Goldstein v. McKee

CHARLES AARON GOLDSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. LT. UNKNOWN MCKEE, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:21-CV-408-HEA

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

September 17, 2021

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the application of self-represented plaintiff Charles Aaron Goldstein, an incarcerated person at Northeast Correctional Center, to proceed in the district court without prepaying fees or costs. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court will grant the motion, and assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will issue process on the complaint as to claim three against defendant Lieutenant McKee in his individual capacity. The Court will dismiss without prejudice claims one and two and defendants Nurse Shandi and St. Charles County Correctional Center.

Initial Partial Filing Fee

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to his account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff did not submit a certified copy of his inmate account statement for the six months preceding the filing of his complaint. He submitted a printed page from the Missouri Department of Corrections dated April 12, 2021 that shows he owes $2, 875.93 in fees to Fulton Reception and Diagnostic Center. Based upon the information the Court has in the record, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. This amount is reasonable based upon the information before the Court. See Henderson v Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount "that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner's finances.").

Legal Standard on Initial Review

This Court is required to review complaint filed in forma pauperis, and must dismiss it if it is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although a plaintiff need not allege facts in painstaking detail, the facts alleged "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This standard "demands more than an unadorned the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true "[f]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that "if the essence of an allegation is discernible," the court should "construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, evenpro se complaints must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged, Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights arising out of his exposure to the COVID-19 virus and his quarantine in the St. Charles Correctional Center ("SCCC") from September 2020 to February 2021. He sues defendants Lieutenant McKee and Nurse Shandi, ^[1] in both their official and individual capacities, and sues SCCC.

Plaintiff enumerates three separate claims in his complaint. In his first claim, plaintiff states that for nearly sixty days while incarcerated at SCCC, he was placed in quarantine, not allowed to attend any court hearings, and not allowed unrecorded contact with his lawyer.

In his second claim, plaintiff states that he has screws and plates in his shoulder from a past motorcycle accident. He states the during quarantine he "had screws coming out." He sought medical attention, but Nurse Shandi told him that he could not see a doctor until after he was off quarantine.

Finally for his third claim, plaintiff states that in October 2020, Lieutenant McKee informed plaintiffs wing that they were being quarantined because of exposure to COVID-19. He states, in full:

For 60 days we were not allowed to leave the wing, during which time about 3-6 people a week came down with Covid they did nothing to protect us from it. We didn't get clean clothes for almost 14 days sometimes and were made to use [infected] areas in the day room and showers as well. I was basically made to get Covid before I could plea out. I eventually caught Covid where I permanently lost my smell, and my life was put in [jeopardy].

In addition to losing his sense of smell, plaintiff states he has no feeling in his right pinky finger "I think due to no medical attention for the screws in my shoulder." For relief, he seeks $680, 000 in damages.

Discussion

(1) Claim No. 1-Denial of Access to Court and Attorney

For his first claim, plaintiff states only that he was not allowed unrecorded contact with his lawyer nor was he allowed to attend court hearings during his nearly sixty-day quarantine at SCCC. This claim is subject to dismissal on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Liberally construed, plaintiff has not stated a claim for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not allege what constitutional right was violated in claim one. It appears, however, that plaintiff is seeking damages under § 1983 for alleged violations of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Such claims are more properly brought in his underlying criminal case or in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241.

Within the framework of an action brought under § 1983, however, plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim. First, he does not allege any defendant is personally responsible for the alleged constitutional violations. Section 1983 liability "requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights." Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewellv. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)); see also Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiffs excessive bail claims because none of the defendants set plaintiffs bail, and therefore, "there can be no causal connection between any action on the part of the defendants and any alleged deprivation" of plaintiff s rights). To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the defendant to the challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff has alleged no facts connecting any of the named defendants to claim one, and the Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice.

Additionally to the extent the Court could treat plaintiffs claim as one arising under the First Amendment for access to the courts, it would fail because plaintiff has not alleged prejudice. To state a claim premised upon denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered an "actual injury." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1996). The Eighth Circuit has recognized that, when bringing an access-to-courts claim, it is insufficient to merely allege a denial of access to a specific resource, even if the denial is systemic. Sabers v. Delano, 100 F.3d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n.4). Instead, the plaintiff must plead that the lack of the resource deprived him of some specific opportunity to defend himself, or advance a viable legal claim, in a criminal appeal, postconviction matter, or civil rights action. Id. Because plaintiff has not alleged any defendant was responsible for the alleged deprivation, nor that he suffered any injury, the Court will dismiss...