Gonzalez-Caratini v. Garcia-Padilla, No. CIV. 02-1016(RLA).

278 F.Supp.2d 189

Glorymir GONZALEZ-CARATINI, Plaintiff, v. Juan Carlos GARCIA-PADILLA, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. 02-1016(RLA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

August 6, 2003.

As Amended Nunc Pro Tunc August 27, 2003.

Francisco R. González-Colón, Esq., San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Johanna M. Emmanuelli-Huertas, Esq., Jorge Martínez-Luciano, Esq., Pedro Ortiz Alvarez Law Offices, Ponce, PR, María L. Santiago-De-Vidal, Esq., Department of Justice, Federal Litigation Division, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

AMENDED¹ ORDER IN THE MATTER OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ACOSTA, District Judge.

Plaintiff is former Coamo Local Director of ASCIFAL, a South-Central Consortium² composed of various municipalities³ organized for providing employment and training opportunities in their municipalities. She instituted this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming termination of her employment due to political patronage.

Defendants JUAN CARLOS-GARCIA PADILLA ("GARCIA-PADILLA"), MARTA ORTIZ (ORTIZ) and the MUNICIPALITY OF COAMO have moved for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Fed.R.Civ.P.

In essence, defendants contend that no action lies against the MUNICIPALITY OF COAMO or its mayor because plaintiff was not a municipal employee and the conduct alleged in the complaint took place prior to GARCIA-PADILLA being sworn in as mayor.⁴

The court having reviewed defendants' arguments as well as plaintiff's opposition thereto hereby rules as follows.

THE FACTS

The South-Central Consortium is an entity established under the Job Training Partnership Act ("JTPA") and currently operating under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 ("WIA") 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801- 2945. The purpose of WIA "is to provide workforce investment systems, that increase the employment, retention, and earnings of participants, and increase occupational skill attainment by participants, and, as a result, improve the quality of the workforce, [and] reduce welfare dependency. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 2811.

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2841 "one stop delivery systems" may be established as part of the program whereby the services provided in accordance with the statute are made available to participants in a single location. The Coamo Regional Office operates as a one-stop delivery system and is one of a number of these centers operating in the area served by the Consortium.

The Board of Mayors, composed of the mayors of each of the six municipalities included in the South-Central Region serves as the Local Board for the Consortium.

GARCIA-PADILLA is being sued both in his personal capacity and in his official capacity as the Mayor of Coamo. Codefendant MARTA ORTIZ, the current Coamo Consortium Coordinator is also being sued in her official and personal capacities.

According to the complaint plaintiff and codefendants belong to opposing political parties. Both GARCIA-PADILLA and ORTIZ are members of the NPP party which promotes statehood whereas plaintiff has been an active PDP supporter which favors Commonwealth status.

Plaintiff, who had been an aide to the former Coamo mayor—a PDP member— as well as PDP electoral commissioner in 2000, contends that she had been the victim of a discrediting crusade by the NPP during the campaign period for the November 2000 elections and that prior to his election GARCIA-PADILLA had vowed to get rid of her.

Plaintiff alleges that on December 4, 2000, prior to GARCIA-PADILLA being sworn as mayor, codefendant MARTA ORTIZ came to plaintiff's office "to get her out of the office, telling [plaintiff] that nobody wanted her, that the Mayor didn't want her, that there was no way that office could have two Directors at the same time and [ORTIZ] was there to be the new Director". Complaint ¶ 13

Plaintiff claims she became so distraught as a result of the aforementioned confrontation that she left work sick and subsequently had a miscarriage.

CARLOS E. TEXIDOR-GARCIA, Acting Human Resources Director of ASCIFAL notified plaintiff in writing "as terminated on January 9, 2001; and officially terminated on (sic) a written letter signed by DIMAS A. TORRES-SANCHEZ (Director of ASCIFAL) on January 24, 2001" explaining that she held a position of "trust". Complaint ¶ 5.

Plaintiff claims she was forced out of her position due to her political affiliation and beliefs and that GARCIA-PADILLA was the "moving force" behind codefendant ORTIZ's actions against her.

She further contends that GARCIA-PADILLA "approved and ratified" ORTIZ taking over the position of Coamo Local ASCIFAL Director after he was sworn in as mayor.

Plaintiff prays for reinstatement to the Local Director position as well as economic and punitive damages.

MOTION TO DISMISS/SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff having submitted two statements under penalty of perjury in support of her opposition, defendants' motion to dismiss was thus converted into a summary judgment request as provided for in Rule 12(b) Fed.R.Civ.P. Santiago v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 138 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1998).

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions. See Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-61 (1st Cir.2000). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record. DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997). A genuine issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual disputes to require a trial. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the governing law. Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1995).

In cases where the non-movant party bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite and competent evidence to rebut a motion for summary judgment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir.2001); Grant's Dairy v. Comm'r of Maine Dep't of Agric., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.2000), and cannot rely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation". Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 412 (1st Cir.2000); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

ISSUES

Defendants claim the Municipality of Coamo is not responsible for plaintiff's termination because she was an employee of the Consortium not a municipal employee. They further contend that the events charged in the complaint were not taken under color of state law because GARCIA-PADILLA had not yet officially taken office.

Thus, there are essentially two issues presented in defendants' motion to dismiss: (1) whether the mayor was acting in his capacity as such or as a member of the Board of Mayors when he purportedly caused plaintiff's termination and (2) whether the fact that GARCIA-PADILLA had not yet been sworn in was bereft of any legal authority.

SECTION 1983

The complaint charges violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which reads:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.

In order to prevail in a § 1983 claim plaintiff must bring forth evidence that (1) defendant acted "under color of state law" and (2) deprivation of a federally protected right. Rogan v. City of Boston, 267 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.2001); DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir.2001); Collins v. Nuzzo, 244 F.3d 246 (1st Cir. 2001); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.1999).

Mayor/Municipality

Municipal entities are deemed "persons" within the meaning of § 1983, Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) and are therefore, subject to liability for violations of this statute. However, municipal liability may not be based on respondeat superior principles. Rather, it is only when municipal employees are acting pursuant to a municipal "policy" or "custom" which results in a deprivation of federally protected rights that liability attaches. A municipal "policy" or "custom" may be established by evidence that the deprivations were the result of: (1) a formally adopted rule or policy, (2) a pattern of unconstitutional conduct which suggests a custom or usage, or (3) the acts or omissions of an officer with final policy-making authority. Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002); Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 30-31 (1st Cir.1997).

"[A]ctions of the Mayor constitute[] the official policy of the municipality". Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 867 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1989); Saldana-Sanchez. v. Lopez-Gerena, 256 F.3d 1, 9 n. 15 (1st Cir.2001). A suit against a mayor in his official capacity "is for all practical purposes solely against the Municipality." Andino-Pastrana v. Municipio De San Juan, 215 F.3d 179, 180 (1st Cir.2000). "[I]f there is a judgment against [the mayor] in his official capacity, it runs against [the municipality] itself." Saldana-Sanchez. v. Lopez-Gerena, 256 F.3d at 9.

Municipality v. Consortium

Defendants contend that it is the Board of Mayors in charge of the Consortium which determines its policies and not the Municipality. Specifically, they state that the Consortium and its governing board "are distinct and separate entities from the Municipality" and that "[t]he Municipality of Coamo and its officers had nothing to...