Gomez v. J. Jacobo Farm Labor Contractor, Inc.

188 F.Supp.3d 986

Marisol Gomez, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.J. Jacobo Farm Labor Contractor, Inc., and Bedrosian Farms, LLC; and Does 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants.

1:15-cv-1489-AWI-MJS

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed May 19, 2016

Filed May 20, 2016

Eric Sebastian Trabucco, Hector Rodriguez Martinez, Joseph Donald Sutton, Marco A. Palau, Stanley S. Mallison, Mallison & Martinez, Oakland, CA, Mario Martinez, Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch APLC a Law Corporation, Bakersfield, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Gerardo Hernandez, Jr., Raimondo & Associates, Kevin V. Koligian, Andrew Hoon Woo, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Allison K. Pierce, Littler Mendelson, Fresno, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Anthony W. Ishii, SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Marisol Gomez ("Plaintiff") has filed separate motions, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f),¹ to strike select affirmative defenses alleged by Defendant Bedrosian Farms, LLC ("Bedrosian") (Doc. 11), and Defendant J. Jacobo Farm Labor Contractor, Inc. ("Jacobo") (Doc. 30). The thrust of Plaintiff's argument in both instances is that many of the affirmative defenses alleged are (1) insufficiently detailed such that they are not in compliance with Rule 8 or (2) inapplicable to this case, as a matter of law. The matter is now fully briefed and ripe for decision.

II. Background

Plaintiff Marisol Gomez alleges that she is (or was) employed by Defendants, as joint employers, to perform agricultural work "at various times during the Class Period[—reaching back four years prior to the filing of this action—] through approximately 2015." Compl. at ¶¶ 13, 23. On September 15, 2015, she filed a putative wage and hour class action on behalf of herself and other past and present non-exempt, agricultural and packing shed employees employed by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in "a pattern of employer misconduct," centering on their "piece rate system of compensation, their meal and rest break practices, and their record-keeping procedures." Compl. at ¶¶ 22-23.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged nine causes of action: (1) violation of the Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. ; (2) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of California Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197 ; (3) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of California Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, and 1194.2 ; (4) failure to provide timely and complete meal periods in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 ; (5) failure to provide timely and complete rest periods in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 ; (6) failure to pay wages of terminated or resigned employees in violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 203 ; (7) failure to provide correct wage statements in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226(b), 1174, and 1175 ; (8) violation of Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. , premised on violation of the statutes underlying the first seven causes of action; and (9) an claim pursuant to the Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), California Labor Code §§ 2689 et seq. , seeking civil penalties and unpaid wages, also premised on violation of the statutes underlying the first seven causes of action.

On January 12, 2016, Bedrosian filed a timely answer, responding to each numbered paragraph of Plaintiff's complaint and asserting twenty-five affirmative defenses. Doc. 7. On January 26, 2016, Jacobo filed a timely answer, also responding to each numbered paragraph of Plaintiff's complaint and asserting twelve affirmative defenses. Doc. 9. Jacobo then filed an amended answer on March 4, 2016, without first having sought leave to amend from the Court. That answer contains ten affirmative defenses and is more detailed than the first. Doc. 29. Each of the affirmative defenses alleged by Defendant Bedrosian (and in Jacobo's first answer) is one sentence in length, conclusory, and largely devoid of detail. Jacobo's first amended answer provides some additional detail. Doc. 29 at 17-20.

III. Legal Standard

This Court recently set forth the legal standard applicable to a motion to strike affirmative defenses:

Pursuant to Rule 12(f), the court may strike an "insufficient defense." The purpose of Rule 12(f) is to "avoid the expenditure of time and money that ... arise[s] from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Sidney–Vinstein v. A.H.Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, because of the limited importance of pleading affirmative defenses in federal practice and because they often needlessly extend litigation, broad motions to strike rarely avoid the expenditure of time and money and are generally disfavored. SeeKratz Aerial Ag Service, Inc. v. Slykerman, 2016 WL 1090361, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2016) (citing Spring er v. Fair Isaac Corp., 2015 WL 7188234, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015) ); Atcherley v. Hanna, 2016 WL 70028, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016) (citation omitted).

