Gomez v. Walker

540 P.3d 936

2023 COA 79

2023 COA 79

Carmelita GOMEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Ryan WALKER, Defendant-Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0468

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. III.

Prior Opinion Announced July 13, 2023, WITHDRAWN, Petition for Rehearing GRANTED

Announced September 14, 2023

City and County of Denver District Court No. 19CV32345, Honorable Michael J. Vallejos, Judge, Honorable Stephanie L. Scoville, Judge

Law Offices of John D. Halepaska, John D. Halepaska, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellant .

Jeremy R. Maline & Associates, Andrew M. LaFontaine, Westminster, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

Opinion by JUDGE LUM

¶1 Plaintiff, Carmelita Gomez, appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint against defendant, Ryan Walker. She contends that the district court erred by dismissing her complaint as untimely and awarding Walker his attorney fees and costs. Because we determine that section 2-4- 108(2), C.R.S. 2023, does not operate to extend the statute of limitations period in this case, we affirm the judgment. We also affirm the order awarding Walker attorney fees and costs.

I. Background

¶ 2 Gomez and Walker were involved in a car crash on June 15, 2016. Gomez filed her complaint on June 17, 2019, alleging that Walker negligently collided with her, causing her to suffer injuries.

[1] ¶ 3 Walker moved to dismiss Gomez’s complaint under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) because it was filed beyond the applicable three-year statute of limitations period prescribed by section 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), C.R.S. 2023.¹ Because the June 15, 2019, limitations deadline fell on a Saturday, Gomez maintained that the court should accept tier June 17, 2019, filing because that day was the next business day that the court was open.

¶ 4 Initially, the district court agreed with Gomez, concluding that the limitations period ended on June 17, 2019, and it denied Walker’s motion to dismiss. However, in April 2021, a division of this court published Morin v. ISS Facility Services, Inc., 2021 COA 55, 487 P.3d 1289, which had a similar fact pattern. In Morin, the division held that C.R.C.P. 6(a)(1)—which provides for the extension of a time period when the period ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday—does not extend a statutory limitations period that expires on a weekend. Morin, ¶¶ 4, 13, 15. Based on Morin, Walker filed a "renewed motion to dismiss." Gomez opposed the motion, asserting that section 2-4-108(2) extended the applicable statute of limitations and that Morin did not address that statute.

¶ 5 Relying on Morin, the district court granted the renewed motion and dismissed Gomez’s claims as untimely. Gomez moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Walker moved for, and was granted, attorney fees and costs. Gomez appeals.

II. Statute of Limitations

¶ 6 The parties agree that (1) Gomez’s claims were subject to the three-year statute of limitations prescribed by section 13-80-101(1)(n)(I); (2) the limitations period began to run on June 15, 2016, when the collision occurred; and (3) June 15, 2019—the end of the three-year period—was a Saturday. Thus, the only question before us is whether section 2-4-108(2), which generally acts to extend statutory time , periods that expire on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, applies to the statute of limitations in this case. We conclude that it does not.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

[2] ¶ 7 "We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action based on a statute of limitations defense." Williams v. Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 2015 COA 64, ¶ 3, 361 P.3d 1075. The issues raised in this appeal also concern statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 273 (Colo.. 1995).

[3–5] ¶ 8 In construing a statute, our primary task is to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent, which we do by first looking to the plain language of the statute. Elder v, Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d 694. We construe words and phrases according to their common usage unless they have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise. § 2-4-101, C.R.S. 2023; Ma v. People, 121 P.3d 205, 210 (Colo. 2005). In addition, we must construe the statute as a whole, giving its terms consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect, while avoiding an illogical or absurd result. Elder, ¶ 18. "If the statute is unambiguous, then we apply it as written and need not resort to other rules of statutory construction." Id.

B. Sections 2-4-108(2) and 13-80-101(1)

[6, 7] ¶ 9 As an initial matter, we agree with Gomez’s contention that Morin does not control, or even address, whether section 2-4-108(2) extends a statute of limitations period that expires on a weekend. While Morin concluded that similar language in C.R.C.P. 6(a)(1) did not extend a limitations period under similar facts, its holding was premised on express language limiting the applicability of C.R.C.P. 6(a)(1) to periods of time "prescribed or allowed by" the rules of civil procedure.² Morin, ¶ 15 (quoting C.R.C.P. 6(a)(1)). Morin did not consider the effect of section 2-4-108(2), which—unlike C.R.C.P. 6(a)(1)—specifically applies to statutory time periods.³

¶ 10 Sections 2-4-101 through 2-4-114, C.R.S. 2023, govern how the words and phrases of statutes are to be construed.

