Gonzales v. Cnty. Court of Arapahoe

477 P.3d 752

David GONZALES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.COUNTY COURT OF ARAPAHOE and the Honorable Cheryl Rowles-Stokes, Judge, Defendants-Appellants.

Court of Appeals No. 19CA0393

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division VII.

Announced July 9, 2020

Recht Kornfeld P.C., David M. Beller, Andrew E. Ho, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Emily Buckley, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Kotlarczyk, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants

Opinion by JUDGE BROWN

¶ 1 In this C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action, we consider whether a mandatory reporter's willful failure to report child abuse or neglect constitutes a continuing offense such that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a report is made or law enforcement discovers the failure to report.

¶ 2 Under section 19-3-304(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019 (the failure to report statute), any mandatory reporter

who has reasonable cause to know or suspect that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect ... shall immediately upon receiving such information report or cause a report to be made of such fact to the county department, the local law enforcement agency, or through the child abuse reporting hotline system ....

Any mandatory reporter "who willfully violates" the reporting requirement commits a class 3 misdemeanor. § 19-3-304(4).

¶ 3 But when does the statute of limitations begin to run on this misdemeanor offense? Is it triggered the moment the mandatory reporter willfully fails to immediately report the child abuse or neglect? Or is it tolled until a report is finally made or the failure to report is discovered?

¶ 4 In a related case, MacIntosh v. People , 2020 COA 105, ––– P.3d ––––, another division of this court holds that the plain language of section 19-3-304 dictates that willful failure to report is not a continuing offense, and that the statute of limitations begins to run when a mandatory reporter has reason to know or suspect child abuse or neglect but willfully fails to make an immediate report. We agree with the MacIntosh division's conclusion, albeit on slightly different grounds.

¶ 5 We do not agree that the plain language of the statute unambiguously and inexorably compels our holding; instead, after applying the appropriate rules of statutory construction and consulting legislative history, we simply cannot conclude that the General Assembly assuredly intended failure to report to be a continuing offense. In the absence of clear legislative intent, we must conclude that failure to report is not a continuing offense, and that the statute of limitations begins to run when a mandatory reporter has reason to know or suspect child abuse or neglect but willfully fails to make an immediate report.

¶ 6 Accordingly, we conclude the Arapahoe County Court and the Honorable Cheryl Rowles-Stokes (collectively, the County Court) erred by denying David Gonzales's motion to dismiss the charge of failure to report when the limitations period had expired before the charge was filed.

I. Background

¶ 7 The People allege that in April 2013, C.V., a female student at Prairie Middle School, told another student that when she was fourteen she had a sexual relationship with a teacher, Brian Vasquez. According to the People, the student's allegation was disclosed to the school's dean, but rather than report the abuse, the dean met with C.V. and asked her to reconsider her allegation given the consequences that it could have for Vasquez.

¶ 8 The dean then took C.V. to meet with Gonzales, the principal of Prairie Middle School. As a public school official, it is undisputed that Gonzales is a mandatory reporter under section 19-3-304(2)(l ). The People allege Gonzales questioned C.V., again stressing the consequences that her accusations would have for Vasquez.

¶ 9 Ultimately, C.V. retracted her claim. She was subject to disciplinary proceedings, after which she was suspended from school for purportedly falsifying an allegation against Vasquez. Gonzales never reported C.V.'s sexual assault allegation, as required by the failure to report statute.

¶ 10 In August 2017, police interviewed Vasquez regarding allegations of sexual abuse pertaining to a different student. Vasquez confessed to sexually abusing numerous students — including C.V. — starting in 2013.

¶ 11 In January 2018, after a grand jury hearing, Gonzales was indicted on one count of failure to report child abuse in violation of section 19-3-304(1)(a). At the time Gonzales was charged, the statutory limitations period for his alleged offense was eighteen months. § 16-5-401(1)(a), C.R.S. 2018.¹ Accordingly, Gonzales moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting that his prosecution was initiated after the limitations period had expired in October 2014.

