Goldman v. Youngkin

PAUL GOLDMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GLENN YOUNGKIN, in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:22CV789 (RCY)

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division

February 21, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION (GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS)

RODERICK C. YOUNG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a civil and voting rights action arising from the Democratic Party of Virginia's so-called “firehouse primary”^[1] that occurred on December 20, 2022. Paul Goldman, Tavorise Marks, Tamia Douglas, Tina McCray, Julie Michele Pope, Jamale Pope, Richard Walker, and Dawnette Drumgoole (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin, Chairman of the Virginia State Board of Elections Robert Brink, Vice Chair of the State Board of Elections John O'Bannon Secretary of the State Board of Elections Georgia Alvis Long Commissioner of the State Board of Elections Susan Beals State Board of Elections member Donald Merricks, and State Board of Elections member Angela Chiang, all in their official capacities (collectively, the “Commonwealth Defendants”), and against the Democratic Party of Virginia (“DPVA”), DPVA Chairwoman Susan Swecker, and Chairwoman of the Fourth Congressional District Democratic Committee Alexsis Rodgers, both in their official capacities (jointly with the DPVA, the “DPVA Defendants”). Plaintiffs' claims include violations of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The crux of Plaintiffs' grievances is the number of voting locations available to voters and the short period of time between the announcement of the “firehouse primary” and its occurrence.

The case is presently before the Court on two Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 34, 36), both of which seek dismissal based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs have filed no response to either Motion. Despite Plaintiffs' failure to defend jurisdiction and the sufficiency of their claims, the Court is nevertheless obligated to ensure that dismissal is proper even when, as here, the motion to dismiss is unopposed. See Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, Md., 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2014). The Court dispenses with oral argument, as Defendants' arguments are clear on the face of their pleadings, and the interest of the voters of Virginia in participating in an election unshrouded by ongoing litigation supports an efficient resolution of this case.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) tests the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving proper subject matter jurisdiction as the party asserting jurisdiction. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). On a 12(b)(1) motion, the district court is to regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue and may consider facts outside the pleadings without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if a party fails to state a claim under which relief can be granted. In considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true, and the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. T.G. Slater & Son, Inc. v. Donald P. & Patricia A. Brennan LLC, 385 F.3d 836, 841 (4th Cir. 2004). Importantly, legal conclusions enjoy no such deference by the reviewing court. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint for facial sufficiency, the court must parse out legal conclusions and enriching commentary. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit pointed out in Francis v. Giacomelli, “naked assertions of wrongdoing necessitate some factual enhancement within the complaint to cross the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, a complaint must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” stating a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Ordinarily, a court may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, on a [12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss.” Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 559 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011)). However, the court may consider documents attached or incorporated into the complaint, “as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Accepting as true Plaintiffs' well-pleaded allegations and viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court determines the operable facts to be as follows:

United States Congressman Donald McEachin died unexpectedly on November 29, 2022. (2d Am. Compl. (hereinafter, “Compl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 11.) To fill McEachin's seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, on December 12, 2022, Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin issued a Writ of Special Election pursuant to Va. Code § 24.2-209, setting a Special Election for February 21, 2023. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5; Commonwealth Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Commonwealth Mem. Supp.”), Ex. 1, ECF No. 35-1.)

The General Assembly of Virginia controls the manner, conduct, administration, and other necessary rules and procedures for the nomination process in any state election, per the Virginia Constitution. (Compl. ¶ 6.) The General Assembly granted the authority to choose the nomination process for any Democratic nominee in a Special Election to the DPVA, pursuant to Va. Code §§ 24.2-508 et seq. (Id. ¶ 7.) This primary-structuring power is not limited by any guidelines or standards (Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 21), other than a timing requirement found in the Virginia Code. Specifically, the Virginia Code provides that “[e]ach political party shall have the power to . . . provide for the nomination of its candidates, including the nomination of its candidates for office in case of any vacancy.” Va. Code § 24.2-508. The Virginia Code further provides that, when a Writ of Special Election is issued more than 60 days before the date of the forthcoming Special Election, political parties must nominate their candidate for the Special Election at least 60 days before the election. Va. Code § 24.2-510(5)(i). To select a candidate for the upcoming Special Election, the Fourth Congressional District Democratic Committee chose to utilize an unassembled caucus process, colloquially known as a “firehouse primary” (hereinafter, the “Primary”). (Compl. ¶ 10; Call to Caucus, ECF No. 37-2.^[2]) On December 13, 2022, the day after the issuance of the Governor's Writ of Election, the Fourth Congressional District Democratic Committee issued a Call to Caucus announcing its chosen process for the Primary and setting the Primary for December 20, 2022 (a Tuesday), with five specified voting locations. (Call to Caucus, ECF No. 37-2.) The Call to Caucus did not provide any options for early voting or mail-in ballots. (Id.; see also Compl. ¶¶ 12-14.) The next day, the DPVA secured three additional voting locations, bringing the total number of Primary voting locations to eight. (Compl. ¶¶ 37-39.) The eight voting locations were distributed across seven of the Fourth Congressional District's fifteen jurisdictions. (Id. ¶ 22.)

Plaintiffs allege that when Congressman McEachin was originally elected, he received more votes from certain jurisdictions that ultimately did not have a polling location for the Primary than he did votes within jurisdictions that were allocated a polling location. (Id. ¶¶ 128-32.)

Plaintiffs further allege that the Primary, as structured, imposed a “wealth burden” on voters, insofar as the majority of voters would not have a primary within easy walking or “short driving” distance, and the majority of eligible Democratic voters were non-white females, largely from working-class families and thus disproportionately impacted. (Id. ¶¶ 20 24-25, 27.) Plaintiffs also allege that a “significant percentage” of eligible Democratic voters were elderly citizens, working women with childcare responsibilities, and citizens of modest means who did not have a car and thus might not be able to bear the cost necessary to take public transportation to a voting location outside their home precinct. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs allege that the DPVA knew the burden it was imposing on voters constituted an unconstitutional barrier to the ability to exercise voters' core First Amendment right to political speech, given that, in a 2015 EDVA case, the DPVA itself alleged that “equivalent type measures affecting the right to vote unconstitutionally burdened voters, especially minority voters of modest means.” (Id. ¶ 29 (citing Lee v. Virginia State Board of Elections, et al., 155 F.Supp.3d, 572 (E.D. Va. 2015) (case challenging Virginia's...