Gomez v. Reihert

FERNANDO GOMEZ, # R-26543, Plaintiff, v. K. REIHERT, JOSHUA SHOENBEEK, MICHAEL ATCHISON,SALVADOR GODINEZ, TERRI ANDERSON, HASEMEYER,BILLY W. GREER, RICHARD HARRINGTON,K. BUTLER, LORI OAKLEY, BARBARA MULLER, MAJOR OLSEN,and UNKNOWN PARTY, Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-291-NJR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

June 6, 2016

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center ("Pontiac"), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is serving a 40-year sentence for murder. His claims arose during his confinement at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"), where he alleges he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement and improperly held in administrative detention. The complaint is now before the Court for a preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim that "no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit." Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross "the line between possibility and plausibility." Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

Applying these standards, the Court finds that some of Plaintiff's claims survive threshold review under § 1915A.

The Complaint

On January 5, 2013, Defendant Shoenbeek placed Plaintiff on "investigative status" (Doc. 1, p. 9). This status was approved by Defendant Olsen. On January 10, 2013, DefendantReihert (Internal Affairs Supervisor) interviewed Plaintiff regarding an allegedly threatening phone call Plaintiff had made. In the interview, Plaintiff denied any involvement in an assault on a prison lieutenant. On January 11, 2013, Plaintiff was placed in administrative detention at Menard, where he remained for nineteen months. He was not allowed to have his personal property in his possession during the time he was in administrative detention. Plaintiff was never given a hearing or any formal notice of his administrative detention, and he had no opportunity to challenge this assignment. He learned of the reasons for his administrative detention only in June 2014 (Doc. 1, p. 4). In responding to Plaintiff's grievances over the administrative detention, Defendant Harrington stated that placement in administrative detention was an administrative decision and "not grievable." Plaintiff asserts that under Westefer v. Snyder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ill., 2010), he was entitled to a hearing over this placement (Doc. 1, p. 6).

From January 11, 2013, to June 2013, Plaintiff's administrative detention cell had no heat, and he was required to endure the cold conditions until the weather warmed in June. In addition, the cell had no hot water for a total of nine months (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff filed numerous grievances and complaints regarding the cell conditions. Defendants Atchison, Harrington, Muller, and Shoenbeek were alerted by Plaintiff to the substandard conditions in his cell, yet took no steps to mitigate his exposure to those conditions.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Atchison and Harrington were aware of the conditions in Plaintiff's cell area before he was moved there, through complaints filed by other prisoners over the lack of heat and/or hot water. Defendant Atchison (warden) deemed Plaintiff's grievances over the conditions to be "non-emergency." Defendant Harrington (warden) indicated in the response to Plaintiff's grievances that the heating system and hot water would be fixed, but failed to move Plaintiff to a properly functioning cell or allow him access to a daily showerduring the long delay before repairs were accomplished (Doc. 1, p. 5). Defendant Muller (counselor) took no steps to resolve the problems with Plaintiff's cell when he complained to her through his grievances, and she responded that "the pioneers showered, bathed, and shaved in the cold without heat [and] they had no hot water" (Doc. 1, p. 7). Defendant Shoenbeek was aware of the substandard conditions throughout Plaintiff's stay in administrative detention (Doc. 1, p. 9).

Plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit. Any other claim that is mentioned in the complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice.

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for placing and holding Plaintiff in administrative detention without notifying him of the reasons for this placement or providing him with a hearing in which he could challenge the administrative detention;

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for housing Plaintiff in a cell that lacked heat for approximately five months during the winter, and lacked hot water for nine months.

As explained below, Count 1 shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Count 2 shall proceed for further review against some of the Defendants.

Dismissal of Count 1-Administrative Detention

The placement of inmates in administrative segregation or detention is, as Plaintiff was informed, discretionary. Such a cell assignment does not give rise to a protected liberty interest or the right to a notice and hearing. Plaintiff thus cannot maintain a Fourteenth Amendment claim over the detention he describes.

Illinois statutes and correctional regulations do not place limitations on the discretion of prison officials to place inmates in administrative segregation, including investigative or temporary lockdown or confinement and involuntary protective custody; accordingly, there is no liberty interest implicated by an inmate's placement in these forms of segregation. Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1248 (7th Cir. 1995); Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d 1278, 1281-84 (7th Cir. 1991); Kellas v. Lane, 923 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1991); see generally Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983). See also Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1996) (continued confinement in administrative detention does not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest).

Although Plaintiff may have been subjected to more burdensome conditions due to the removal of his personal property, those conditions are "within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the [government] to impose." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (transfer of inmates to prison with more burdensome conditions of confinement not a violation of due process); see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477 (1995). It does not constitute a "grievous loss" of liberty, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), an atypical and significant hardship on the prisoners generally in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, or a dramatic departure from the basic conditions or duration of the prisoner's sentence. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-85.

Plaintiff's reliance on the Westefer v. Snyder injunction to argue that he has the right to a hearing regarding his continued administrative detention is unavailing. The injunction issued by this Court in 2010, mandating a hearing review process for Tamms inmates held in administrative segregation, was specific to the conditions at the now-closed Tamms supermax prison. Westefer v. Snyder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ill., 2010). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit vacated this Court's order in 2012, Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012), and the revised injunction was vacated by this Court in 2013 after Tamms was shuttered. Westefer v. Snyder, Case No. 00-cv-162-GPM, 2013 WL 1286971 (March 27, 2013).

Count 1 shall therefore be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants Reihert, Olsen, and the John/Jane Does Defendants, who are mentioned only in connection with this claim, shall be dismissed from...