Golden v. State

552 P.3d 74

2024 OK CR 16

Ni’Avien Lee GOLDEN, Appellant

v.The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee

Case No. F-2023-931

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Filed June 13, 2024

AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY; THE HONORABLE CLIFFORD SMITH, ASSOC. DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES AT TRIAL

BENJAMIN FU, 2727 E. 21^ST ST., STE. 312, TULSA, OK 74114, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

KEVIN KELLER, ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 500 S. DENVER AVE., STE. 900, TULSA, OK 74103-3838, ATTORNEY FOR STATE

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL

BENJAMIN FU, 2727 E. 21^ST ST., STE. 312, TULSA, OK 74114, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

KEVIN KELLER, ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 500 S. DENVER AVE., STE. 900, TULSA, OK 74103-3838, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

OPINION

LEWIS, JUDGE:

¶1 Ni’Avien Lee Golden, Appellant, was ordered held for trial as an adult after preliminary examination on amended charges of Count 1, second degree murder, in violation of 21 O.S.2021, § 701.8; and Counts 2 through 4, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 21 O.S.2021, § 645, in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. YO-2023-24.¹ Appellant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming immunity from prosecution pursuant to the Stand Your Ground law. See generally 21 O.S.2021, § 1289.25. The Honorable Clifford Smith, Associate District Judge, denied the motion to dismiss. Mr. Golden appeals.

FACTS

¶2 Only a brief statement of the facts is necessary to the resolution of this appeal. Appellant is charged with murder and felony battery arising from a verbal and physical altercation involving multiple persons shortly after a football game at Tulsa’s McClain High School in September, 2022. Four people were injured—one fatally—when Appellant allegedly fired on the crowd with a pistol he was carrying during this incident. Some evidence indicates that Appellant initially sought out a difficulty with one or more rivals, but also may have been encircled at some point, punched in the face, and knocked down just before he produced the pistol and opened fire.

ANALYSIS

[1, 2] ¶3 In his sole proposition of error, Appellant argues the district court erred in ruling that he was engaged in unlawful activity at the time of his use of deadly force and thus barred from obtaining Stand Your Ground immunity.² We review the trial court’s denial of Stand Your Ground immunity for an abuse of discretion, Reynolds v. State, 2022 OK CR 14, ¶ 12, 516 P.3d 249, 255, defined as "a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented." Vanderpool v. State, 2018 OK CR 39, ¶ 32, 434 P.3d 318, 325.

[3] ¶4 A defendant seeking pre-trial immunity under section 1289.25 bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the use of force was justified. Reynolds, 2022 OK CR 14, ¶ 15, 516 P.3d at 255. Appellant presents his argument in three parts: He first maintains that because he is now an adult in the eyes of the law, his carrying of a firearm on the day of the shootings when he was yet sixteen years old was not a crime, and thus not an "unlawful activity" that precludes Stand Your Ground immunity.

¶5 Second, he argues that the misdemeanor of illegally carrying a firearm is not the type of unlawful activity that removes his otherwise justified use of force from Stand Your Ground immunity. Finally, he argues that to treat him as an adult for disadvantageous purposes of trial and punishment without beneficially relating his adult status back to the date of his possession of a firearm denies him equal protection.

[4] ¶6 First, we address Appellant’s claim that his possession of a firearm on the date of the shootings was not a crime because of his subsequent certification to stand trial as an adult. The significance of this premise is found in the language of 21 O.S.2021, § 1289.25 (D), which provides:

A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony (emphasis added).

¶7 If Appellant could establish that he was attacked in a place where he had a right to be and used only such force as he reasonably believed necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury, he would be immune from prosecution. 21 O.S.2021, § 1289.25 (F). On the other hand, if he was engaged in "unlawful activity" when he used deadly force, he is ineligible for immunity by the terms of section 1289.25 (D).

¶8 No act or omission is deemed a crime under state law except by enactment of the Legislature in the Oklahoma Statutes. 21 O.S.2021, § 2. As pertinent here, Title 21, O.S.2021, section 1273 provides:

It shall be unlawful for any child to possess any of the arms or weapons designated in Section 1272 of this title,³ except firearms used for participation in hunting animals or fowl, hunter safety classes, education and training in the safe use and handling of firearms, target shooting, skeet, trap or other sporting events or competitions … As used in this section, "child" means a person under eighteen (18) years of age.