United States v. Gibson Wine Co., 2016 WL 1626988, *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016).

An affirmative defense is one that precludes liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiff's claim are proven. Sherwin – Williams Co. v. Courtesy Oldsmobile – Cadillac, Inc., 2016 WL 615335, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (citation omitted). If a purported affirmative defense only addresses the elements of the cause of action, it is not an affirmative defense and it will be stricken as redundant. Sherwin – Williams, 2016 WL 615335 at *2 (citing Barnes v. AT&T Pension Ben. Plan, 718 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ; seeWhittlestone, Inc. v. Handi – Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973–974 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that allegations are properly stricken as redundant if they appear elsewhere in a pleading). The Gibson court continued:

A[n] [affirmative] defense may be insufficient either as a matter of law or as a matter of pleading. Kaur v. City of Lodi, 2016 WL 627308, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) (citation omitted). An affirmative defense is legally insufficient if it "lacks merit under any set of facts the defendant might allege." Dodson v. Strategic Restaurants Acquisition Co., 289 F.R.D. 595, 603 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

An affirmative defense must give fair notice of the defense pled. Wyshak v. City Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). A split developed in this Circuit after the United States Supreme Court issued Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), applying a "plausible on its face" standard to allegations of a complaint. Some courts—including this Court—suggested that the plausibility standard applies to affirmative defenses. E.g.Coppola v. Smith, 2015 WL 2127965, at *6 n.4 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2015) (citing inter alia, Dodson v. Strategic Rests. Acquisition Co. II, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 595, 602–603 (E.D. Cal. 2013) ). Other courts found that the "fair notice" standard of Wyshak was unaffected by Twombly and Iqbal. SeePacific De ntal Services, LLC v. Homeland Ins. Co. of New York, 2013 WL 3776337, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) ; Kohler v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 464, 468 (S.D. Cal. 2013).

The Ninth Circuit has spoken to the standard by which affirmative defenses must be pled. SeeKohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015). It decided that "the ‘fair notice’ required by the pleading standards only requires describing [an affirmative] defense in ‘general terms.’ " Kohler, 779 F.3d at 1019 (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1274 (3d ed. 1998) ). In this district, courts have recently read Kohler to have resolved the split regarding whether the heightened "plausibility" requirement set out in Twombly and Iqbal modifies the "fair notice" standard traditionally applied to affirmative defenses; they found that it does not. E.g. Staggs v. Doctor's Hospital of Manteca, Inc., 2016 WL 880960, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016) ; Deleon v. Elite Self Storage Management, LLC, 2016 WL 881144, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016). Courts in the Northern District continue to apply the plausibility standard. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Kraus USA, Inc., 313 F.R.D. 572, 574–575 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (applying the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses); Martinez v. County of Sonoma, 2016 WL 1275402, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2016) (same); Perez v. Wells Fargo & Company, 2015 WL 5567746, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015) (In Kohler"the Ninth Circuit did not specifically hold in that case that the Twombly[and] Iqbal standard does not apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses."); see alsoHernandez v. Dutch Goose, Inc., 2013 WL 5781476, at *4, n.2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) ("[E]very judge in th[e] [Northern District] to have taken up the issue has concluded that Iqbal and Twombly apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses.")

Kohler was not explicit that Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to determining the sufficiency of affirmative defenses. In fact, Kohler quoted from the 1998 version of a practice guide, the most recent version of which identifies the dispute but does not purport to resolve whether Twombly and Iqbal apply. SeeKohler, 779 F.3d at 1019 (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1274 (3d ed. 1998) ); 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1274 (3d ed. Apr. 2016) ("[C]ourts are in disagreement as to whether the pleading standard articulated in ... Twombly and Iqbal... extends to the pleading of affirmative defenses."). That aside, this Court finds that requiring that an affirmative defense to be described in " ‘general terms' does not ...

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