Gonzales ex rel. A.G. v. Burley High Sch.

JORGE GONZALES on behalf of his minor child A.G.,TODD MERRELL, on behalf of his minor child A.M.;MANUEL MORALES and VERONICA MORALES on behalf of their minor child Z.M.;HENRY MUNOZ and MISTY MUNOZ on behalf of their minor child I.M.;ERASMO SALAZAR and ELLEN SALAZAR on behalf of their minor children C.S. and S.S.;ROBERT SANCHEZ and TIFFINY SANCHEZ on behalf of their minor child I.S.;SILVIA OCHOA on behalf of her minor child D.O.;SONIA RAMIREZ on behalf of her minor child V.R., Plaintiffs, v. BURLEY HIGH SCHOOL; CASSIA JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT 151;GALEN SMYER in his official and individual capacity;SANDRA MILLER in her official and individual capacity;LEVI POWER in his official and individual capacity; and DOES I-X, Defendants.

Case No. 4:18-cv-00092-DCN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

November 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Nontaxable Costs (Dkt. 46) and Motion to Supplement Attorneys' Fees (Dkt. 56). Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court will decide the motions without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B).

For the reasons outlined below, the Court finds good cause to GRANT in PART and DENY in PART Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Nontaxable Costs (Dkt. 46). The Court awards initial attorneys' fees of $359,841.88, and costs of $8,631.90. The Court also finds good cause to GRANT in PART and DENY in PART Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement Attorneys' Fees (Dkt. 56). The Court awards supplemental attorneys' fees of $19,918.75.

II. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is outlined in detail in the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Partial Summary in favor of Plaintiffs (Dkt. 37) and will not be repeated here. In brief, Plaintiffs brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of their First Amendment rights. The Court granted partial summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor, and the parties ultimately settled Plaintiffs' claims for damages.¹ Dkt. 37; Dkt. 45. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Dkt. 46. In their motion, Plaintiffs sought a total of $399,290.15 which included attorneys' fees of $381,973.00 and non-taxable costs of $17,317.15 ("initial fee request"). Dkt. 46-1, at 17-18. Defendants objected, arguing that—for various reasons—the amount of fees and costs should be significantly reduced. Dkt. 51. In their Reply,Plaintiffs voluntarily reduced the amount of attorneys' fees requested to $366,548.38 ("revised fee request") and the amount of costs requested to $11,181.90 ("revised cost request"). Dkt. 55. However, Defendants suggest Plaintiffs' fees should be much more substantially reduced. For instance, while Plaintiffs voluntarily reduced their attorneys' fees by over $15,000.00, Defendants suggest Plaintiffs' fees should be reduced by more than $100,000.00.² In addition, Defendants object to most of Plaintiffs' requested costs.

Plaintiffs also incurred fees subsequent to the fee calculation originally set forth in their initial Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and later submitted a Motion to Supplement Attorneys' Fees ("Motion to Supplement"). Dkt. 56. In their Motion to Supplement, Plaintiffs request an additional $20,904.75 in attorneys' fees ("supplemental fee request"). Dkt. 56, at 2. Defendants again object, arguing that the Court should exercise its discretion to reduce any "fees-on-fees" award and to disallow supplemental fees for non-attorney work performed by an attorney. Dkt. 57, at 3-4.

The motions have been fully briefed and are now ripe for review.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Generally speaking, each party to a lawsuit bears its own attorney's fees unless Congress has provided otherwise through statute. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of thecosts[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Section 1988(b) also provides the Court discretion to award "those out-of-pocket expenses that would normally be charged to a fee paying client." Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Congress enacted § 1988 specifically because it found that the private market for legal services failed to provide many victims of civil rights violations with effective access to judicial process." City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986). "In order to ensure that lawyers would be willing to represent persons with legitimate civil rights grievances, Congress determined that it would be necessary to compensate lawyers for all time reasonably expended on a case." Id. at 578.

Courts within the Ninth Circuit apply the "lodestar" approach to determine appropriate fee awards. Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr., LLC, 893 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2018). The lodestar amount is "calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." Id. at 1160 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). "The product of this computation—the 'lodestar figure'—is a 'presumptively reasonable fee' under 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013).³

The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that the lodestar amount is calculated by multiplying "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." Costa v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (alteration omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). In calculating the lodestar:

[D]istrict courts "have a duty to ensure that claims for attorneys' fees are reasonable," Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added), and a district court does not discharge that duty simply by taking at face value the word of the prevailing party's lawyer for the number of hours expended on the case. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993). Rather, a district court must "ensure that the winning attorneys have exercised 'billing judgment.'" Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998).

Vogel, 893 F.3d at 1160. Ultimately, the district court "must strike a balance between granting sufficient fees to attract qualified counsel to civil rights cases and avoiding a windfall to counsel." Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 111 (9t Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). "The way to do so is to compensate counsel at the prevailing rate in the community for similar work; no more, no less." Id.

The prevailing party has the burden of submitting evidence to establish the claimed rates and hours expended on the litigation are reasonable. Latta v. Otter, 2014 WL 7245631 at *2 (D. Idaho Dec. 19, 2014). "The party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracyand reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits." Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98.

With these principles in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiffs' fee request.

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this case and that they are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. Dkt. 51, at 2-3. Instead, for numerous reasons, Defendants challenge the amount of fees and costs Plaintiffs request.

A. Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Dkt. 46)

1. Reasonable Rate

Defendants first challenge the $225.00 hourly rate of one of Plaintiffs' attorneys—Angie Perkins—and also object to the rate of $140-$175 per hour charged by three of Plaintiffs' paralegals. Defendants suggest such rates are higher than the prevailing market rates in Boise, Idaho.⁴ Defendants also note that Plaintiffs did not provide an affidavit from an attorney or paralegal of comparable skill, experience, and reputation to establish the prevailing market rate—for either Ms. Perkins or for Plaintiffs' paralegals—in southern Idaho.

Reasonable hourly rates "are to be calculated according to the prevailing marketrates in the relevant community." Vargas v. Howell, 949 F.3d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). In determining a "reasonable hourly rate," "the critical inquiry in determining reasonableness is now generally recognized as the appropriate hourly rate." Blum, 465 U.S. at 886 n. 11. Conclusory affidavits as to what constitutes a reasonable rate, even if from other attorneys working in the same area of law, are insufficient to establish the prevailing market rate. See Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1998). Instead, the fee applicant must "submit satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Blum, 465 U.S., 895-96 n. 11.

a. Ms. Perkins

Defendants suggest Ms. Perkins' $225 hourly rate is unreasonable because Plaintiffs did not provide a sufficient affidavit declaring Ms. Perkins' rate was reasonable and comparable to other attorneys of similar experience and skill in Boise, Idaho. Defendants also argue that since Ms. Perkins has only been a licensed attorney for a little over three years, her market rate should be lower than comparably qualified attorneys in Boise. For example, another attorney who worked for Plaintiffs, Chris Brown, has been a licensed attorney for seven years, but also billed at a rate of $225 an hour. Defense counsel also notes that in a recent case, defense counsel was...