21 O.S.2021, § 1273(C), (E) (emphasis added). Violation of section 1273 is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $100.00 to $250.00 and up to thirty days in jail. 21 O.S.2021, § 1276.⁴

¶9 We hold that Appellant’s subsequent judicial certification as an adult on these felony charges does not relate back the date of these offenses in the way he would wish. Whether one will face trial and punishment as an adult rather than rehabilitation and treatment as a juvenile or youthful offender involves a statutory assessment of the crime(s) and the offender’s potential amenability to treatment and rehabilitation. See 10A O.S.2021, §§ 2-2-403 (A) and 2-5-206A (B)(stating statutory factors for certification). This determination has nothing at all to do with whether Appellant was chronologically under age eighteen when he possessed a firearm without a purpose allowed by law, and thus violated the state statute regulating firearms possession.

¶10 On the date of these shootings, Appellant was sixteen years old and in possession of a concealed and loaded pistol on the crowded premises of a high school football game in apparent violation of section 1273. His later certification to stand trial as an adult cannot remit or pardon an act that was criminal and delinquent when it occurred. Indeed, this fiction contradicts the whole purpose of certification for juveniles and youthful offenders. See 10A O.S.Supp.2022, § 2-5-202 (B) (stating Legislature’s purpose to hold youths accountable for serious crimes while affording rehabilitation for amenable offenders).

[5] ¶11 We also reject the argument that the illegal act of carrying the firearm allegedly involved in these shootings was a "minor infraction" of law rather than the kind of unlawful activity contemplated in section 1289.25 (D). To hold otherwise minimizes the grave danger of juveniles carrying weapons in anticipation of situations just such as this one, with the resulting escalation of verbal or physical conflicts into tragic and deadly confrontations.⁵

¶12 In Dawkins v. State, 2011 OK CR 1, ¶ 11, 252 P.3d 214, 218, this Court held that the defendant’s possession of an illegally modified (sawed-off) shotgun that he used to shoot the victim was an "unlawful activity" within the meaning of section 1289.25 (D) which precluded Stand Your Ground immunity. The Court said that:

[T]he Legislature’s intent was to exclude from the benefit of this statute persons who are actively committing a crime, not persons who have or may have committed a crime in the past. Examples of current crimes include, but are not limited to, use of an illegal weapon in commission of the homicide, possession of illegal drugs on the premises, or an ongoing assault by the defendant against another person in the residence.

Id. (emphasis added).

¶13 Dawkins rejected the argument that the unlawful activity must have some causal "nexus" to the allegedly justified use of force. We instead concluded that where the Legislature declined to specify the types of unlawful activity that would preclude Stand Your Ground immunity, this Court would "not attempt to create such distinctions." Id., 2011 OK CR 1, ¶ 10, 252 P.3d at 218.

¶14 Appellant understandably points to language in Dawkins venturing that unlawful activity under section 1289.25 (D) would not include "minor infractions of the law," and giving the examples of being illegally parked, having outdated vehicle registration, outstanding warrants for minor offenses, or back due child support. See Dawkins, 2011 OK CR 1, ¶ 11, 252 P.3d at 218.⁶

¶15 However, we see little or no meaningful difference between our reasoning and resolution in Dawkins and this case, considering the evidence that Appellant here was actively committing a crime at the time of the shootings by being "in possession of an illegal weapon" and thus "engaged in an unlawful act." Id, 2011 OK CR 1, ¶¶7-8, 252 P.3d at 218.

[6] ¶16 Finally, Appellant seems to argue that the guarantee of equal protection, as well as statutory language granting him all adult rights and protections when facing trial as an adult, dictate that his underage carrying of a firearm was either a minor offense or no crime at all for purposes of Stand Your Ground immunity. We respectfully disagree.

¶17 We first conclude that these statutory classifications do not burden any fundamental rights. Appellant cannot seriously claim a right to carry a concealed firearm in public while still a child in violation of state law.⁷ Nor is Appellant denied any fundamental right by the loss of Stand Your Ground immunity. He retains the right to present a claim of self-defense or justification to a judge or jury at trial. See Reynolds, ...