Gonzales v. Cal. Victim Comp. Bd.

316 Cal. Rptr. 3d 757

Joshua Zamora GONZALES, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.CALIFORNIA VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARD, Defendant and Respondent;

People of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

B323360

Court of Appeal,

Second District, Division 2.

Filed December 29, 2023

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCP04185)

The Law Offices of Jarrett Adams, Jarrett Adams, Lillian C. Gaither and Megan D. Baca for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Jodi L. Cleesattle, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Dean, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Andrew Huang, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Jessica C. Leal, Deputy Attorney General, for Real Party in Interest.

HOFFSTADT, J.

In California, inmates who are exonerated of their crimes may apply to an administrative board for compensation for the time they were erroneously imprisoned. (Pen. Code, § 4900 et seq.)¹ Here, an inmate convicted as the shooter in a gang-related drive-by shooting applied for such compensation after the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the Ninth Circuit) granted the inmate’s habeas corpus petition and overturned his convictions on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Under the pertinent statutes in effect in 2020, an inmate’s entitlement to compensation in this situation turned on his ability to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, his "factual innocence." (Former § 1485.55, subd. (b), Stats. 2019, ch. 473 (Sen. Bill No. 269), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020; former § 4903, subd. (a), Stats. 2019, ch. 473 (Sen. Bill No. 269), § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2020; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 644, subd. (d).)² In determining whether the inmate has carried this burden, the "factual findings and credibility determinations establishing the court’s basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus" are "binding" in the compensation proceeding before the board. (§§ 4903, subd. (b), 1485.5, subds. (c) & (d).) This appeal presents two questions. First, does the conclusion of a habeas court granting relief that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support an inmate’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt automatically establish that inmate’s factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence? Second, do the habeas court’s summary of the trial record as well as commentary on the relative strength or weakness of the evidence in that record—in the course of granting relief to the inmate—constitute "factual findings" that are "binding" in the subsequent administrative proceeding to award that inmate compensation? We hold that the answer to each question is "no." We further conclude that, even if there were "factual findings" in this case, the board treated them as binding. As a result, we agree with the trial court that the board’s denial of compensation to the exonerated inmate in this case does not warrant the issuance of a writ of administrative mandamus and accordingly affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The Crime

On a Saturday night in October 2008, three men standing on a street corner in a residential neighborhood down the block from a party were shot. The shooter fired from the backseat of a "black" or "dark-colored," newer model Cadillac with rims and three people riding inside. The shooting was gang-related: The men were "talking shit" to passersby, and the shooter in the Cadillac made the archetypical gang challenge-demanding to know, "Where you fools from?"—before opening fire. All three shooting victims survived their wounds.

No direct evidence tied Joshua Zamora Gonzales (Gonzales) to the shooting. No witness, including none of the victims, positively identified Gonzales as the shooter. One victim testified that Gonzales was not the shooter, but subsequently clarified that he did not see who shot him. A search of Gonzales’s home did not turn up any firearm or firearm paraphernalia. No one came forward to say Gonzales was involved. And Gonzales, in a post-arrest interview, denied being the shooter.

Thus, all evidence of Gonzales’s involvement in the shooting was circumstantial. He was present at the party. He wore a baseball cap sporting the Pittsburgh Pirates’ "P" logo signifying the Playboyz street gang, bragged to other partygoers that he was a member of the Playboyz gang who went by the moniker "Knuckles," and had also previously told police he was a member of that gang. The victims wore "L.A. gear" worn by one of the Playboyz’s rival gangs. Gonzales admitted to driving by the victims while in the backseat of a newer model Cadillac with rims and containing three people, although he claimed the Cadillac was "red" "like a fire truck" or "light red." Moments before the shooting, the victims "started talking shit" to Gonzales and Gonzales responded, "what’s up." Gonzales had two particles of gunshot residue on his right hand, although that residue—because the test was not conducted until 12 hours after the shooting and because Gonzales had washed his hands in the interim—was equally consistent with Gonzales touching a surface with gunshot residue as with Gonzales firing a gun. In his post-arrest interview, Gonzales also changed his story about being present at the location of the shooting and interacting with the shooting victims and repeatedly refused to answer questions for fear of being known as a "snitch."

II. Gonzales’s Prosecution and Conviction

The People charged Gonzales (in San Bernardino County) with three counts of attempted premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), and shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 12034). The People further alleged that Gonzales personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 12022.55), and committed the charged crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).

In December 2009, a jury convicted Gonzales of all charged crimes and found time the firearm and gang allegations.

In January 2010, the trial court sentenced Gonzales to prison for 86 years and eight months.

III. Review of Gonzales’s Convictions

A. Direct appeal

On direct appeal of his conviction, Gonzales challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, held in an unpublished opinion that circumstantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Gonzales was the shooter—namely, (1) a partygoer’s testimony that Gonzales was "dressed like a Playboyz gang member and associating with other gang members"; (2) Gonzales’s "admissions to the police that he attended the party, dressed as [the partygoer] described him, and that he was in a car, passing by a group of men on the street at the time of the shooting"; and (3) Gonzales’s "positive gunshot residue test."

(People v. Gonzales (June 3, 2011, E050175) 2011 WL 2164565 [nonpub. opn.].)

The California Supreme Court denied Gonzales’s petition for review.

B. Federal habeas corpus review³

1. District Court proceedings

Gonzales filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Among other claims, he argued that his convictions were not supported by substantial evidence. In a July 2013 order, the court rejected Gonzales’s claim, "find[ing] no defect in the state [appellate] court’s analysis and determination" regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. (Gonzales v. Gipson (July 19, 2013, ED CV 12-862-BRO (PLA)) 2013 WL 3789631.)

2. Ninth Circuit proceedings

Gonzales appealed the denial of his habeas petition to the Ninth Circuit.

In August 2016, a three-judge panel initially affirmed the denial in a 2-1 decision, with one judge dissenting. (Gonzales v. Gipson (9th Cir. 2016) 659 Fed.Appx. 400.)

Gonzales petitioned for rehearing, and the three-judge panel granted the petition and issued a new 2-1 decision in April 2017. (Gonzales v. Gipson (9th Cir. 2017) 687 Fed.Appx. 548.) In this decision (which was later modified), the two-judge majority ruled that "the evidence [was] constitutionally insufficient to support Gonzales’s convictions." The majority then offered six reasons for this conclusion, each of which summarized and/or made observations about the trial record:

• "First, no eyewitness testified that Gonzales was the shooter or could identify any of the occupants of the vehicle from which the shots were fired."

• "Second, testimony concerning Gonzales’s baseball cap and gang affiliation does not distinguish him from other people present on the night of the shooting.… No witness testified that the shooter wore a baseball cap that matched the one Gonzales wore that night. The evidence did not establish that a person known as ‘Knuckles’ was connected with the shooting, nor that the victims were shot to benefit the Playboyz gang specifically."

• "Third, witnesses’ descriptions of the car from which the shots were fired did not match descriptions of the car in which Gonzales claimed he was a passenger" because Gonzales "consistently stated" he was in a "light red Cadillac," while witnesses described a "black or dark colored" Cadillac. Also, Gonzales "repeatedly denied ever shooting a gun."

• "Fourth, although Gonzales stated during his police station interview that he was the rear passenger in a car that drove by some men on the street who were ‘talking shit’ and that he later heard gunshots, he did not clearly admit that he exchanged words with or motioned to anyone from the backseat of his friend’s light red Cadillac."

• "Fifth, the two particles of gunshot residue on Gonzales’s right...