Gonzales v. Paxton

RAUL GONZALES, Plaintiff, v. KEN PAXTON, Defendant.

No. 3:20-CV-1616-L (BH)

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

October 8, 2021

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ^[1]

Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the case should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

Raul Gonzales (Plaintiff), a Texas prisoner, again sues the Attorney General of Texas (AG) to challenge the constitutionality of Texas's Sex Offender Registration Program (TSORP), codified at Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. (See docs. 3, 6.) In 1998, he was convicted of sexual assault of a child under the age of 17, triggering reporting obligations under TSORP. See https://inmate.tdcj.texas.gov/InmateSearch, search for Plaintiff. On February 28, 2020, he was convicted of failing to comply with those requirements and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment, which he is currently serving. (See id.) Insisting that he is proceeding under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Plaintiff “affirmatively pleads that he does not seek monetary relief of any kind ” but rather, a declaration that TSORP “violates the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to [him, by subjecting him to retroactive and increased punishment under Article 62.102.” (See doc. 6 at 3, 19.) He also seeks to be “released from his illegal restraint”^[2] and to have the AG order the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) to de-register and remove him from the sex offender central database. (See Id. at 3.)^[3]

II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING

Plaintiff is an inmate who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to “raise the right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere “labels and conclusions” nor “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” suffice to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id.

A duplicative in pauperis complaint that “seek[s] to relitigate claims which allege substantially the same facts arising from a common series of events which have already been unsuccessfully litigated by the IFP plaintiff” may be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915. Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969 (1989); see also Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of in pauperis prisoner complaint as duplicative of prior litigation and frivolous under §1915). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has also found that an in forma pauperis prisoner lawsuit which duplicates the allegations of another pending federal action by the same prisoner may be dismissed as “malicious.” Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Chambers v. Stalder, 999 F.2d 1580 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (Table, text on Westlaw) (quoting Pittman, 989 F.2d at 995); Humphrey v. Luna, 59 F.3d 1242 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (Table; text on Westlaw) (finding it is malicious for a pauper to file successive duplicative suits in forma pauperis) (citing Pittman, 980 F.2d at 995 (pending lawsuits) and Bailey, 846 F.2d at 1021 (previous lawsuits)). The addition of different defendants or new claims in the later filed action does not change the frivolous or duplicative nature of a case, and a court may properly dismiss it. See Bailey, 846 F.2d at 1020-21.

Here, Plaintiff filed this action against the AG immediately after the dismissal of a prior action against him, and two other defendants, based on the same facts and asserting the very same claims. This case is therefore subject to summary dismissal as malicious and duplicative. Alternatively, as discussed below, it is also potentially barred and subject to dismissal because it seeks relief against a defendant who is immune from suit.

III. SECTION 1983

Because he expressly invokes the PLRA and names the AG as a defendant, Plaintiff's claims are liberally construed as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).

A. Heck Bar

Plaintiff's claims appear to be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). It provides that a plaintiff who seeks to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, imprisonment or other unlawful action that renders a conviction or sentence invalid must first prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id. at 486-87. Heck applies to claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as those seeking damages. Shabazz v. Franklin, 380 F.Supp.2d 793, 805 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Here, a successful attack on the constitutionality of TSORP would necessarily implicate the invalidity of Plaintiff's failure-to-register conviction, and he does not allege that this conviction has been reversed, invalidated, or expunged. His claims are therefore not cognizable at this time. See Hall v. Attorney General of Texas, 266 F. App'x. 355, 356 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Further, because he is currently incarcerated for failure to register, Hall's constitutional challenge to the registration requirement also is an indirect challenge to his incarceration. Hall's claims are thus not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until he proves that the incarceration has been reversed or declared invalid.”) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). Any § 1983 claims challenging the validity of his conviction are “legally frivolous” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and should be dismissed “with prejudice to [] being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met.” Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Balisok, 520 U.S. at 649; Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1994); Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27-28 (5th Cir. 1994)).

Because the issues in this case are appropriate for early and final determination, however, the Court also considers whether the AG is immune from suit. See Patton v. Jefferson Correctional Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 462 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (when an action raises an issue of immunity, the court to the extent it is feasible to do so should determine that issue as early in the proceedings as possible); Smithback v. Cockrell, No. 3:01-CV-1658-M, 2002 WL 1268031, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2002) (accepting recommendation that “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks relief unavailable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or sues individuals or entities who are not proper parties under § 1983, it also seems appropriate to have an early determination of those issues”).

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which he sues the AG. Based on the course of proceedings, his complaint is liberally construed as asserting official-capacity claims only.^[4]

An official capacity claim is merely another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the individual defendant is an agent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). A lawsuit against the AG in his official capacity is treated as a lawsuit against the State of Texas. League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 899 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993) (dissent); Gallagher v. Paxton, No. 4:18-CV-575-ALM-CAN, 2019 WL 5390173, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2019), rec. accepted, 2019 WL 4267438 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2019) (citing Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165).

The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” “This withdrawal of jurisdiction effectively confers an immunity from suit.” P.R Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). Therefore, “an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own...