Gonzales v. Columbia Hospital at Med. City Dallas

Page 570

207 F.Supp.2d 570

Vicki GONZALES, Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA HOSPITAL AT MEDICAL CITY DALLAS SUBSIDIARY, L.P. Defendant.

No. CIV.A.3:01-CV-1287-P.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

May 28, 2002.

John E. Wall, Jr., Attorney at Law, Laura Ellen Calhoun, Attorney at Law, Law Office of John E. Wall Jr., Dallas, for Vicki Gonzales, plaintiffs.

Sherri Turner Alexander, Attorney at Law, Matthew R Scott, Attorney at Law, Bell Nunnally & Martin, Dallas, for Columbia Hospital at Medical City Dallas Subsidiary LP, defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SOLIS, District Judge.

Now before the Court are the following:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint, with brief in support, filed December 3, 2001;

2. Defendant Medical City Dallas Hospital's Response to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Leave to Amend Her Federal Court Complaint, filed January 11, 2002; and

3. Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint, filed January 28, 2002.

After a thorough review of the parties' briefs and the applicable law, for the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint should be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Vicki Gonzales ("Plaintiff" or "Gonzales") filed this action against Defendant Medical City Dallas Hospital ("Medical City") on July 3, 2001, alleging discriminatory practices in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Pl.'s Orig. Compl. at 1-2. On July 31, 2001, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that Plaintiff's complaint failed to provide any specific factual support for her alleged ADA claims, and further failed to allege each element of her prima facie case. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss and Br. in Supp. at 1. Plaintiff subsequently moved for leave to file an amended complaint, focusing almost exclusively on curing the defects as highlighted by the Defendant's motion to dismiss. Medical City ultimately withdrew its objection to Gonzales' First Motion for leave, and the Court ordered that Plaintiff's First Amended Original Complaint be filed on September 12, 2001.

Plaintiff, after conducting early discovery, once again sought leave to amend her complaint, this time to add causes of action against Medical City under the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act ("ERISA") and for breach of contract. Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. to File Pl.'s Second Am. Orig. Compl. ("Pl.'s Br.") at 1. Specifically, Gonzales asserts in her Second Amended Original Complaint that she was an employee of Defendant until her termination in March 1996, when she was forced to resign her position as a charge nurse and signed a release. Pl.'s Second Am. Orig. Compl. at ¶¶ 8, 22. Plaintiff alleges that as a condition of this release Defendant agreed that she would remain eligible for rehire. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 22. However, Plaintiff claims, she was repeatedly denied rehire by Defendant after reapplying for various positions of employment in June 1999, July 1999 and September 1999. Id. at ¶ 10.

Based on the agreement signed at her termination regarding her eligibility for rehire, Gonzales now states that she had a reasonable expectation of returning to work and of being covered under the insurance benefit plan. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was a fiduciary under the insurance plan within the meaning of ERISA, and as such, was responsible for discharging its duties solely in the interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan. Id. at ¶ 23. Therefore, Gonzales seeks to add a claim for Defendant's breach of this duty when it refused to rehire her for pretextual reasons and with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of her rights and benefits under the insurance plan. Id. at ¶ 23. Moreover, Gonzales claims Medical City discriminated against her in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1140 when it refused to rehire her for previously exercising her rights under the employee benefit plan and for seeking healthcare benefits in connection with the treatment of her work related injuries. Id. at ¶ 24.

The second cause of action which Plaintiff seeks to add in her Second Amended Original Complaint is one for breach of the release contract she signed in connection with her termination in March of 1996. Id. at ¶ 25. More specifically, Gonzales argues that as a condition of this release Medical City agreed that she would remain eligible for rehire. Id. As she has reapplied for employment in jobs which she believed were available and for which she was qualified, it is Plaintiff's position that by refusing to rehire her Defendant has breached its obligation under the release agreement and she has suffered damages including lost wages and lost benefits as a result. Id.

Defendant argues that these additional claims for breach of contract and for ERISA violations brought by Plaintiff are patently frivolous and as such the Court should deny Plaintiff's second request for leave to amend. Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Second Mot. for Leave. ("Def.'s Resp.") at 2. These arguments shall be considered in turn.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard for Leave to Amend Complaint

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend a pleading "shall freely be granted when justice so requires." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). The decision to grant leave to amend lies within the discretion of the trial court. However, in the context of motions to amend pleadings, "discretion" may be a misleading term because rule 15(a) severely restricts the court's freedom due to the bias in favor of granting leave to amend. Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir.1981). The policy of the federal rules is to permit amendment to facilitate determination of claims on the merits and to prevent litigation from becoming a technical exercise in the fine points of pleading. Id. Thus, unless there exists a substantial reason for denying leave to amend, the district court should permit the filing of a proposed amendment. Id.

Nevertheless, the parties' ability to amend their pleadings is by no means unlimited. See In re Southmark, 88 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.1996); In re Circuit Breaker Litigation, 175 F.R.D. 547 (C.D.Cal.1997). In determining whether to grant leave to amend, the court may consider several factors, including undue delay or prejudice to the non-movant, bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and futility of amendment. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.

The Court may deny a motion to amend if it concludes that the proposed amendment would be futile. J.R. Stripling v. Jordan Production Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872-73 (5th Cir.2000). The Fifth Circuit has defined "futility" to mean that "the amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted" and has further held that the legal standard developed under Rule 12(b)(6) guides this analysis. Id. at 873. In this context, the Court may not deny the motion for leave to amend "unless it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court must render its decision taking the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and taking its allegations as true. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir.1996). Moreover, the Court limits its inquiry to whether plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support claims and does not address whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits. Johnson v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 199 (5th Cir.1994). Nonetheless, dismissal shall still be proper when "even the most sympathetic reading of [the] pleadings uncovers no theory and no facts that would subject the present defendants to liability." Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791-92 (5th Cir.1986).

II. Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim

Gonzales' Second Amended Original Complaint purports to advance a claim for breach of contract arising out of the "Compromise and Settlement Agreement" signed between the parties at the time of her resignation in March of 1996. App. Def.'s Br., Exh. A2. The language upon which Plaintiff relies essentially states:

"In consideration of the payment of ... Twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00), the sufficiency and receipt which is hereby acknowledged, has been tendered to the undersigned, Vicki Gonzalez (hereinafter `Recipient'), paid by Medical City Dallas Hospital (hereinafter `Company') and which Recipient acknowledges as reasonable and sufficient consideration ... Recipient does hereby release and forever discharge Company ... from any and all claims or causes of action of any kind whatsoever ... now existing or that might arise hereinafter, directly or indirectly attributable to any occurrence ... relat[ing] to any occurrences prior to the date of the signing of this Agreement which is March 7, 1996.

...

Recipient understands that her treating physician has provided documentation to Company stating that she is no longer capable of performing the essential functions of the job as a Registered Nurse; that Company has determined no reasonable accommodation exists as established by law and; therefore Recipient further understands, that she is no longer eligible for employment with Company.

As required by law, Medical City Dallas Hospital will offer an equal opportunity for re-employment to Recipient for any position which she applies and is capable of performing the mental and physical essential functions. Such equal opportunity for re-employment will be given without consideration of...