¶ 11 Section 2-4-108(2) provides as follows: "If the last day of any period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period is extended to include the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday." "Period" is defined as "a portion of time determined by some recurring phenomenon." Merriam- Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/MXF4- N7VT; see also Veith v. People, 2017 CO 19, ¶ 15, 390 P.3d 403 (noting that courts may consult recognized dictionaries to ascertain a term’s ordinary meaning). In the directly preceding sections, three different time periods are defined: a week, a month, and a year. §§ 2-4-105 to -107, C.R.S. 2023. A year is "a calendar year." § 2-4-107.

¶ 12 "Any" means "one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/J97F-NUD7. The plain meaning of "any period" is inclusive; it does not exclude a certain period. Therefore, the plain language of section 2-4- 108(2), in conjunction with the context of the immediately preceding sections, unambiguously declares that, if a period described in years (or any other recurring portion of time) ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period is extended to the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

¶ 13 Section 18-80-101(1) provides that certain tort actions, including those arising from car accidents, must be brought "within three years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter." Thus, section 18-80-101(1) describes a "period" of three years, which begins on the date the cause of action accrues and—under the definition of a "year" in section 2-4-107—ends on the third calendar anniversary of that date.

[8] ¶ 14 It is tempting to give effect to both statutes by simply applying the language of section 2-4-108(2) to extend Gomez’s three-year limitations period—which ended on a Saturday—to the next date that was not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. And if section 13-80-101(1) stated only that the claim must be brought "within three years after the cause of action accrues," it would be possible to harmonize the statutes in this manner. See People v. Steen, 2014 CO 9, ¶ 9, 318 P.3d 487 (a court is obligated to construe legislative acts to avoid inconsistency).

¶ 15 However, we must also give effect to the phrase "and not thereafter," Wolford v. Pinnacol Assurance, 107 P.3d 947, 951 (Colo. 2005) ("[W]e must interpret a statute to give effect to all its parts and avoid interpretations that render statutory provisions redundant or superfluous."). When read in conjunction with the rest of section 13-80-101(1), the plain meaning of these words is that the action cannot be filed after the three-year anniversary of the date the cause of action accrued. Harmonizing the statutes by applying section 2-4-108(2) to extend the three- year anniversary date either renders the phrase "and not thereafter" redundant to the phrase "within three years" or reads "and not thereafter" out of the statute entirely, Therefore, we conclude that the statutes cannot be harmonized and are in conflict.

[9] ¶ 16 "If giving effect to both statutes is not possible, the more specific provision prevails over a more general provision." Morin, ¶ 10; see also § 2-4-205, C.R.S. 2023. "A general provision, by definition, covers a larger area of the law. A specific provision, on the other hand, acts as an exception to that general provision, carving out a special niche from the general rules to accommodate a specific circumstance." Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. 2001).

¶ 17 Section 2-4-108(2) is a general provision because it facially applies to all time periods described by statute. In contrast, section 13-80-101 applies only to the types of actions identified in subsections (1)(a) through (1)(n) of that statute. Through the phrase "and not thereafter," section 13-80-101(1) acts as an exception to the general rule that statutory time periods are extended when they expire on a weekend or legal holiday. Cf. People v. Fransua, 2016 COA 79, ¶ 21, 457 P.3d 64 (describing section 2-4-108(1), regarding the computation of a period of days, as a "generic statute of general applicability" and concluding it must give way to a more specific statute regarding the calculation of a period of presentence confinement), off’d 2019 CO 96, 451 P.3d 1208.

[10, 11] ¶ 18 Even if we were unable to determine which statute is more specific, section 13-80-101(1) would prevail because if is more recent. Section 2-4-206, C.R.S. 2023, provides that "[i]f statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the general assembly are irreconcilable, the statute prevails which is latest...