute of repose, expired in July 2021 and thus time-barred Golden’s suit. The trial court denied that motion, concluding that the claims were not time-barred by OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) because the repose statute was tolled by former Chief Justice Harold D. Melton’s "Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency" dated March 14, 2020 ("March 14 Order"). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) was not tolled by the March 14 Order but, instead, that OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) expired before Golden filed her renewal complaint. See Golden v. Floyd, Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 368 Ga. App. 409, 417-25 (3), 890 S.E.2d 288 (2023). For the reasons below, we conclude that Golden’s claims were not time-barred because the March 14 Order tolled OCGA § 9-3-71 (b), and that under these circumstances there is no impediment in the federal or Georgia Constitutions for the statute of repose to be tolled, so we reverse.

[1] 1. An appellate court "review[s] de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, accepting as true all well-pled material allegations in the complaint and resolving any doubts in favor of the plaintiff." Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., 313 Ga. 533, 535 (2), 870 S.E.2d 739 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). Viewed in this light, the record shows that:

Golden visited Floyd Emergency Care Center at approximately 8:30 p.m. on July 1, 2016, complaining of abdominal pain, fever, chills, and nausea. Among other readings taken during Golden’s triage assessment, medical staff noted that she had a low-grade fever, a heart rate of 118 beats per minute, a white blood cell count of 4.9, and bands of 15 percent. As a result of these readings, Golden alleged that she satisfied two general internal criteria of "systemic inflammatory response syndrome" (or, SIRS) to be monitored for sepsis — an elevated heart rate and bands in excess of 10 percent.

A nurse practitioner [Charles William Stein] initially suggested that Golden was suffering from an ovarian cyst or endometriosis and administered saline fluid and medications to control her pain. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on July 2, "a computer generated Sepsis Alert concerning … Golden activated based on an algorithm that interpreted her vital signs and lab results as being at risk for sepsis[.]" Golden alleged that [Sharon] Gaylor, the charge nurse on duty at the time of the sepsis alert, failed to forward the alert to the attending physician on duty [Dr. Garrett H. Barnes] and the primary nurse assigned to Golden, in violation of Floyd Medical’s written sepsis alert policy. Golden was prescribed additional pain medication and discharged approximately one hour after the sepsis alert, with instructions to follow up in two to three days.

Golden’s symptoms persisted and her condition worsened throughout the day, including the onset of additional symptoms of a sore throat, headache, dizziness, and shortness of breath. At approximately 4:00 p.m. on July 2, an ambulance transported Golden, by then in septic shock, to Redmond Regional Emergency Care Center for treatment. Medical staff initiated Redmond Regional’s sepsis protocol, administered extensive treatment of Golden, and admitted Golden to the Redmond Regional Medical Center Intensive Care Unit. Golden remained in Redmond Regional's ICUfor 11 days before transferring to University of Alabama-Birmingham Medical Center for further treatment. As a result of the septic shock, Golden suffered necrosis that required the amputation of parts of her fingers and toes.

Golden, 368 Ga. App. at 410-12, 890 S.E.2d 288 (footnote omitted).

In June 2018, Golden filed suit in federal court against Floyd Medical, the attending physician (Dr. Barnes), the nurse practitioner (Stein), and a physician’s assistant (Danny Day Rogers), among others. Her complaint asserted several claims, including claims for medical malpractice and hospital negligence.

During the pendency of her case, the COVID-19 pandemic began. In response to the pandemic, former Chief Justice Melton issued the March 14 Order, citing as the basis of his authority, OCGA § 38-3-62. As pertinent here, the March 14 Order provided:

Pursuant to OCGA § 38-3-62, during the period of this Order, the undersigned hereby suspends, tolls, extends, and otherwise grants relief from any deadlines or other time schedules or filing requirements imposed by otherwise applicable statutes, rules, regulations, or court orders, whether in civil or criminal cases or administrative matters, including, but not limited to any: (1) statute of limitation … and (11) such other legal proceedings as determined to be necessary by the authorized judicial official.¹

This Court subsequently issued several documents clarifying the effect of the March 14 Order. On March 27, 2020, this Court issued a document called "Guidance on Tolling Filing Deadlines Under the Chief Justice’s Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency" ("March 27 Guidance") applicable to "all proceedings and filing deadlines," clarifying that the March 14 Order tolled all "nonconstitutional filing deadlines" if the "filing deadline date was after March 14, 2020[.]"² On April 6, 2020, this Court issued another guiding document clarifying that "[i]f the period of limitation for a particular cause of action commenced prior to March 14, 2020 … the running of the period of limitation was suspended on March 14" and would "resume when the tolling provision of the March 14 declaration … expired or [was] otherwise terminated."³ Finally, on July 10, 2020, then-Chief Justice Melton issued an order that reinstated, starting from July 14, 2020, all deadlines suspended, tolled, or extended by the March 14 Order, subject to exceptions not relevant here.⁴

In June 2021, the federal district court granted a motion by the defendants to strike Golden’s expert Rule 26 disclosures, and she then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss her complaint without prejudice, which the district court granted.

On October 21, 2021, Golden filed a renewal action in Floyd County Superior Court against Floyd Medical, asserting claims of medical malpractice and hospital negligence in Count I of her renewal complaint.⁵ Floyd Medical moved to dismiss, arguing in part that OCGA § 9-3-71 (b), the five-year medical malpractice statute of repose, expired on July 1-2, 2021, five years from Golden’s allegedly negligent treatment, and so her October 21, 2021 renewal complaint was time-barred. The trial court denied Floyd Medical’s motion to dismiss with respect to Golden’s Count I medical malpractice and hospital negligence claims, determining that Chief Justice Melton’s March 14 Order tolled OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) for 122 days such that the repose period for those claims expired on October 31, 2021.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Golden’s claims were barred by the five-year medical malpractice statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-71 (b). See Golden, 368 Ga. App. at 417-25 (3), 890 S.E.2d 288. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the March 14 Order did not toll OCGA § 9-3-71 (b), because Georgia courts, even in cases decided after the enactment of the Judicial Emergency Act in 2004, have held that statutes of repose are "absolute" and "cannot be tolled," see e.g., Simmons v. Sonyika, 279 Ga. 378, 379-80, 614 S.E.2d 27 (2005) (citation and punctuation omitted), and because the March 14 Order and subsequent guiding documents did not specifically state that the March 14 Order tolled statutes of repose. See Golden, 368 Ga. App. at 422-25 (3), 890 S.E.2d 288.

This Court, in turn, granted review to consider three questions:

(1) Does OCGA § 38-3-62 (a) empower "[a]n authorized judicial official" to "suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from" the application of a statute of repose?

(2) Did Chief Justice Melton’s "Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency" dated March 14, 2020, and subsequent orders suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from the application of a statute of repose?

(3) Assuming that the answers to questions (1) and (2) are "yes," can OCGA § 38-3-62 (a) and Chief Justice Melton’s COVID emergency orders be applied to toll the statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) consistent with the federal and Georgia Constitutions? See Southern States Chemical, Inc. v. Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc., 316 Ga. 701, 888 S.E.2d 553 (2023).

3. Turning now to the first question, we answer it in the affirmative: OCGA § 38-3-62 (a) empowers an "authorized judicial official"—here, Chief Justice Melton⁶—to "suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from" the application of a statute of repose.

OCGA § 38-3-62—which the Georgia General Assembly enacted in 2004 as part of the "Judicial Emergency Act of 2004" (OCGA §§ 38-3-60 et seq.), see Ga....