Gomez v. J Jacobo Farm Labor Contractor, Inc.

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MARISOL GOMEZ and IGNACIO OSORIO, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. J JACOBO FARM LABOR CONTRACTOR, INC.; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-01489 JLT-BAM

United States District Court, E.D. California

May 22, 2023

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DECERTIFY CLASS (DOC. 168)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT WITNESS (DOC. 167)

This class action lawsuit involves an employment dispute with J Jacobo Farm Labor Contractor, Inc. The Court certified Plaintiff's claim that Defendant failed to issue proper itemized wage statements to its employees in violation of California law.^[1] (Doc. 114.) The Court then modified its original certification order by also certifying Plaintiff's claim that Defendant failed to pay its employees for rest breaks in violation of California law.^[2] (Doc. 126.) The Court further modified its order by setting the class period end date for the certified rest break class to November 5, 2019.^[3] (Doc. 138.)

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Decertify and Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness. (Doc 167; Doc. 168.) Defendant's Motion to Decertify seeks decertification of Plaintiff's rest break pay claim but not the wage statement claim. Plaintiff filed Opposition briefs, (Doc. 171; Doc. 172.), and Defendant filed Reply briefs. (Doc. 173; Doc. 174.) The Court found the matters suitable for decision without oral arguments, and the hearing on same was vacated. (Doc. 175.) For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion in Limine and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Decertify the class.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The original certification order includes a detailed recitation of facts relevant to the certified classes. (Doc. 114 at 1-9.) The facts in the original certification order control and remain unchanged. For purposes of this order, the Court will summarize additional facts relevant to Defendant's Motion to Decertify and Motion in Limine.

Defendant is a farm labor contractor. It employed at least 3,267 employees between December 20, 2011, and January 6, 2018. Some of the employees worked as field workers. For the most part, Defendant allowed the employees to decide when to take breaks and the length of the breaks. A significant contingent of the class elected to forego their rest breaks by working through the provided rest breaks.

Of Defendant's 3,267 employees, 2,868 employees (or 87.8%) were paid on a piece-rate basis at some point during their employment. Of those 2,868 piece-rate employees, 2,320 employees (or 80.1%) were paid with checks that did not include any payment for rest breaks. Some but not all employees were paid retroactively by Defendant by check for unpaid break and non-productive time. Defendant appears to have payment records identifying the employees who were given retroactive “safe harbor” payments and minimum wage true ups. Defendant also provided its employees with wage statements, some of which failed to include information about rest breaks and rest payments. Defendant universally applied the same system and practices for wage statements to all employees.

Defendant used a software called Datatech to process and maintain payroll records. Plaintiffs designated Aaron Woolfson as an expert witness in this action to “provide structure to, and analyze time keeping and payroll data” produced from Defendant's Datatech records. (Doc. 168-1 at 8-9.) In his expert report, Woolfson states that the Datatech records “indicate that 100% of checks dated before 2/27/2016 which involved piece-work [or approximately 2,275 checks] did not have any payment for rest periods.” (Id. at 11, 15.) Woolfson's report further states he “created the damage formulas and assumptions that will transform all of Defendants data into damages which [he] will present at trial.” (Id. at 13.) Defendant designated Joseph Krock as a rebuttal expert to provide comment regarding “claims made by Mr. Woolfson” and “his qualifications as an expert witness in matters similar to this.” (Doc. 168-1 at 237.)

LEGAL STANDARD

1. Decertification

District courts retain the “flexibility to address problems with a certified class as they arise, including the ability to decertify.” United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 2010). “Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of subsequent developments in the litigation.” Id. (citing General Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)); see also Rodriguez v. West Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A district court may decertify a class at any time.”). In resolving a motion for class decertification, the court may rely on “previous substantive rulings in the context of the history of the case,” “subsequent developments in the litigation,” and “the nature and range of proof necessary to establish the classwide allegations.” Munoz v. Phh Mortg. Corp., 478 F.Supp.3d 945, 985 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Arredondo v. Delano Farms Co., 301 F.R.D. 493, 502 (E.D. Cal. 2014)). The standard is the same for class decertification as it is with class certification: a district court must be satisfied that the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b) are met to allow plaintiffs to maintain the action on a representative basis. Marlo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 639 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2011).

2. Rule 23^[4]

Under Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must demonstrate “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Castillo v. Bank of Am., NA, 980 F.3d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th Cir. 2012)). Rule 23(b)(3)'s “predominance” requirement inquires into whether the class members' interests are “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). The inquiry focuses on “the relationship between the common and individual issues” and “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 623). “[A] central concern of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance test is whether ‘adjudication of common issues will help achieve judicial economy.'” Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, 571 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001)).

DISCUSSION

Defendant's Arguments

Defendant argues that the class should be decertified because common questions regarding Plaintiff's rest break pay claim do not predominate over individualized inquiries. Specifically Defendant asserts that for Plaintiff to establish his rest break pay claim, he must identify the total number of shifts class members worked each day, and then prove per day that Defendant failed to pay its employees for rest breaks. Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot prove this because Plaintiff's proffered evidence-specifically, Woolfson's expert report-is unreliable for several reasons. First, Woolfson's report relies on incomplete records and weekly payroll data that cannot be used to ascertain how many work shifts-and corresponding rest break violations-occurred each day. Second, Woolfson's report does not provide a calculation of damages using the Datatech data it relies on. Finally, Woolfson's report does not include any supplemental analysis using extrinsic non-Datatech data, such as data drawn from surveys or studies of the class that Woolfson conducted independently.

Plaintiff's Arguments

Plaintiff argues that Defendant's Motion to Decertify should be denied because Woolfson's expert report demonstrates that common questions regarding rest break violations still predominate over individual inquiries. According to Plaintiff, Woolfson's reliance on weekly payroll data does not make his report unreliable because his findings can still be used to prove that class members worked shifts with mandatory rest breaks and that Defendant failed to pay its employees for those rest breaks. For example, Plaintiff notes that if a weekly payroll record shows that an employee worked 14 hours over a four-day stretch, then basic principles of logic and math demonstrate that the employee worked at least one 3.5-hour shift on a given day and, therefore, was entitled to a rest break and corresponding rest break pay. Although Woolfson's report does not indicate the exact number of shifts and violations that occurred each day, Plaintiff argues that this issue ultimately goes to damages, which is no bar to class certification. Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that Woolfson's inability to show when shift-level violations occurred is a result of Defendant's own timekeeping practices. Specifically, Woolfson's report could not rely on daily payroll data drawn from Defendant's system because Defendant did not track daily time records in the first instance.

Discussion

In certifying Plaintiff's rest break pay claim in its original order, the Court observed that Section 226.7 of the California Labor Code requires employers to provide rest breaks consistent with the applicable wage order. (Doc. 126 at 9.) Wage Order No. 14 requires employers of agricultural workers to provide rest breaks and count authorized rest breaks “as hours worked for which there shall be no deduction from wages.” 8 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11140(12). “The wage order's requirement not to deduct wages for rest periods presumes the [employees] are paid for their rest periods.” Bluford v. Safeway Inc., 216 Cal.App.4th 864, 871 (2013) (interpreting...