¶ 12 The People countered that the duty to report is a continuing obligation, failure to meet that obligation is a continuing offense, and the statute of limitations was not triggered until law enforcement discovered the alleged nondisclosure in August 2017. The County Court denied Gonzales's motion, concluding that the General Assembly intended failure to report child abuse to be a continuing offense.

¶ 13 Gonzales challenged the County Court's order through a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action in the district court. In a detailed order, the district court concluded that failure to report is not a continuing offense and ordered the County Court to dismiss the criminal case.

¶ 14 The County Court appeals, contending that the district court erred by finding that Gonzales's prosecution was barred by the applicable statute of limitations because failure to report constitutes a continuing offense.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A. Rule 106(a)(4)

¶ 15 An original proceeding under C.R.C.P. 106 is a proper avenue for challenging the county court's jurisdiction to proceed on criminal charges. See Huang v. Cty. Court , 98 P.3d 924, 927 (Colo. App. 2004). This is in contrast to an appeal challenging a county court conviction or seeking review of the county court's rulings during the course of a criminal case properly before the county court, which must be pursued in the district court. See § 13-6-310(1), C.R.S. 2019; Crim. P. 37. And any further review of a district court's decision on appeal from the county court is solely via a petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court. § 13-6-310(4) ; Crim. P. 37(h) ; see also § 13-4-102(1)(f), C.R.S. 2019. But appellate review of the district court's decision in an original Rule 106 action is within our purview. § 13-4-102(1) ; see also Huang , 98 P.3d at 927.

¶ 16 In a proceeding under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), district court review of a county court's ruling is limited to whether the county court exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion when there is no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy otherwise provided by law. Huang , 98 P.3d at 928. The district court's review is based on the evidence in the record before the county court. City & Cty. of Denver v. Cty. Court , 37 P.3d 453, 455-56 (Colo. App. 2001). A county court abuses its discretion under Rule 106(a)(4) by misconstruing or misapplying the law. Roalstad v. City of Lafayette , 2015 COA 146, ¶ 13, 363 P.3d 790.

¶ 17 On appeal from a district court's decision in a Rule 106 action, we are in the same position as the district court, so we review the district court's decision de novo to assess whether the county court exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. Berges v. Cty. Court , 2016 COA 146, ¶ 6, 409 P.3d 592.

B. Statute of Limitations and Continuing Offenses

¶ 18 "The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions." Toussie v. United States , 397 U.S. 112, 114, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970). Criminal statutes of limitation are designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the facts have been obscured by the passage of time, to minimize the danger of punishment for acts in the far-distant past, and to encourage law enforcement to promptly investigate suspected criminal activity. Id. at 114-15, 90 S.Ct. 858. For these reasons, criminal statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in a favor of the defendant. Id. at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858.

¶ 19 A statute of limitations typically begins to run when the crime is complete. People v. Thoro Prods. Co. , 70 P.3d 1188, 1192 (Colo. 2003). In certain circumstances, however, a crime continues beyond the first moment when all its substantive elements are satisfied. Id. With a continuing offense, the statute of limitations does not begin to run so long as the illegal conduct continues. Id. at 1193.

¶ 20 Because there is a tension between the purpose of a statute of limitations and the continuing offense doctrine, the doctrine should only be applied in limited circumstances. Id. ; People v. Perez , 129 P.3d 1090, 1092 (Colo. App. 2005) ("There is a presumption against a crime being a continuing offense."). An offense should be considered continuing only if (1) "the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion" or (2) "the nature of the crime involved is such that [the legislature] must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one." Toussie , 397 U.S. at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858 ; see also Allman v. People , 2019 CO 78, ¶ 12, 451 P.3d 826 ; Thoro Prods. Co. , 70 P.3d at 1193.

¶ 21 Determining whether an offense is continuing is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Allman , ¶ 10.

¶ 22 When construing a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Nieto , 993 P.2d 493, 500 (Colo. 2000). To determine legislative intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute. Id. We read words and phrases in context and construe them literally according to...