Gomes v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co.

866 A.2d 704

87 Conn.App. 416

John A. GOMES v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 24409.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 18, 2004.

Decided February 15, 2005.

Matthew E. Auger, New London, with whom, on the brief, was Susan M. Phillips, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Daniel P. Scapellati, with whom, on the brief, was Jude Francois, Hartford, for the appellee (named defendant).

LAVERY, C.J., and SCHALLER and DIPENTIMA, Js.

SCHALLER, J.

The plaintiff, John A. Gomes, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that he was not entitled to coverage under the underinsured motorist policy endorsement issued by the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) construed General Statutes § 38a-336(f) as limiting underinsured motorist coverage to those employees of a named insured who are injured while "occupying" a covered motor vehicle, rather than construing it to require such coverage to any person insured under the liability portion of the policy, (2) concluded that the exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity rule provided by § 38a-336(f) does not apply to him because he was not "occupying" a covered motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute and (3) failed to conclude that because he was a named insured under his employer's policy, he was not barred from collecting underinsured motorist coverage by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal.² In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured on January 11, 2001, while working in his capacity as a volunteer fire policeman for the Pawcatuck fire district (district). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he responded to an emergency call, parked his vehicle at a nearby intersection and began directing traffic to carry out his assigned duties. He further alleged that while standing in the middle of the road directing traffic, he was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by the tortfeasor, Stanley Prachniak, and was seriously injured. The plaintiff applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from the district for his injuries. The plaintiff also recovered $100,000 from Prachniak's insurance carrier for the injuries he sustained. The plaintiff brought the present action to collect on the underinsured motorist coverage provided by a policy issued to him by Allstate Insurance Company, and by a policy issued to the district by the defendant.

On January 28, 2003, the defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the defendant's policy. In support of its motion, the defendant argued that General Statutes § 31-284(a), the workers' compensation exclusivity provision, limited the plaintiff to the remedies provided by the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.³ The defendant further argued that the underinsured motorist coverage exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision provided by § 38a-336(f) was inapplicable to the plaintiff because he was not occupying a covered motor vehicle at the time of the accident.⁴

The plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion and argued that when interpreted in light of legislative intent, the exception provided by § 38a-336(f) was applicable regardless of whether he was occupying a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. In the alternative, the plaintiff argued that the exception was applicable because he was occupying or using a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. In addition to these arguments, at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that pursuant to Agosto v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 239 Conn. 549, 687 A.2d 1267 (1996), and Hansen v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 239 Conn. 537, 687 A.2d 1262 (1996), the terms of the uninsured and underinsured motorist endorsement were ambiguous and that, therefore, the policy must be construed to provide coverage regardless of whether he was occupying a covered vehicle at the time of the accident.

On June 26, 2003, the court issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision provided by § 38a-336(f) was not applicable because the plaintiff was "in the middle of an intersection directing traffic when struck" and was not occupying a covered vehicle as "defined by the policy to mean `in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.'" The court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff's recovery was limited to those remedies provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. The court subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. On July 10, 2003, the plaintiff filed this appeal.

On July 16, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation in which he sought to have the court address his argument that § 38a-336(f) was applicable regardless of whether he was occupying a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. The court denied the motion. On November 5, 2003, the plaintiff filed a second motion for articulation regarding the reasons for the court's apparent rejection of the argument based on Agosto that he made during the hearing.⁵ The plaintiff stated: "In light of the absence of any indication that the trial court addressed [the] Agosto argument, the plaintiff requests that an articulation be granted in order to create a proper record for this appeal." On November 13, 2003, the court denied the motion.

Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for review of the court's November 13, 2003 decision denying the motion for articulation.⁶ We granted the plaintiff's motion for review and, citing Agosto, ordered the court to "articulate whether the plaintiff was entitled to uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits as an insured as opposed to `as an occupant' of a covered motor vehicle." The order also directed that the articulation include the factual and legal bases for the court's decision.

The court articulated its decision, explaining that, at the time it issued its decision, it had considered the issue before it to be whether the plaintiff was occupying a covered vehicle rather than whether ambiguity of the policy language entitled the plaintiff to coverage. After reviewing Agosto and Hansen, the court concluded that the policy language was ambiguous and that accordingly, the plaintiff "is entitled to coverage under the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage policy of the defendant." In the final sentence of its articulation, the court stated that it "therefore, reverses itself and denies the motion for summary judgment."

The defendant filed a motion for review in which it asked this court to vacate the trial court's articulation on the ground that it had exceeded its authority by reversing its prior summary judgment ruling when responding to this court's order for articulation. We granted the motion and ordered stricken the final sentence of the trial court's articulation reversing its prior ruling.⁷ Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that when the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, it improperly concluded that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was not entitled to coverage under the uninsured and underinsured motorist policy endorsement. Before addressing his specific claims, we set forth the applicable standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See also Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 83, 856 A.2d 372 (2004). "Our review of the trial court's decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 450, 820 A.2d 258 (2003).

In addition, because this appeal involves questions of statutory construction, we set forth our well established principles of statutory interpretation. "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wasko v. Manella, 269 Conn. 527, 534, 849 A.2d 777 (2004). "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." General Statutes § 1-2z; see also Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn. 120, 129, 848 A.2d 451 (2004). When we must consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of a statute, we look "to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wasko v. Manella, supra, at 535, 849 A.2d 777. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, over which our review is plenary. Bengtson v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 86 Conn.App. 51, 56, 859 A.2d 967 (2004).

I

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly construed § 38a-336(f) as limiting underinsured motorist coverage to those employees of a named insured who are injured...