Golden v. Quality Life Servs.

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JORGE GOLDEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and ANTHONY YBARRA, Plaintiffs, v. QUALITY LIFE SERVICES, LLC, SALLY CHAVEZ, and APRIL LICON, Defendants.

Civ. No. 22-579 GJF/GBW

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

April 30, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HONORABLE GREGORY J. FOURATT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE PRESIDING BY CONSENT

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs' “Opposed Motion to Certify Class” [ECF 27] (Motion). The Motion is fully briefed. See id.; ECFs 30 (“Response”), 31 (“Reply”). On April 7, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on the Motion and considered additional evidence. ECF 50 (“Tr.”). Having reviewed the entire record and applicable law, and for the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART Plaintiff's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Quality Life Services, LLC (“QLS”) is a New Mexico limited liability company formed by Defendants Sally Chavez and April Licon. ECF 40 at ¶¶ 6-8 (“Am. Compl.”); see also ECF 27-1 at 45. QLS specializes in rendering “health care services to [developmentally disabled] patients in their homes or the health[-]care facilities” that house them. Am. Compl at ¶ 19; see also ECF 27-1 at 44; Quality Life Services LLC Home, https://qlsnm.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2023). To provide these services, QLS hires “direct service personnel” (“DSPs”). ECF 27-1 at 28. DSPs “[o]versee and assist” QLS's clients during “meal preparation, personal hygiene, [and] grooming”; chauffeur them; supervise them in “recreational activities both at home and in the community”; monitor them “during evening hours . . . in case of emergency”; informally advocate for their clients' “individual needs and desires”; “[a]ssist with chores, weekly budgets[,] and special requests”; and “[p]erform any other duties assigned by” QLS management. Id. at 28. Defendants promise these DSP-provided services “24 hours per day, 365 days a year.” ECF 51-1 at Bates No. 000171.^[1] Plaintiffs Jorge Golden and Anthony Ybarra (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are former DSPs. Id. at 15, 24.^[2]

This case arises from how Defendants paid the DSPs. As summarized in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants made virtually all DSPs work overtime yet classified them as “independent contractors” instead of “employees” to avoid paying them federally mandated overtime wages. E.g., Mot. at 1; accord 29 U.S.C. § 207 (requiring employers pay employees at least one-and-a-half times their normal wage for any hours worked over 40/week). On August 3, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking those unpaid overtime wages, which they allege were withheld in violation both of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (“NMMWA”). Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 61-62.

Plaintiffs filed the Motion on December 22, 2022. In it, they seek to convert their individual claims into a collective action on behalf of a proposed class of “[a]ll current and former [DSPs] of [QLS] who worked over forty hours a week from August 3, 2019[,] to present and [who] were not paid overtime wages for overtime hours worked.” Mot. at 1-2. Plaintiffs request class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or, alternatively, conditional certification under FLSA § 216(b) should their Rule 23 request be denied. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 23 Class Actions

Rule 23 governs class certification. E.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 298-99 (2010). The Rule allows certification of a class action if the trial court independently finds that Rules 23(a) and 23(b) are both satisfied. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011). Satisfying Rule 23 requires meeting Rule 23(a)'s four prerequisites and at least one of the three options allowed under Rule 23(b). E.g., Soseeah v. Sentry Ins., 808 F.3d 800, 808 (10th Cir. 2015); accord Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351.

First, Rule 23(a) requires the party seeking certification to show that:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Dukes, 564 U.S. at 345; accord Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a).^[3] Second, the party seeking certification “must also satisfy [with] evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b).” Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Tr. v. XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350). Here, the provision at issue is Rule 23(b)(3), which requires showing that:

[1] the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and [2] that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).^[4]

These requirements “are heavily scrutinized and strictly enforced.” CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Broad & Cassel, 773 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 2014). The party seeking certification bears the burden of “affirmatively demonstrat[ing] . . . compliance with the Rule”-namely, showing “that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (emphasis in original); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (requiring the same of Rule 23(b)). The burden demands no less than the traditional measure of persuasion in civil cases-a preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Abraham v. WPX Prod. Prods., LLC, 317 F.R.D. 169, 259 n.67 (D.N.M. Aug. 16, 2016).

Rule 23 is no “mere pleading standard, so the Court cannot “blindly rely” on the representations of either party. Shook v. El Paso Cnty., 386 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Rather, the Court must undertake a “rigorous analysis” to convince itself that Rule 23 is fully satisfied. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350.^[5] The trial court can consider the claims' merits at the certification stage only insofar as those substantive issues overlap with Rule 23's procedural requirements. See, e.g., Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351 (district court's analysis will often “entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim”); but see Amgen v. Conn. Retirement Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013) (“Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.... Merits questions may be considered to the extent-but only to the extent-that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.”).

The end result of the trial court's rigorous analysis is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Reversal occurs only if the decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law[,] . . . an improper application of law to fact[,]” or “hold[ing] a plaintiff seeking class certification to a higher standard of proof than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” Reyes v. Netdeposit, LLC, 802 F.3d 469, 486 (3d Cir. 2015); accord DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010).

B. FLSA Collective Actions

Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to eliminate substandard working conditions caused by “the unequal bargaining power as between employer and employee.” See generally Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945). Subject to certain exclusions, Section 7 of the FLSA generally requires that employers pay their employees at least one-and-a-half-times their hourly wage for any hour worked beyond 40 per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207. To encourage employees to vindicate their FLSA rights, Section 16 authorizes collective actions on behalf of a named plaintiff's' “similarly situated” coworkers. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).^[6] FLSA actions permit collective treatment not through Rule 23 but, rather, a two-step certification process. See Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2001) (endorsing this so-called “ad hoc” approach). At the first stage-the “notice stage”-the court must decide whether the putative class is “similarly situated” enough to warrant provisional class treatment for the purposes of disseminating notice to all similarly situated potential plaintiffs. Id.; see also Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., LLC, 252 F.Supp.3d 1079, 1091-92 (D.N.M. May 2, 2017). Stage two-the “decertification stage”-is not yet at issue in this case. See generally Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102-03 (explaining the difference).

The notice stage standard is “fairly lenient.” Compare id. at 1103, with Eagle v Freeport-McMoran, Inc., No. 15-CV-00577, 2016 WL 7494278, at *2 (D.N.M. Aug. 3, 2016) (unreported) (citation omitted) (conditionally certifying at the notice stage is “by no means automatic”). To succeed, a plaintiff must produce “substantial allegations that the putative class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102 (internal citations and quotations omitted); e.g., Deakin v. Magellan Health, Inc., 328 F.R.D. 427, 432 (D.N.M. Oct. 5, 2018). These allegations must “describe the potential class within reasonable limits and provide some factual basis from which the court can determine if similarly situated potential plaintiffs exist.” Landry, 252 F.Supp.3d at 1114 (internal citations and quotations omitted); Freeport-McMoran, 2016 WL 7494278, at *2 (citation omitted) (“At least some evidence beyond unsupported factual assertions must be presented.”). The court weighs the plaintiff's showing by looking to considerations such as “whether the...